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Abstract
Douglas A. Akhimienmhonan
University of Saskatchewan
Microcredit, Income Assistance, and Households’ Time Allocation to Self-employment
Co supervisors: Dr. Murray E. Fulton and Dr. David Natcher
This study develops a model to explain why some households in the United States and
Canada opt for microcredit (MC) that seems to decrease their utilities in the short term.
Some microcredit participants allocate time to less-productive microenterprises rather
than engage in paid work. The role of sequential lending is examined in understand-
ing household participation in microcredit programs. Sequential lending means that a
household’s current use of microcredit gives it access to greater funds in the future.
Under a multi-period model, the effect of current use of microcredit on future utilities is
captured. To keep the analysis simple, households are assumed to live in two periods —
the present and the future. The model acknowledges that households are heterogeneous
with respect to their relative preference for income and leisure. Two types of households
are assumed. The type-1 household has a high relative preference for income: the type-2
household has a high relative preference for leisure.
Each household has a reservation utility, — the utility it would derive if it self-selected out
of the microcredit program. The reservation utility derives from leisure and paid earnings
(as well as from income assistance benefits in the case of income assistance recipients).
Each household also faces a utility from self-selecting into the microcredit program. The
microcredit is small, thus the current period utility from participating in the MC program
may be less than the current period reservation utility. But with sequential lending, a
current period participant will have access to a larger loan in the future and utility
with that loan may increase beyond the reservation utility. Each household self-selects
into the microcredit program only if the net present value of its anticipated utility with
microcredit exceeds the net present value of its reservation utility.
A household’s likelihood of self-selecting into the microcredit program is an increas-
ing function of its discount factor, its productivity in self-employment, and the size of
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future loans anticipated from current borrowing. On the other hand the likelihood of
self-selecting into the microcredit program is a decreasing function of the cost of borrow-
ing and the household’s wage rate in paid employment. One of the interesting results of
the model is that some households — in a bid to access the future loan — may obtain
microcredit in the current period and repay it without having invested it in a microen-
terprise.
The developed model is applied in explaining microcredit participation among income
assistance (IA) recipients. IA recipients facing a 100% earnings tax rate will not allocate
time to paid work because their entire earnings would be clawed back from the guar-
anteed benefit leaving no change in total income. If the household obtains microcredit
and allocates time to a microenterprise, its utility would decrease because leisure would
decrease and total income would not change under the 100% earnings tax rate. However,
in the future period, the household would get a larger loan by virtue of past participation
in the microcredit program. The loan could be large enough to generate profits beyond
the IA eligibility point, in which case the household would break away from IA, total
income would increase, and utility could increase to the point of offsetting any utility loss
incurred in the preceding period. Therefore, an IA recipient facing a 100% earnings tax
rate may obtain microcredit and allocate time to a microenterprise in order to access a
larger capital in future, in anticipation of breaking away from the IA program.
The analyses of time allocation among income assistance recipients produced a set of
equations for comparing between the marginal effects of income assistance and microcredit
on households incomes and utilities. This comparison is at the heart of ongoing proposals
to replace income assistance with microcredit in a bid to reduce public spending on IA
while encouraging IA recipients to work. Based on the marginal effects of IA and MC,
this study prescribes the minimum rates of substituting microcredit for income assistance
in order to ensure that affected households do not experience a short-fall in their incomes
and utilities. The prescribed minimum rate is a positive function of the earnings tax rate
in the prevailing IA program, and a negative function of the household’s preference for
leisure, as well as its marginal value product of capital.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Poverty and the alleviation of poverty have emerged as important public policy issues in
Canada and the United States during the 20th century (Lichter, 1997; Rank and Hirschl,
1999; Osberg, 2000; Finnie and Sweetman, 2003). Since the Great Depression in the
1930s, governments in both countries have introduced legislation to improve the economic
conditions of poor households. For instance, in 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt of the
United States commissioned the Federal Emergency Relief Administration to give both
cash relief and work relief to unemployed households so as to mitigate the effects of the
Depression (Hopkins, 1999).1 Two years later, U.S. Congress passed the Social Security
Act of 1935 which introduced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).2
The concern for poor households was re-emphasized by U.S. President Lyndon John-
son in his 1964 declaration of “war on poverty”. The declaration preceded the passage
by Congress, of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 to provide work, training, ed-
ucation, and technical assistance to young men and women from impoverished homes
(Boone, 1972; Andrews, 2001). Programs established under the Economic Opportunity
Act coexisted alongside the AFDC.
In Canada, attempts to fight poverty resulted in the Unemployment Assistance Act of
1956. Under the act, the federal government matched provincial benefit payment to em-
ployable persons who were unemployed (Osborne, 1985; Moscovitch, 1988). The act was
subsequently replaced in 1966 by the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP) which retained
the federal matching formula for income assistance spending by each province (Allen,
1993; Lemieux and Milligan, 2008; Barrett and Cragg, 1998; Hum and Simpson, 1993;
1Adoption of the relief program at the federal level followed a 1931 adoption of similar program by
the city of New York (Hopkins, 1999).
2Upon inception the AFDC was called the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) but was subsequently
renamed as Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
1
Chapter 1.
2001).
The Income Assistance (IA) policies of both the United States and Canada have since
undergone reforms to pave way for the present day IA programs (Greenberg, 2002; Brzo-
zowski, 2007; Caputo, 2009; Frech, 2009; LeMire, 2008; Kneebone and White, 2009). The
reforms have been driven, as well as accompanied by debates in political and academic
circles. Two major objections have been raised against the programs. The first is based
on their expenditure burden on society. The second is based on the disincentive for work
that is created by the payment of benefits to low-income households (Moffitt, 1992; Hum
and Simpson, 1993; 2001).
The present day IA program in the United States is known as Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF). As of March 2010, the TANF caseload stood at 1.83 million fam-
ilies covering 4.3 million recipients (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: Ad-
ministration for Children and Families). Canada’s IA caseload in March 2008 was 600,000
families covering 1.3 million recipients.3 Income Assistance programs are also known as
Income Support, Welfare, or Social Assistance, depending on the jurisdiction.
As a more recent alternative in the fight against poverty, microcredit has been intro-
duced in Canada and the United States. The introduction was inspired by the reported
success of microcredit programs as a measure to alleviate poverty in developing coun-
tries (Frankiewicz, 2001), and by a growing ideology of “Bootstrap Capitalism” (Servon,
1999).4 Bootstrap capitalists believe that low-income households, when provided with
capital can “pull themselves up by their bootstraps” — by becoming entrepreneurial and
self-sufficient — rather than rely on income assistance (Sherraden, 1991; Stoesz, 2007;
Isserles, 2003). Microcredit programs extend business loans to low-income households
who, for lack of collateral securities, are unable to access conventional sources of business
loans. The loans are often very small in size and require repayment in installments over
a specified period of time. Eligibility for the loans is based on a household’s ability to
demonstrate its intention to invest the credit in some income-generating activity.
The earliest microcredit programs in Canada and the United States were introduced in the
1980s and funded mainly by non-governmental organizations (Conlin, 1999; Frankiewicz,
2001; Pickering and Mushinski, 2001; Zephyr, 2004). The early programs targeted low-
income households with business loans of between $500 and $5,000. Their lending method-
3These figures were calculated from Social Assistance Statistical Report: 2008 (see HRSDC (2010)).
4Studies that have reported the success of microcredit programs in developing countries include
Khandker et al., 1998; Amin et al., 1998; Morduch, 1998; Zaman, 1999; McKernan, 2002; Chavan and
Ramakumar, 2002; and Mahmud, 2003. However, there are some dissenting voices regarding the impact
of these programs, particularly on the empowerment of women (Rahman, 1999; Isserles, 2003).
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ology was fashioned after the group lending model used in developing countries.5 Many of
the early programs in Canada and the United States were ultimately unsuccessful owing
partly to a small client base and a high rate of loan default, as well as the ineffectiveness
of the group lending model in the United States and Canada (Frankiewicz, 2001; Taub,
1998; Zephyr, 2004).
That notwithstanding, attempts at adapting microcredit programs to the United States
and Canada is still ongoing. Today, only a few MC programs use the group lending
technique while the vast majority deliver loans on an individual basis. Additionally, the
range of loan sizes offered by the program has increased, with some programs offering up
to $35,000. As of 2008, there were at least 263 MC programs in the United States alone.
The programs served a median of 200 and a mean of 416 borrowers. The total number
of loans disbursed was 9,191 with a total value of over 100 million dollars (Girardo and
Edgcomb, 2011; FIELD, 2010).
The demand for microcredit among low-income households in the United States and
Canada has been driven partly by IA reforms, including the tightening of work require-
ments for IA recipients (Edgcomb and Klein, 2005). Loprest (2001) estimates that 6.8% of
households who leave income assistance programs get self-employed in a microenterprise.
The number of participants in today’s microcredit programs is still considered small in
relation to the size of the potential market. Edgcomb and Klein (2005)estimate that the
potential market for microcredit in the United States is 10 million individuals, out of
which 140,000 are IA recipients who would become self-employed.
1.2 Problem Statement
Although microcredit programs have been introduced as a way of increasing the earnings
of the poor, little is known about the impact of these programs on the earnings of par-
ticipants in the United States and Canada. Available reports are mostly descriptive and
the majority have been commissioned by program practitioners rather than by indepen-
dent analysts (Klein et al., 2003; Clark and Kays, 1999; Himes and Servon, 1998; Black,
2004; Burrus, 2005; Frankiewicz, 2001; Wehrell, 2002). These studies have concluded that
households who participate in the MC program experience an increase in earnings.
Sanders (2002) is perhaps the only study of the impact of microcredit programs that
uses an experimental design including a control group. The paper compared the income
5Under the group lending model, prospective borrowers are required to form groups of four to eight
members who agree to be jointly liable for one another’s loan. Joint liability ensures a high repayment
rate for microcredit programs in developing countries (Ghatak, 2000; Stiglitz, 1990).
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growth of participants of seven U.S. microcredit programs with the income growth of
eligible nonparticipants over a four-year period (1991 to 1995). The paper concluded that
the microcredit programs do not seem to have a significant positive effect on the incomes
of participants. In a different study of U.S. microcredit participants, Spalter-Roth et al.
(1994) observed that low-income households combining wage work with self-employment
had lower per hour earnings from their microenterprises than they did from their wage
work.
A decrease in earnings has also been reported among some microcredit participants in
Canada. Citing an unpublished work by Eric Santor and Rafael Gomez who were then
PhD students at the University of Toronto, Frankiewicz, 2001 (P. 37) states, “Santor
and Gomez also expressed concern that, despite improvements in the average borrower’s
situation, Metrofund’s [microcredit] loans appeared to leave many borrowers worse off.
They found that roughly one-third of all borrowers reported lower profits and business
revenue after receiving a loan...”
The question of whether microcredit leads to increased earnings is a complex one. From
the interviews carried out early on in this research, it was learned that for a number of
the borrowers, the profits from their microenterprise were not sufficient to repay the loan
(for details on the interviews, see Chapter 3). Nevertheless, these borrowers were willing
to remain as participants in the microcredit program.
The traditional model of household time allocation between wage work and self-employment
does not explain the time allocation decisions of households for which microcredit partic-
ipation results in a decrease in earnings. The traditional model as developed by Becker
(1965) and later made popular by Gronau (1977) suggests that these households should
ex ante self-select out of the MC program and instead allocate time to the more pro-
ductive wage jobs. This is in contrast to the observations made of Vancity’s microcredit
borrowers.
Additionally, while existing theory suggests that IA recipients facing a 100% earnings tax
rate would allocate all their time to leisure (Moffitt, 1992; 2003; Danziger et al., 1981),
some such households have actually participated in microcredit programs, allocating time
to a microenterprise and having all their earnings clawed back from their IA benefits. The
interview sample of seven borrowers in Vancity’s microcredit program included three re-
spondents who were recipients of British Columbia’s IA program at the time of joining
the microcredit program. The BC Income Assistance (BCIA) program applies a 100%
earnings tax rate to the benefits payable to eligible recipients. Therefore, although mi-
crocredit participation could increase the earnings of the IA recipient, the effect on the
4
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household’s total income would be zero because the entire earnings are clawed back from
the IA benefit. Below is one respondent’s comment regarding the impact of participa-
tion in the microcredit program that, in her opinion, increased her earnings but did not
increase her total income.
....[my friends] think I am poor, I am wasting my time....because you know,
they say that I am still at the same spot that I was before. Same spot means;
I don’t have - I can’t travel, I don’t have maybe nice beautiful clothes, I don’t
have money. You know when somebody have money? And I work seven days
a week. You know what I am talking about, I am still living in the housing -
low rent. But everybody is different. At least I have to do something, I have
to work, I am not going to sit back and be on welfare [income assistance].
For the above quoted IA recipient, the work disincentive of a 100% earning tax rate
was not enough to discourage time allocation to a microenterprise as suggested by the
existing theory. A review of the loan application forms of thirty first-time applicants to
Vancity’s microcredit program revealed that eleven applicants where BCIA recipients.
Further, a review of 94 loan application forms of returning borrowers in the microcredit
program, revealed that 36 households were participants in the BC Income Assistance
(BCIA) program as well as self-employed on the microenterprise they had set up with an
earlier borrowed microcredit.
The gap between time allocation as observed among microcredit borrowers and time
allocation as suggested by the traditional model can be explained by the sequential lending
attribute of microcredit. Whereas the basic model of household time allocation to work
assumes a single-period utility maximization problem, the sequential lending attribute of
microcredit suggests that a multi-period analysis is more appropriate in understanding
households’ time allocation to microcredit. Under the sequential lending arrangement of
microcredit programs, a first time applicant is approved for only a small loan, which
upon successful repayment qualifies him or her for a larger loan (Servon and Bates,
1998). In addition, microcredit programs provide households with opportunities to build
good credit histories by successfully borrowing and repaying small loans. With such credit
histories, the households may in the future be able to access larger sums of business capital
from traditional sources of credit. A multi-period model would capture the future-period
effects of current-period participation in the microcredit program.
The objectives of this dissertation are, (1) to develop a two-period model in explaining
time allocation by households who are eligible for microcredit in the United States and
Canada, and (2) to apply the model in explaining self-selection into microcredit programs
5
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among income assistance recipients who face a 100% earnings tax rate on the IA pro-
gram. The effects of household-specific variables such as the relative preference for work,
microenterprise productivity, and time preference rate are considered. Also considered
are the effects of specific variables on the MC programs (such as the interest rates and
the size of the next loan that can be accessed by virtue of current participation). For
income assistance recipients, the effects of specific variables on the IA programs (such as
the amount of the basic benefits and the duration of assistance) are considered as well.
Resulting equations are used to compare the marginal effects of microcredit and income
assistance on household incomes, as well as utilities. The comparisons give estimates of
the minimum rate of substituting microcredit for income assistance without causing a
decrease in households’ total incomes and utility.
1.3 Organization of Thesis
This rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of
microcredit and income assistance programs in Canada and the United States. Chapter 3
presents data from Vancity’s microcredit program as evidence of strategic borrowing and
earnings decrease among microcredit participants. Chapter 4 develops a model of time
allocation to a microenterprise by a household who lives in a current as well as a future
period. The model is in two parts. The first part explores time allocation (and utility
maximization) in a given period conditional on the household having self-selected into
the microcredit program. The second part of the model considers the household’s decision
to self-select into the program as a problem of maximizing the net present value of its
current and future period utilities. Chapter 5 applies the model developed in chapter
4 in explaining self-selection into microcredit programs among IA recipients. In chapter
6, the equations produced in analyzing the time allocation response of IA recipients
are exploited in comparing the marginal effects of microcredit and income assistance
on household incomes and on utilities. Chapter 7 concludes and discusses the policy
implications of the findings.
6
Chapter 2
An Overview of Microcredit and Income Assistance
Programs in the United States and Canada
2.1 Microcredit Programs
At least 65 million borrowers have participated world wide since the introduction of mi-
crocredit programs in Bangladesh in 1976 (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005).
Interest in the programs has spread to other developing countries as well as to devel-
oped countries. In the words of a serving president of the World Bank, microcredit has
“brought the vibrancy of the market economy to the poorest villages and people of the
world...[and] allowed millions of individuals to work their way out of poverty with dignity”
(cited by Williams, 2004, p.146). The United Nations’ declaration of the year 2005 as the
“International Year of Microcredit” underscored the global recognition of the programs
in the fight against poverty. The euphoria about microcredit has not gone unnoticed in
the United States and Canada. Following is a brief discussion of the history and current
state of microcredit in the two countries.
2.1.1 Microcredit Programs in Canada
Canada’s first microcredit program was introduced by Calmeadow, a non profit organi-
zation headquartered in Toronto. Calmeadow was inspired by its partnership with micro-
credit organizations in the developing world to introduce the program to poor commu-
nities in Canada. In 1987, Calmeadow launched a pilot microcredit program, the Native
Self-employment Loan Program (NSELP) in Wikwemikong, Kettle Point, and Sachigo
Lake communities in Ontario (Frankiewicz, 2001). Following the success of the NSELP,
Calmeadow created the First Peoples Fund (FPF) in 1990, with an objective to deliver
microcredit to first nations communities across Canada.
Within the next four years, Calmeadow created three additional microcredit funds across
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Canada: Partnership Assistance for Rural Development (PARD) was launched in Shel-
bourne Nova Scotia in 1991, Peer Assisted Lending (PAL) in Vancouver BC in 1992, and
Metrofund in Toronto in 1994 (Frankiewicz, 2001). Between 1987 and 1999, the micro-
credit funds founded by Calmeadow across Canada delivered more than $4.6 million in
2,558 loans (Frankiewicz, 2001). The average loan size was $1,800.
The microcredit programs where initially designed after the peer lending model of the
Grameen bank. Borrowers were required to form groups of four to ten and to assume
responsibility for one another’s loan. Joint liability meant that no member of the group
would be able to access a next loan until the previous loans made to every member of the
given group had been repaid. The thinking was that such joint liability would provide
incentive for peer monitoring within the group and therefore ensure a low default rate on
the program. However, the peer lending model proved to be ineffective in Canada, much
like the experience with U.S. microcredit programs (Frankiewicz, 2001; Williams, 2004;
Taub, 1998; Zephyr, 2004). By 1998, Calmeadow had introduced individual lending to run
along side the group lending programs (Frankiewicz, 2001; Hudson and Wehrell, 2005).
The individual loans ranged from $1,000 to $15,000 and were approved for borrowers
with relatively higher net worth and larger businesses (Frankiewicz, 2001; Gomez and
Santor, 2003). In 1997, Calmeadow sold PAL to Vancity Credit Union and in 2000, it sold
Metrofund to Metro Credit Union. The sale of Metrofund marked the end of Calmeadow’s
involvement in microcredit programs in Canada.
Vancity Credit Union continues to operate its Peer Lending Program. In addition, the
awareness generated by Calmeadow’s microcredit initiatives had inspired other microcre-
dit programs across Canada. The Social Investment Organization and Riversdale Com-
munity Development Corporation reported that there were at least 60 microcredit funds
in Canada in 2003 (cited by Visano, 2008; P. 109). Some of these programs are still
in operation today. They include Yukon Micro Loan Program; GEODE Stepping Stone
Loan Program in Greater Sudbury; PARO Centre for Women’s Enterprise Program in
Northern Ontario; Newfoundland and Labrador Federation of Co-operatives Micro Loan
Program; Momentum Micro Business Loan Program in Calgary; St. John’s community
Loan Funds, as well as SEED Winnipeg.
The GEODE Stepping Stone program offers a maximum loan of $3,000. Loan sizes for Mo-
mentum as well as for St. John’s Community Loan Fund go to a maximum of $7,500. The
microcredit loan from SEED Winnipeg ranges from $1,000 to $10,000. The microcredit
programs of Vancity Credit Union, as well as the PARO Centre for Women’s Enterprise
give loans of between $500 and $5,000. Between 1995 and 2008, PARO served a total of
52 peer lending groups. Each group comprises of four to seven female borrowers. In 2008
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alone, PARO delivered a total of $239,500 in 136 loans to group members.1
Vancity’s Peer Lending Program is arguably the oldest microcredit program in the coun-
try. Data obtained in 2009 from the program revealed that it had delivered at least 434
loans to 245 households since 1997. Total outstanding loan as at July 2009 was $90,644.
Interest rate on the loans was mostly 5.25% for loans approved prior to 2008 and 6.25%
for more recent loans. Further details about the quantitative as well as qualitative data
from Vancity’s Peer Lending Program are presented in chapter 3.
Since 1998, the government of Canada, through Western Economic Diversification (WED),
has provided a total of at least $5 million to five credit unions for the expansion of micro
lending operations across the country. The credit unions are Assiniboine in Winnipeg,
Affinity in Saskatoon, Servus in Alberta, as well as Vancity and Coast Capital Savings
in Vancouver. WED-sponsored micro loan programs are based on the individual lending
model and give loans to a maximum of $35,000. Eligibility requirements include lack
of credit history and insufficient collateral to access the traditional sources of business
loans.
Most of today’s micro lending activities are undertaken by credit unions (Coyle, 2002;
McKillop et al., 2007; Strandberg and Plant, 2004; Hebb et al., 2006). The dominant
position of the credit unions may be regarded as arising from the non profitability of
microcredit lending operations, given that mainstream banks with the objective of profit
maximization do not engage in microcredit lending. Credit unions are financial coopera-
tives – owned by their own customers. Because cooperatives are vertically integrated into
the consumer sector, they have a different objective function than mainstream banks.
A cooperative has the objective of maximizing the welfare of its members (customers)
subject to the cooperative’s own profit being nonnegative (Fulton and Giannakas, 2001).
This different objective of cooperatives (as compared to that of mainstream banks) could
help explain why credit unions have a greater focus on micro credit.
Credit unions place more emphasis on community development, and have a different
governance structure than mainstream banks. Unlike in banks where voting power is
based on the investor’s share, credit unions allocate equal voting powers to all its members
(i.e., customers – including microcredit borrowers).
1Information in this paragraph is as obtained from the websites of the various programs.
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2.1.2 Microcredit Programs in the United States
The history of MC in the United States dates back to the early 1980s when Women’s
Self-employment Project (WSEP) established the Full Circle Fund to deliver microcredit
to low-income women in inner city Chicago (Zephyr, 2004; Conlin, 1999). The Full Circle
Fund used a group lending model. By the late 1980s there was an increase in the number of
U.S. microcredit programs. The Pine Ridge Indian Reservation in South Dakota became
home to the Lakota Fund MC program in 1986 (Pickering and Mushinski, 2001). Two
years later, MC was introduced in rural Arkansas by the Good Faith Fund and, in 1991,
ACCION established a microcredit program in New York (Taub, 1998; Zephyr, 2004;
Burrus, 2005).
ACCION has since spread its microcredit programs to several other U.S. locations and is
today the most prominent MC provider in the United States. By 2005, ACCION claimed
to have disbursed over 100 million dollars in microcredit to 10,000 microentrepreneurs
with a historical average loan size of $4,500 and a cumulative loan loss rate of 5% (Burrus,
2005).
By 2008, there were at least 263 microcredit programs in the United States with at
least 124 programs serving rural communities and at least 121 operating in urban areas
(Girardo and Edgcomb, 2011). The microcredit programs had faced a difficult learning
curve over the years in adapting their operations to the socio-economic environment of
the U. S. The early MC programs were mostly criticized for having high operational
costs and a high default rate. The problem was due in part to the ineffectiveness of the
group lending methodology in the United States, as in other developed economies where
social capital is inadequate (Taub, 1998; Zephyr, 2004). Most of the early MC programs
that experimented with group lending either had to convert to individual lending or
close entirely as unsustainable programs. Of the 198 MC programs recorded in 2003,
only 36 used group lending while the remainder operated as individual lending programs
(Edgcomb and Klein, 2005; Burrus, 2005). Similar to the trend in Canada, some U.S.
microcredit programs now provide loans up to a maximum of $35,000 (Girardo and
Edgcomb, 2011).2
Operational cost decreased over the years. While it cost the median MC program $2.33 to
loan $1 in 1998, the cost to loan a dollar in 2003 was estimated at $0.44 (Burrus, 2005).
However, MC programs are yet to reach a sustainable scale. The MC programs do not
generate enough revenues to cover the cost of operations. For instance as of 2004, cost
recovery by ACCION ranged between 20 and 63% across the different locations of its
2ACCION New Mexico lends microcredit of between $200 and $50,000 (Berger et al., 2007, p.6.)
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program (Painter and Tang, 2001; Burrus, 2005). This lack of self-sufficiency means MC
programs have continued to rely on external sources of funds to keep their operations
going. These sources include charitable donations from private and corporate groups,
community loan funds, governments, churches, as well as banks and other financial in-
stitutions. In 2008, only 16.3% of the total operating budget of U.S. MC programs came
from earned incomes — 28% came from private donors and 39% came from government
(Girardo and Edgcomb, 2011).
Practitioners believe the number of households that have so far been served by U.S.
microcredit programs represents only a tiny fraction of the potential market. There were
at least 13.1 million microenterprises in the United States as of the year 2001 (Edgcomb
and Klein, 2005; Burrus, 2005). Of this number, between 6 million and 10.8 million were
reported to have difficulty accessing traditional sources of business loans. Additionally,
Edgcomb and Klein (2005) estimate that there are about 140,000 households among
welfare (income assistance) recipients who would like to become self-employed. In all, only
a total of 114,000 IA recipients and non-recipients were reached by the entire network of
U.S. microcredit programs in the year 2000 (Edgcomb and Klein, 2005).
2.1.3 Essential Features of Microcredit Programs in the United States and
Canada
Business Training
In both the United States and Canada, a common feature among microcredit programs is
their provision of business training for borrowers (Conlin, 1999; Loxley, 2003; Hudson and
Wehrell, 2005; Edgcomb and Klein, 2005; Girardo and Edgcomb, 2011). In some cases,
the training is provided directly by the MC program. In other cases, the MC program
forms partnerships with other community development agencies to which they refer their
microcredit borrowers for business training (Burrus, 2005; Cameron, 2007). Borrowers
are trained on simple bookkeeping, business planning, and marketing. Some microcredit
programs make completion of a business training program mandatory for borrowers.
Justification for providing business training for microcredit borrowers draws from the
belief that the socio-economic circumstances of low-income households does not arise
from the lack of credit alone, but also perhaps from the lack of requisite knowledge and
skill to successfully manage a business (Servon and Bates, 1998; CSEHub, 2009). By
providing business training for borrowers, microcredit programs attempt to maximize
borrower successes with the loans. Business training however imposes additional costs on
the microcredit programs (Hudson and Wehrell, 2005).
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Periodic Repayment Schedules
Microcredit programs issue their loans with a repayment term of between four months
and four years depending on the size of the loan (Servon and Bates, 1998; Pollinger et al.,
2007). The largest loans carry the longest repayment terms. Over the term, repayment
is required in multiple installments. Repayment typically begins in the first month from
the date on which the loan was disbursed and continues every month until the entire
loan is repaid. Some programs require borrowers to make the repayments in biweekly
installments (Hung, 2006). By requiring periodic repayment of the loans, microcredit
programs are able to detect delinquent borrowers early and to reach out to the borrower
to avoid default (Williams, 2004; Morduch, 1999).
Sequential Lending
Microcredit programs typically approve loans in stages. A first-time borrower may get
only the minimum amount on the program. Upon successful repayment of the first loan,
the borrower may be approved for a next loan of a higher amount (Servon and Bates,
1998). The number of loan stages on the program, as well as the incremental amount
of each successive loan stage, varies with the program. Vancity Peer Lending Program,
for instance, typically approves $1,000 to $2,000 for a first-time borrower while returning
borrowers get up to $3,000 or $4,000. A fifth-time borrower on the program typically gets
the maximum amount of $5,000. Additionally, those who have successfully participated
in the peer lending program may apply to the WED-sponsored micro loan program where
they could eventually get up to $35,000.
By adopting a sequential lending model, the microcredit programs reduce the risk of loan
loss to delinquent borrowers. The borrower’s repayment performance with the smaller
loans on the program helps the program determine its credit worthiness for larger loans
(Morduch, 1999).
2.1.4 Program Impact
Available reports indicate aspects of program impact on households that may be desirable
from both a private and a social perspective. Microcredit programs target low-income
households that are unable to access the conventional sources of loans due to a poor
or nonexistent credit history (Frankiewicz, 2001; Vancity, 2005). Participation in the
microcredit program offers such households the opportunity to build a good credit history
to ease their future access to larger business loans.
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Microcredit programs have also been reported to promote income assistance recipients’
transition to work (Wehrell, 2002; Clark and Kays, 1999; Sanders, 2002; Klein et al.,
2003). Some studies report that poor households who use microcredit programs are the
most credit worthy among the poor compared to those on income assistance who are
the least credit worthy (Light and Pham, 1998; Schreiner, 1999). Some IA recipients are
believed to shy away from participation in microcredit programs because the IA policies
produce a disincentive for self-employment (Schreiner, 1999; Klein et al., 2003). Those
who use the MC program have been reported to experience an increase in earnings and
therefore a decrease in reliance on IA programs (Wehrell, 2002; Clark and Kays, 1999;
Sanders, 2002; Klein et al., 2003).
2.2 Income Assistance Programs
The objective of modern IA programs is to provide financial assistance to low-income
households to enable them meet their basic needs (Barrett and Cragg, 1998). Under the
programs, eligible households receive monthly (or bimonthly) benefits. Eligibility is based
on an ongoing assessment of resources available to an applicant household.
In both Canada and the United States, income assistance (popularly known as welfare in
the United States) is one of the many programs under a broader social safety net. Some
of the other programs in Canada’s social safety net are Employment Insurance, Health
Care, Child Tax Benefits, Disability Assistance and Old Age Security. Programs in the
U.S. safety net include Medicaid, Food Stamps, Earned Income Tax Credit, Housing
Assistance and Unemployment Insurance. These other programs within the safety net
either deliver benefits in kind, e.g. health and housing, or they are tied to a specific
group, e.g. the disabled or the aged (Blank and Hanratty, 1993; Bitler et al., 2010).
What distinguishes income assistance from these other programs is that IA benefit is in
cash, rather than in kind, and is meant to guarantee a minimum income to all who lack
sufficient earnings. Some recipients of income assistance may also be eligible for one or
more of the other programs in each country’s safety net (Danziger et al., 1981; Frech,
2009). This section focuses on income assistance programs in line with the goals of this
dissertation.
2.2.1 Income Assistance Programs in Canada
In terms of expenditures, IA is the fourth largest social transfer program in Canada
(INAC, 2007). The beginning of income assistance in Canada was delayed by a long
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period of disagreement between the federal and provincial levels of government. In 1935
(during the period of economic depression), Prime Minister R. B. Bennett attempted to
introduce an income assistance program through an Employment and Social Insurance
Act. The proposal was opposed by provinces because the federal government had no
powers to enact such an act. In 1945, the federal government made another attempt at
income assistance through its Green Book proposal. Funding arrangements between the
federal and provincial government became an issue of contention and a reason for the
failure of the proposal (Moscovitch, 1988).
The high unemployment rate of 1953 – 1954, motivated another round of discussions
which ultimately culminated in the Unemployment Assistance Act of 1956 (Osborne,
1985; Moscovitch, 1988). The act required the federal government to reimburse half of
each province’s benefit payment to employable persons who were unemployed. No ceiling
was placed on individual benefits or on federal expenditures. The unemployment assis-
tance act was a categorical welfare legislation as it was specific to persons categorized as
“unemployed employables.”
In 1966, Canada’s government introduced a universal welfare legislation — the Canada
Assistance Plan (CAP) — covering income assistance payments to “unemployed employ-
ables” as well as payments to other categories of persons such as the disabled and the
aged (Allen, 1993). CAP replaced the Unemployment Assistance Act as well as earlier
social transfer acts such as the Disabled Persons Allowance Act of 1954 and the Old
Age Assistance Act of 1951. Under the CAP, the federal and provincial government were
each responsible for 50% of IA spending in each province (Lemieux and Milligan, 2008;
Barrett and Cragg, 1998). Households’ eligibility was completely based on needs, with
broad guidelines set by the federal government, and with provinces having no powers
to restrict benefits to households based on work requirements or length of residency in
their jurisdiction. The 100% matching grant of CAP meant that federal funding grew
without limits in consonance with provincial spending, which escalated over the next two
decades due to an increase in welfare caseloads. Barrett and Cragg (1998) report that
the number of IA recipients in Canada grew from 1.2 million to 2.7 million while total
federal-provincial per capita expenditure increased from $106 to $268 (in 1992 dollars)
over the 1970 to 1992 period.3
The increase in the IA caseload was blamed partly on the recessions in 1974–75, 1981–82,
and 1990–92 (Barrett and Cragg, 1998; Kneebone and White, 2009). However, the years
of economic growth that followed the recessions did not result in a significant decline in
3The number of recipients represented 5.7% and 9.5% of Canada’s population in 1970 and 1992
respectively.
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the caseloads (Barrett and Cragg, 1998; Kneebone and White, 2009). The increase in IA
expenditures gave impetus for change in the IA policy of Canada. In 1990, the federal
government put a 5% limit on the annual increase in its CAP funding for the three richest
provinces, Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia. The federal governments action was
an attempt to curtail its escalating expenditure on IA.
In 1996, CAP was replaced by the Canadian Health and Social Transfer (CHST) plan,
which effectively ended the federal government’s cost commitment to income assistance.
The CHST was a federal transfer payment provided to provinces and territories as a
block funding for health care, post-secondary education, income assistance, and other
social services (Kneebone and White, 2009; INAC, 2007).4 The removal of the federal
government’s cost commitment to IA was accompanied by the granting of greater au-
tonomy to the provinces to set their own program rules and standards (INAC, 2007).
Therefore, the provinces were able to freeze benefits, tighten the conditions for eligi-
bility, and introduce work requirements in an attempt to minimize program spending
(Brzozowski, 2007; Kneebone and White, 2009).
Following these reforms, the income assistance caseloads in each of the provinces has been
on the decline from a peak in the mid-1990s.5 The total number of IA recipients across
the different provinces and territories in Canada decreased from an estimated 2.2 million
in 1997, to 1.3 million in 2008 (HRSDC, 2010).
Provincial autonomy meant that provincial policies developed independently from one an-
other and IA programs today vary across the provinces. Therefore, the income assistance
programs are referred to by different names in the different provinces and territories in the
country. For instance while the program is known as Social Assistance in Prince Edward,
New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, and Yukon, it is called Income Support in Nunavut as
well as in Newfoundland and Labrador.
The programs differ in their rules of eligibility, their basic benefits, as well as the fraction
of earnings an IA recipient is allowed to keep (the earnings exemption). The basic benefit
is the guaranteed benefit a household would be eligible to receive if it had no income from
any other source. The earnings exemption rule defines an implicit tax rate by which the
basic benefit is reduced as the recipient’s earnings increase. In the province of Ontario,
50% of the monthly earnings of an IA recipient with no disability is clawed back from the
guaranteed benefit. The corresponding tax rate for Nova Scotia and British Columbia is
4The CHST plan was replaced in 2004 by the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) plan which provided
funds for health care and the Canada Social Transfer (CST) plan which gave block funding for post-
secondary education, income assistance, and other social services.
5Unlike in other jurisdictions, the number of IA recipients has actually been on the rise in Nunavut,
from 8,100 in 2001 to 15,523 in 2008.
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Table 2.1:
Monthly Basic Benefits for Employable Single Adults and Lone Parents on Canada’s Provincial and
Territorial IA Programs
Province/Territory Program Name Monthly Basic Benefit ($)
Single Adult Lone Parent
(One Child)
Newfoundland & Labrador Income Support 674 1,040
Prince Edward Social Assistance 555 945
Nova Scotia Employment Support
and Income Assistance
510 780
New Brunswick Social Assistance 294 809
Quebec Last-Resort
Financial Assistance
589 709
Ontario Ontario Works 573 911
Manitoba Employment and
Income Assistance
505 803
Saskatchewan Social Assistance 693 1,024
Alberta Alberta Works-
Income Support
583 889
British Columbia Employment and Assistance 610 946
Yukon Social Assistance 1,240 1,612
North West Territories Income Assistance 1,412 1,744
Nunavut Income Support 3,621 3,893
Source: National Council of Welfare Reports: Welfare Income 2009, Vol. 129, Winter 2010
70% and 100% respectively. The IA program in Manitoba allows recipients to keep the
first $200 of earnings while 70% of the remainder is clawed back from the guaranteed
benefit (HRSDC, 2010). Table 2.1 shows the monthly basic benefit for an employable
single adult and an employable lone parent with one child across the provincial and
territorial IA programs in Canada.6
6The programs typically pay higher amounts of basic benefit to IA recipients with more children as
well as to those who are considered unemployable due to disabilities.
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2.2.2 Income Assistance Programs in the United States
Income Assistance in the United States is commonly referred to as Welfare. Beginning
in 1935 during the Great Depression, the federal government of the United States has
funded welfare program for low-income families. Between 1935 and 1996, the govern-
ment’s commitment to welfare was through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program. The AFDC was originally called the Aid to Dependent Children and
aimed to provide benefits for needy dependent children. Under the initial arrangement,
participating states where required to pay benefits to dependent children aged 15 and
younger, while the federal government reimbursed the states for one-third of the benefit
payment to each eligible child. The federal government’s reimbursement was capped at
$6 for each first child and $4 for each additional child in the family. This meant states
could get one-third of their benefit payment reimbursed as long as the benefits did not
exceed $18 for the first child and $12 for each additional child. Total reimbursement to
each state was however not capped and therefore federal expenditure grew without limits
as states’ welfare caseloads increased.
In 1961, the AFDC program was expanded to also pay benefit to any unemployed parents
of the needy dependent children (Hoynes, 1996). It was again expanded in 1962, to pay for
a second parent in a family with an unemployed or incapacitated parent and the program
was renamed as AFDC. By 1965, the federal government increased its reimbursement of
states’ benefits from one-third to one-half. The next three decades were to witness a rapid
growth in welfare caseloads as well as in public expenditure on the program. The number
of families on the AFDC program increased from 800,000 in 1960 to 3.7 million in 1985
(Moffitt, 1992). Public spending on the program increased from $1.7 billion in 1965 to
$12.8 billion in 1981 (Danziger et al., 1981). In 1995, public expenditure on welfare benefits
reached $22 billion. This amount was comprised of benefit payments alone and did not
include the administrative cost of the programs (Zedlewski and Giannarelli, 1997).
The growth in welfare caseloads and spending was accompanied by public outcry against
the programs (Gueron, 1993; Handler, 1995; Dickerson, 1999). The AFDC was believed to
depress work incentives among recipients. First, the disincentive for work was influenced
by the earnings tax rate on the program. Upon inception in 1935, the program had
applied a 100% tax rate on the earnings of eligible families. The tax rate was lowered to
67% in 1967, and again increased back to 100% in 1981 (Moffitt, 2003). Second, eligible
households were deemed entitled for benefits as long as their resources fell below their
officially approved needs. The program placed no limit on the duration of receipt of
benefits and required no work efforts from families. Therefore, a welfare class arose and
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comprised of households with perpetual dependence on welfare (AuClaire, 1979;Duncan
et al., 1988).
By 1993, some states had started to receive waivers from federal welfare rules. The waivers
gave them the autonomy to enforce strict work requirements on welfare recipients. At
about the same time, the country started to witness a rapid macroeconomic growth and
many welfare recipients took up jobs and dropped out of the welfare caseload. Therefore,
after having reached a peak of 5.1 million families in 1994, the U.S. welfare caseload
started on its current long-term decline (Grogger, 2004; Frech, 2009). AFDC caseloads
decreased nationwide by an average of 18% between 1993 and 1996, and the decrease was
as much as 40% in some states (Ziliak et al., 2000).
In 1996, the administration of President Bill Clinton made a wholesale reform of U.S.
welfare policy. The reform was brought about by the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) which was passed by Congress in August
1996 (Caputo, 2009). The law abolished the AFDC and replaced it with the Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program. TANF was a block grant of $16.5 billion
per year which the federal government gave to states toward benefit payments to needy
families. In contrast to the AFDC program under which the duration of assistance had
no limit, the new policy placed a five year (60 month) lifetime limit on the payment of
benefits to a recipient.
To be eligible for the TANF grant, each state was required to satisfy a maintenance of
effort (MOE) obligation. The MOE obligation required that states continued to spend
at least 75% or 80% of their 1994 (AFDC) expenditure on welfare (Peterson, 2002).
Additionally, states were required to meet specified work participation rates by welfare
recipients. At least 50% of recipients in a single-parent household must work for no
fewer than 35 hours per week while at least 90% of recipients in a two-parent household
must work for no fewer than 55 hours total per week. States that did not meet the
MOE obligation were to be liable for penalties including the denial of the TANF grant
(Greenberg, 2002; LeMire, 2008). The 1996 welfare reform was reauthorized in 2002, and
has been sustained to date.
The work requirement that was introduced with the reform, as well as the robust economic
growth of 1994 to 2001, helped to sustain the decreasing trend in welfare caseloads that
started two years before the reform. As of 2008, the number of families receiving the
TANF benefit was only 1.6 million (Frech, 2009). The reforms occurred concurrently
with economic growth, and economists have been engaged in a debate as to how much
of the observed decrease in historic welfare caseloads is due to economic growth and
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how much is due to welfare reform (Ziliak et al., 2000; Grogger, 2004; Bell, 2001; Ribar,
2005).
Because TANF is a block grant, the federal government allows each state to set the
guaranteed benefit levels and earnings tax rate on their respective programs. Therefore,
both the benefit levels and tax rates differ across the states. In 2009, the maximum
monthly guaranteed benefit for a family of three on TANF funded programs ranged from
$170 for Mississippi to $923 for Alaska (Frech, 2009). Earnings tax rate on the programs
mostly falls between 50% and 75%. A few states have tax rates as high as 100% while a
few others have zero tax rate (Moffitt, 2003).
2.3 Summary
Income Assistance caseloads have declined in both the United States and Canada after
having reached a peak in the mid 1990s. The decline in IA caseloads has been attributed
to policy reforms as well as to macroeconomic growth. The policy reforms discouraged
dependence on IA at the same time as macroeconomic growth made it easier for former
IA recipients to find jobs.
Microcredit was introduced into both countries a few years before the IA caseloads started
to decline. The number of MC programs in both countries has increased alongside the
decline in IA caseloads. The MC programs target IA recipients as well as non-recipients
who need microcredit to become self-employed on a microenterprise. Available reviews
suggest that the impact of MC programs on household income is mixed. Some house-
holds are observed to experience a loss in income as a result of time allocation to a
microenterprise.
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Sequential Borrowing and Earnings Changes among
Vancity’s Microcredit Participants
3.1 Introduction
The preceding chapters highlighted sequential lending as an essential component of mi-
crocredit programs. Additionally, the preceding discussions noted that some households
have experienced a decrease in their earnings upon self-selection into a microcredit pro-
gram. This chapter presents qualitative and quantitative evidence of sequential borrowing
among participants in Vancity’s microcredit program. The chapter also presents evidence
of a decrease in earnings relative to the pre-participation period in some of the house-
holds.
The qualitative data was obtained from interviews carried out in November 2008 with
seven borrowers on Vancity’s Microcredit Program. The interviews represented the first
phase of this dissertation. The purpose of the interviews was to gain first hand informa-
tion about the experiences of microcredit users, with a view to identifying a researchable
question. The respondents were determined with the help of Vancity Credit Union. The
credit union provided the contact information of borrowers who had indicated their con-
sent to be interviewed. Out of twelve borrowers who provided contact information, only
seven eventually made themselves available for interview. The respondent determination
and interview methods were approved by the Behavioural Research Ethics Board of the
University of Saskatchewan in July 2008.
The respondents included three men and four women. One of the respondents had been
on the microcredit program for ten years and had borrowed a total of five loans totaling
$20,000. The remaining six respondents had between one and three years of participation
in the program and had borrowed between one and three loans. Cumulative loan use
among these six respondents ranged from $1,000 to $6,000.
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The interviews were conducted privately with each respondent. Five respondents had the
interviews in their homes, while the remaining two were interviewed in a restaurant. Each
interview was semi-structured, lasting for at least 90 minutes. The interview questions
elicited respondent discussion of their motivation for taking the loan, what the loans were
used for, how the loans had affected their household incomes, and how the borrowers
felt about the peer lending technique used by the program. The oral interviews were
transcribed and analyzed to identify issues that resonated across the respondents.
Additionally, quantitative data was obtained in August 2009 from Vancity’s electronic
records, as well as from the paper application forms completed by households in applying
for the microcredit loans. As of August 2009, at least 456 microcredit applications have
been made by at least 245 households since the program’s inception in 1997. Only 22 of
these applications were declined, while the rest were approved. Below is a discussion of
the qualitative and quantitative data from the program.
3.2 Information from Interviewed Borrowers
The data collected from the interviews shed light on a number of issues such as the
use to which the loans were put, the impact of the loans on borrowers’ incomes, the
sources of funds for repayment, the incentive for repayment, and the ineffectiveness of
the group-lending model.
3.2.1 Use of the Microcredit Loans
Four respondents reported starting up a microenterprise with their loans. Two other
respondents reported using their loans to expand an already existing microenterprise.
The remaining respondent reported consuming the loan due to previously unforeseen
circumstances. For the six respondents who reported investing their loans, the nature
of investment included the purchase of fabrics, sewing machines, computers, cameras,
video recorders, packaging materials, and labeling machines. Their microenterprises were
completely owned and managed by the borrowers themselves. None of the respondents
had an employee.
3.2.2 Preference for Microcredit Relative to other Sources of Credit
Microcredit is sometimes regarded as being one of the alternative sources of credit for
households that have no credit history. While credit cards and payday loans are believed
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to be alternative means by which such households may build a credit history, interview
respondents indicated their preference for microcredit. Five of them narrated the difficult
experience they had in applying for a credit card. One respondent reported having to
make a security deposit of $300 before being granted a credit card of the same amount.
Another reported being asked to provide a guarantor with a good credit standing so as
to be approved for a credit card of $1,000. This respondent’s refusal to get a guarantor
as requested is understood from the following quote;
....Except for credit card which I don’t want to do. I don’t want anybody to
go and sign for me. The problem is my privacy, confidentiality, self respect,
and so on.... I am a very independent person. I like to be self reliant. Although
if really pushed to the corner sometimes I can do things like that, but I don’t
want to do it now. I want to try this [microcredit] first and see what happens.
For the four respondents who eventually succeeded in getting a credit card, they also
reported not using the cards because they are more expensive than microcredit. The
reported interest rates on their credit cards ranged from 9% - 19.5%.1
3.2.3 Impact of Microcredit on Borrower Income
Only three of the respondents reported an increase in income as a result of having invested
the loans, while the remaining four claimed that the loan had not had a positive impact
on their household incomes. Among the four respondents with no income increase, was
the one who had consumed her loan. One respondent specifically reported a decrease in
household earnings as a result of participating in the microcredit program.
3.2.4 Sequential Borrowing
Among the borrowers who reported making no profit from investing the loan, this negative
result was blamed on the smallness of their microcredit investment, as can be understood
from the following comments from a respondent with a $1,000 loan.
It is not enough, but you know the program just say $1,000. We try to push
for $2,000 at least but she [the program manager] doesn’t agree and the people
[i.e., the program staff] doesn’t agree but we try. If the person is good for six
or four months he repay the money, maybe they can give instead $2,000 or
$3,000.
1Vancity’s microcredit loans carry an interest rate of between 5.25% and 6.25%.
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The above comment indicates that some borrowers obtain the maximum amount that is
offered to them by the program, which depends on the borrower’s history of participation,
and which may be insufficient as a profitable investment. This viewpoint was restated in
the following comment from another respondent in explaining the reason for borrowing
only $1,000 from the program.
Because, they won’t give you more than that. They want to know if you pay
on time, if you are a good customer or not — because you are making a credit
[history] from that $1,000, you are making credit [history] yourself. If you
didn’t pay it off — because some people they don’t pay it off, some people
they don’t pay on time, this is all credit [history] — so next time, they won’t
give you any money because your credit [history] is not good, you don’t pay
on time. That’s why they give you $1,000 [at] first. As long as they know that
you are good, you pay on time, you don’t have any late payment, they trust
you and then [next time], they give you more.
For this respondent, the goal was to someday be able to acquire a loan for the purchase of
a business truck. Therefore, apart from revealing that a borrower may be willing to obtain
a loan that is too small for profitable investment, the interviews also provided a clue as to
why such willingness may occur — the loan is only the smallest in the sequence of loans
that can be obtained by the borrower, and access to the larger and more profitable loans
in the sequence is possible only after a smaller loan has been borrowed and repaid.
The sequence of loans extends beyond those offered by the microcredit program. The
interviews revealed that households that have acquired a good credit history as a result
of their microcredit participation may transition from taking microcredit to taking larger
loans from traditional sources. For instance, one borrower who had used up to three loans
on the microcredit program commented:
My loan payments I have, my plan was like pay all these with Vancity, and
get the line of credit.
Another borrower who had also used up to three microcredit loans commented:
I think that when I finish paying this loan, I will be okay. Like I think if I
talked to Vancity, they would give me the line of credit.
Therefore, sequential borrowing may be thought of as a household’s movement through
the different loan stages within the microcredit program, as well as movement from the
microcredit program to outside sources of larger loans for which credit scores are re-
quired.
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3.2.5 Sources of Funds for Repayment
Only three respondents reported repaying the loans from their microenterprise profits.
Three respondents reported obtaining their repayment fund from some paid employment
as their microenterprise was not profitable enough to meet their repayment obligations.
For one respondent, the repayment fund came from some income assistance benefit. Ad-
ditionally, one of the respondents reported having met his first four repayment schedules
from the loan itself.
3.2.6 Incentive for Repayment
Six respondents (including the one who had consumed the loan), reported being up to
date with their loan repayment schedules. One respondent was delinquent at the time
of interview. The respondents reported repaying the loans either for the psychological
benefits, or for access to a next loan.
Six respondents sounded very enthusiastic about maintaining the trust that Vancity
Credit Union had in them. There was a general feeling of gratitude about the credit
union offering them a loan when they had a bad credit history or when no other institu-
tion would have considered them credit worthy. They felt that fulfilling their repayment
obligation was one way to express such gratitude.
Four respondents were desirous of moving up to the next loan to enable them expand
their microenterprises. They understood that a next-loan application could be made only
after they repaid the current loan and that any default or delinquency with the current
loan would jeopardize their chances of being able to access the next loan. Four respon-
dents reported having repaid their first loans before the due dates and having applied
immediately for a second loan.
3.2.7 Ineffectiveness of the Group Lending Technique
Vancity’s microcredit program uses a group-lending technique. Prospective borrowers are
required to belong to a group of three to seven members in order to be eligible for micro-
credit. Members agree to be jointly liable for one another’s loans. Access to a next loan
by any individual is supposed to be granted only after the loans made to every member
of the individual’s group has been repaid. The essence of the group lending technique
is to ensure a high repayment rate on the program. Like the microcredit programs in
developing countries, joint liability is supposed to provide an incentive for prospective
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group members to screen only credit worthy individuals into their groups. Joint liability
is also supposed to induce group members to monitor one another against delinquencies
and defaults.
However, interview findings indicate that the group lending technique is ineffective among
borrowers of Vancity’s microcredit program. The seven respondents were drawn from six
groups. Two respondents belonged to the same group while each of the remaining five
was a member of a different group. The respondents believed that the group lending
technique did not motivate repayment among borrowers as prospective borrowers do not
screen one another before group formation. Additionally, the respondents reported that
group members did not monitor one another to ensure repayment of the loans.
Group Formation: As reported by the respondents, each of the six groups they represent
was formed in one of three ways — self-formed, facilitated or imposed.
Self-formed: Two groups were self-formed by their members. One of these was com-
prised of three members, while the other had four members. For this formation process,
the first potential borrower to learn about the program identified another potential bor-
rower of his or her choice, usually a friend, and the two in turn looked out for other
potential borrowers with whom to form a borrowing group. The group of at least three
members then approach the credit union for loans.
Facilitated: For one of the six groups represented in the interview sample, formation
was facilitated by a loan officer. The respondent reported that members of this group
had signified interest in the program, but could not get a group together because they
knew no one who was interested in the program. A loan officer introduced the interested
borrowers and allowed them to get to know one another and to decide whether or not
they wanted to form a group. This group had a membership of three individuals, with a
culturally heterogeneous background.
Imposed: Group membership was imposed for three of the groups represented in the
interview sample. Vancity Credit Union had modified its peer lending model to include
an animator, — a contract staff member who shared a similar cultural background with
most of the borrowers he or she was assigned to work with. The animator liaised between
the borrowers in a given group, as well as between the group and the bank. At the
time of the interviews, the program had two animators, — one Aboriginal working with
groups of Aboriginal borrowers, and another African working with groups of African
immigrants. Respondents reported that the animator called for a meeting with existing
members of a particular group, requesting them to admit a certain individual into the
group. The existing members accept and sign the loan application form of the newest
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member without any hesitation. The three imposed groups represented in the interview
sample were African. Nonetheless, respondents reported that members speak different
native languages, have different educational backgrounds and in some cases different
cultural/religious orientations.
Non-monitoring among Group Members: At least three respondents reported not
attending any group meetings since joining the group. Respondents also reported being
unaware of who their group members were or the number of borrowers in their group.
Therefore, the respondents reported that they did not monitor one another against delin-
quencies and defaults. Six respondents believed the microcredit program does not take
joint liability seriously and that their access to a next loan was not tied to the repayment
performance of group members.
3.2.8 Microcredit Participation by Income Assistance Recipients
The interview revealed that some income assistance recipients also participate in mi-
crocredit programs. Three of the seven respondents reported being income assistance
recipients at the time of joining the microcredit program. Of these three, two eventu-
ally relinquished IA after some period of microcredit participation — the two were no
longer IA recipients as of the date of the interviews. The respondents reported facing a
100% earnings tax rate from the IA program. They reported to have self-selected into the
MC program out of a desire to generate their own income and break away from income
assistance.
3.3 Quantitative Evidence for Sequential Borrowing
Quantitative data from borrowers’ loan application forms constitutes 417 observations
from 245 households. A household typically makes a first loan application on an initial
date, and then returns at a later date to apply for a next loan. Approval of a next-loan
application is contingent upon successful repayment of the previous loan. Table 3.1 gives
a brief summary of the quantitative data for households whose loan applications were
approved between 1997 and July 2009.2 The differences in sample size (n) with respect
to each variable is due to missing data.
As of the date of data collection, the number of loans that had been obtained by each
household ranged from one to five. Out of 417 approved applications for which data is
available, 223 where for first-time borrowers, 123 where for returning borrowers applying
2Data is generally unavailable for households whose applications were declined.
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Table 3.1:
Descriptive Statistics from Vancity’s Microcredit Program
Application Type 1st
loan
2nd
loan
3rd
loan
4th
loan
5th
loan
sample
size n
Number of approved applications 223 123 36 23 12 417
Mean value of approved loan ($) 1,470 2,330 3,314 4,164 3,909 412
Mean monthly earnings of applicants ($) 1,093 2,367 2,294 2,741 - 126
Mean monthly incomes of applicants ($) 1,700 2,366 2,586 2,989 - 96
Mean age of applicants 37 38 41 40 49 179
Applicants’ mean years of
participation
0 1.1 2.8 4.3 5 181
All earnings, incomes, and loans are in 2002 Canadian dollars. The real amounts of incomes, earnings,
and loans were derived from nominal values using Statistics Canada’s CPI for Vancouver (CANSIM; Table
v41695228, Vancouver, British Columbia [59933]).
for a second loan, while 36, 23, and 12 applications were for a third, fourth and fifth loan
respectively. The mean value (in 2002 dollars) of the first loan was $1,470, the mean value
of the second loan was $2,330, while the mean values of the third, fourth, and fifth loans
was $3,314, $4,164, and $3,909 respectively.
Except for the mean value of the fifth loan, these figures suggest an increase in loan size
along the sequence of loans. Between the first and second loan, the average approved
amount increased by $860. Between the second and third loan the average amount in-
creased by $984, while the average amount increased by $850 between the third and fourth
loan. The slight decrease ($255) in mean approved amount between the fourth and fifth
loan cannot be easily explained without additional information. Of the twelve borrowers
of a fifth loan in the sample, only five (representing 42% of the sample) were approved for
the maximum amount ($5,000) that the program offers to fifth-time borrowers. The data
shows that borrowers generally avail themselves of the maximum loan they can obtain
from the program. In all cases, the amount requested by an applicant was greater than,
or equal to, what they were eventually approved for.
Table 3.1 suggests that first-time borrowers wishing to continue in the program typically
return for a second loan about one year after borrowing the first. The table also shows
that it takes an average of five years for households to move through the sequence of
microcredit loans to the fifth loan.
As shown in table 3.1, the mean values of households’ earnings differ from the mean
values of their incomes. The differences are due to unearned incomes including income
assistance benefits, child tax benefits, and child support. The mean monthly earnings (in
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2002 dollars) range from $1,093 for first time applicants (i.e., those who have not used
any loans from the program) to $2,741 for fourth time applicants (that is those who have
used three loans from the program).
Table 3.1 suggests a high rate of attrition from the program as only about 55% of first-
time applicants return for a second loan and only about 16% return for a third loan.3
Discussions with the program staff, as well as the interviewed borrowers already cited
above, revealed that some of the participants who drop out of the program may have
transitioned to other sources of credit upon developing sufficient credit scores from their
microcredit participation. These other sources of credit include in-store credit cards,
overdrafts, and lines of credit.
3.3.1 Changes in Household Earnings Relative to Pre-participation Peri-
ods
The quantitative data shows evidence of a decrease in earnings among some households
that self-selected into the microcredit program. Within the data, earnings before partici-
pation is reported by households on their first loan application form. Earnings reported in
subsequent loan applications (at which time at least one previous loan has been used and
repaid), represents household earnings after a period of microcredit use. The change in
each participant’s earnings was estimated as the difference in reported earnings between
its first and its most recent loan application.
Figure 3.1 plots the change in each participant’s monthly earnings against the number of
loans it had obtained from the MC program. The plot is comprised of 52 participants for
whom the required data is available. Each of the 52 households had obtained at least one
loan, and at most four loans, from the MC program. The real changes in their monthly
earnings ranged from -$1,560 to $3,630.
Among households that had used only one loan from the program, the figure shows an
earnings decrease for three households relative to their pre-participation periods. These
households had each borrowed a first loan in the range of $907 to $943, and each experi-
enced an earnings decrease of between $25 and $1,040. Figure 3.1 also shows an earnings
decrease for three households among those that used two loans from the program. Each of
the three households had borrowed an average of $1,028 for the first loan and an average
of $2,700 for the second loan. Their reported monthly earnings after having used the two
loans were between $100 and $1,560 less than their pre-participation levels. The graph
3The number of approved applications has been regarded here as a good estimate of the number of
returnees because, as stated earlier, only 22 out of 456 applications were declined, thereby suggesting a
loan approval rate of almost 100%.
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Change in Earnings ($)
Number of Loans Obtained
Figure 3.1: Amounts Borrowed and Changes in Household Earnings
includes only five households that had used more than two loans with all five earning
above their pre-participation levels.
There is reason to suspect that the reported change in earnings is a function of household
earnings before participation. Among the households that had obtained only one or two
loans, those with the largest increase in earnings were more likely to be households with
the smallest pre-participation earnings. On the other hand, households with a decrease
in earnings were more likely to be those with the highest pre-participation earnings.4 It
is plausible that households which were previously under-employed or unemployed (i.e.,
little or no earnings), experience an increase in earnings when they obtain microcredit and
invest some time in self-employment. It is also plausible that households that were fully
employed on a wage job experience an earnings decrease when they obtain microcredit
and re-allocate some time to a lower paying self-employment.
Care has to be taken in concluding that the observed changes in income are the result
of participation in the microcredit program. To have confidence that the impact of the
program is being measured would require an analysis of the counterfactual. Such would
require a comparison of the changes in earnings of participants with the changes in earn-
ings of nonparticipants that have similar household characteristics as the participants
(Ravallion, 1991; Mustafa et al., 1996; Yaron et al., 1997 and Zaman, 1999).
4The average of pre-participation monthly earnings was $660 for six borrowers with the largest increase
in earnings among those who used only one or two loans from the program. On the other hand, the average
of pre-participation monthly earnings was $1,500 for the six borrowers whose earnings decreased.
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3.4 Summary
This chapter has presented data from Vancity’s microcredit program to support the claims
that households engaged in sequential borrowing may experience a decrease in earnings
upon obtaining small loans. Additionally, data from the program suggests that the group
lending technique is ineffective in motivating repayment, and that a borrower’s repayment
of the loans is driven by psychological factors as well as a desire to maintain the good
credit record required to be eligible for sequential borrowing.
The finding that some households are willing to participate in microcredit programs at
the expense of some earnings stands contrary to what could have been expected by con-
ventional wisdom. The basic model of household time allocation to work suggests that a
household which is faced with two alternatives would always allocate time to the more
productive alternative. Having evolved before the advent of microcredit, the basic model
did not contemplate the role of the sequential borrowing attribute of microcredit. There-
fore, the next chapter develops a theoretical model of time allocation among households
that are eligible for microcredit.
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Microcredit and Households’ Time Allocation to Self-
employment
4.1 Introduction
The widely acclaimed success of microcredit (MC) programs in developing countries has
prompted their introduction into developed countries.1 The earliest MC programs in
the United States and Canada were introduced in the late 1980s and funded mainly
by nongovernmental organizations. These programs were considered unsuccessful owing
partly to a small client base and to a high rate of loan default (Frankiewicz, 2001; Taub,
1998). That notwithstanding, attempts at adapting MC programs to the United States
and Canada are still ongoing.
Critics believe the success stories of microcredit in developing countries will be difficult
to replicate in the United States and Canada (Taub, 1998; Zephyr, 2004; Williams, 2004).
Their arguments include that the group lending technique used to guarantee a high repay-
ment rate of the collateral-free loans is not adaptable to developed countries where social
ties between prospective group members are relatively weak. Also, unlike in the develop-
ing world where poor households have no form of social support, low-income households
in the United States and Canada are protected by government income assistance policies.
The work disincentive from income assistance implies such households may not be will-
ing to take up microcredit. Additionally, it is argued that the microcredit is small and
that microenterprises lack the capacity to compete in developed economies where large
businesses dominate. Besides, there is a relative availability of alternative paid work for
1Empirical studies of the programs in developing countries have concluded that they improve house-
hold incomes (Khandker et al., 1998; Zaman, 1999; McKernan, 2002; Chavan and Ramakumar, 2002), re-
duce household vulnerability (Morduch, 1998; Zaman, 1999) and promote women’s empowerment (Amin
et al., 1998; Mahmud, 2003). However, there are some dissenting voices regarding the impact of these
programs, particularly on the empowerment of women (Rahman, 1999; Isserles, 2003).
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would-be beneficiaries of U.S. and Canada’s MC programs. The demand for microcre-
dit is low partly because many households are better off working as employees than as
microentrepreneurs.
In an empirical analysis of U.S. MC programs, Sanders (2002) concluded that low-income
households made no significant gain from participating in the programs. Spalter-Roth
et al. (1994) observed low-income households combining wage work with self-employment
had lower per hour earnings from their microenterprises than they did from wage work.
Further, microenterprises — like every other business — have to cope with uncertainties,
so risk-averse, low-income households may prefer to remain in a wage job in which the
monthly paycheck is guaranteed. It is therefore not immediately clear why some house-
holds participate in the MC programs in the United States and Canada.
This chapter presents two models for explaining households’ time allocation to microcre-
dit. The first — a single-period model — draws from the existing theory of household time
allocation to work as developed by Robbins (1930), Becker (1965), and Gronau (1977).
A household’s time allocation is influenced by its degree of risk aversion, its relative
preference for leisure, as well as by the amount of capital available from the microcredit
program. However, the single-period model only explains time allocation conditional on
the household having self-selected into the MC program. It does not explain a household’s
decision to self-select into an MC program that would cause a short-fall in its current
income.
This decision is explained by a two-period model, which shows that the demand for MC
in the United States and Canada is due partly to the sequential-lending characteristic of
most of the programs. Sequential lending means that a household’s current-period use
of microcredit gives it access to greater funds in a future period. Microcredit programs
provide households with an opportunity to build a good credit history by successfully
borrowing and repaying small loans. With a good credit history, the households may
in the future be able to access a large sum of business capital from traditional sources
of credit. Thus, under the two-period model, the effect of current-time allocation on a
household’s stream of future utilities is captured. The implication on current demand for
microcredit is explored.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews relevant literature on
household time allocation. Section 4.3 presents the single-period model of household time
allocation. Drawing from existing theory, it begins with a household’s utility maximization
decision under time allocation between leisure and wage work alone. Microcredit is then
introduced and the household’s time allocation between leisure, wage work, and self-
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employment in a microenterprise is considered. Next, the marginal effect of capital as well
as the effect of risk aversion on time allocation is considered. Section 4.4 introduces the
concept of sequential lending. It includes a discussion of some qualitative evidences of the
influence of sequential lending on households’ self-selection into the MC program. Section
4.5 introduces a two-period model in which current-time allocation affects household
incomes in the current, as well as the future period. Section 4.6 discusses the model
implications and concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
Economists have traditionally been interested in households’ allocation of time between
market work and leisure (Robbins, 1930). Since the article by Becker (1965), it has been
known that Robbins’ concept of leisure includes time spent on home work. Becker explains
that apart from being utility maximizers, households are also producers. They combine
the inputs of home time and market goods (from market work) in the production of utility-
satisfying commodities such as sleep, seeing a movie, or baby sitting. The time inputs in
producing these commodities have a cost which is forgone income from not allocating the
home time to market work. Hence, the household seeks to minimize the time cost in the
production of utility-maximizing commodities. In this formulation, households are both
producing units and consumers.
However,, Becker’s formulation did not explicitly disentangle the use of home time in home
production (pure home work) from its use in consumption (pure leisure). Gronau (1977),
p. 1100 explains this omission as partly due to the “practical difficulties in distinguishing
between the two, given the number of borderline cases (e.g., is playing with a child leisure
or work at home?)” The article distinguishes between home work and leisure by defining
home work as “something one would rather have somebody else do for one (if the cost were
low enough), while it would be almost impossible to enjoy leisure through a surrogate”
(p. 1104). Hence, home work is seen as a close substitute for market work. By aggregating
home production into a single commodity and assuming diminishing marginal return to
time, Gronau shows that a pre-condition for an interior solution is equality of marginal
product between the market sector and the home sector. In such an interior solution,
time allocation to home work reduces as the wages from market work increase. Gronau
also highlights the importance of household heterogeneity in time allocation. The model
demonstrates how households with a high preference for leisure may choose to allocate
time to only home production and leisure, with no time allocation to market work. In such
a solution, the marginal product of time at home exceeds the market wage rate.
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This theoretical exposition of a households’ time allocation between leisure, home produc-
tion, and wage work has been applied in the analysis of off-farm labour supply of farmers.
Mishra and Goodwin (1997) conclude that the farm household’s time allocation to off-
farm work (wage work) is an increasing function of the perceived riskiness of farm pro-
duction. Time allocation to farm work decreases with increased risk. Olfert et al. (1993),
as well as Sumner (1982), conclude education increases the likelihood that a farm house-
hold also has wage work. Their finding that some households have both self-employment
and wage work is consistent with Gronau’s description of household with interior solution
— allocating time to both housework and wage work (as well as leisure). Fuller (1990)
described a household’s simultaneous participation in self-employment and wage work as
pluriactivity, thereby distinguishing it from part-time self-employment.
The role of capital in households’ time allocation has so far been missing from these
analyses. The introduction of microcredit programs in the United States and Canada
means some households traditionally engaged in wage work may consider allocating some
time to a microenterprise. Households who obtain the loan often invest it in home-based
microenterprises (Schreiner, 1999; Frankiewicz, 2001; Gomez and Santor, 2003). The next
section analyzes a household’s time allocation to the microenterprise as a function of the
available capital from a microcredit program.
4.3 Basic Model of Households’ Time Allocation in a Single
Period
4.3.1 Time Allocation in the Absence of Microcredit
Consider a household which before the introduction of microcredit programs had no
access to capital and therefore could not engage in a home-based business. Assume this
household has no unearned income and that it is not possible to live without a source of
income. The household’s only option for earning a living is to work at a paid job. The
traditional labour-leisure model suggests that at an interior solution to the problem of
utility maximization, the household’s marginal rate of substitution of leisure for income
must equal the wage rate.
Denote the household’s utility as U = U(Y, l), where l is the time spent on leisure,
Y = We is income, W is the wage rate and e is the time spent in paid employment. The
total time available to any household is normalized to 1. The interior solutions are shown
in figure 4.1 for two types of households.
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Figure 4.1: Household Type and Time Allocation between Leisure and Paid Work
The distinguishing characteristic between the households is their relative preference for
leisure. Within the figure, the indifference curve labeled U1 belongs to a type-1 household
— with a lower preference for leisure. The curve labeled U2 is for a type-2 household —
with a higher preference for leisure. The line a–d is the income line with a slope of −W .
At point c, utility is maximized for the type-1 household. This household allocates l1 of
time to leisure and e1 to paid work. Utility is maximized for the type-2 household at
point b, where l2 is allocated to leisure and e2, to paid work.
4.3.2 Time Allocation in the Presence of Microcredit
Now, consider the case where microcredit programs have been introduced and the house-
holds described above have the option of obtaining a loan of amount k for investment in
a microenterprise. Suppose profit from the microenterprise can be represented as
Π = Π(s, k) (4.1)
The parameter s is time allocated to the microenterprise. The household’s total income
becomes the sum of its paid income and its self-employment profit:
Y = We+ Π(s, k) (4.2)
Its objective function becomes
Max U = U [We+ Π(s, k), 1− e− s]
e, s
(4.3)
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The following Khun Tucker necessary conditions must be satisfied at the optimal alloca-
tion of time:
dU
de
= UYW − Ul ≤ 0; e ≥ 0; edUde = 0
dU
ds
= UY Πs − Ul ≤ 0; s ≥ 0; sdUds = 0
(4.4)
The expression UY denotes the marginal utility of income, Ul is the marginal utility of
leisure while Πs is the microenterprise wage rate (that is, additional profit generated by
spending an additional unit of time in the microenterprise). The first-order conditions
in (4.4) embody an interior solution in which the household allocates time to all three
activities (i.e., l > 0, e > 0, and s > 0). It also contains the solutions in which time is
allocated to at most two of the three activities. The solution that obtains depends on the
household type, as well as the relative profitability of the microenterprise. The results are
already well explained by existing theory within the context of household time allocation
between home production and market work (Gronau, 1977). This theory has been applied
in the analysis of off-farm labour supply of farmers (Bollman, 1979; Sumner, 1982; Olfert
et al., 1993)
The conditions in (4.4) suggest that for an interior solution to hold, a portion of the
microenterprise profit function (Π(s, k)), must lie above the paid wage line a–d as shown
in the first panel of figure 4.2. At the interior solution, the Khun-Tucker conditions
yield
Πs = W =
Ul
UY
(4.5)
The fraction Ul
UY
is the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for income (MRSlY ). As
illustrated in panel 1 of figure 4.2, the type-1 household — with a low preference for
leisure — has the interior solution. This household reallocates some of its work time to
the microenterprise. Returns from the microenterprise represented by line a–h exhibit
diminishing marginal returns. Optimal time allocation to the microenterprise is s∗1 at
which point the marginal profit Πs from the microenterprise equals the wage rate W
from paid work. Utility is maximized at point i where the conditions Ul
UY
= W is satisfied.
Hence, the household allocates e∗1 to the wage work and l
∗
1 to leisure. Thus, the effect of
microcredit on this household type would be a decrease in total time allocation to work
(e∗1 + s
∗
1 < e1), while leisure, total income, and utility would increase.
For the type-2 household, the Khun Tucker conditions also suggest that time is allocated
to the microenterprise only if the microenterprise profit function dominates the paid
income line. Given its high preference for leisure, the type-2 household maximizes utility
at point f as illustrated in the second panel of figure 4.2. At this solution, the Khun-Tucker
36
Chapter 4.
1
a
d
c
0
 Π¯(s, k)
h
i
j
Income
(Y )
l1type 2. Time spent on paid employment reduces from e1
Leisure (  ) e l s
slope = - W
∗ l1
∗
may be greater than, equal to, or less than 1. e1
∗ ∗ s1∗
01
0 1e l s|
e l s e, s
∂U1
∂U1
1
1
a
d
0
 Π¯(s, k)
f
Income
(Y )
|
s l2 l￿2 e2
Leisure (  ) e l s
slope = - W
b
∗ l2
∗ ∗ s2∗
∂U2
∂U2
2
1
a
d
c
0
Income
(Y)
l1type 2. Time spent on paid employment reduces from e1
|
s l2 l￿2 e2 Leisure (  ) e l s
b
slope = - W
 Π¯(s, k)
∂U2
3
∂U1
Figure 4.2: Microenterprise Profitability and Households’ Time Allocation
conditions above give
Πs =
Ul
UY
(4.6)
Total time spent working increases from e2 to s
∗
2 while leisure reduces from l2 to l
∗
2.
Therefore,, the effect of microcredit on this household would be a reallocation of all its
work time from wage work to the microenterprise, a decrease in time allocated to leisure,
while total time spent working, as well as income and utility, would increase.
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A third type of solution is suggested by equation 4.4 for the case where the microenterprise
profit function is dominated by the paid income line. The loan made available from
the microcredit program may be too small as an investment for the household. Or the
household may lack requisite managerial skills so its productivity in self-employment is
small. In either case, the wage line dominates the microenterprise profit function as shown
in the third panel of figure 4.2. The solution suggests the household would allocate all of
its work time to the wage work. In other words, the type-1 and type-2 household would
remain in full-time paid employment at point c and point b respectively. This is to say,
time allocation would be unchanged by the introduction of the microcredit program and
these households would self-select out of the MC program.
These results have only been illustrated for households at the extremes of relative pref-
erence between work and leisure.2 It can be expected that households lie everywhere
between these extremes and that the time allocation effect of introducing microcredit
ranges within the results found for the type-1 and type-2 household. The effect on in-
come is positive for households whose microenterprise profit function dominates their paid
wage function, but zero for households who anticipate that the profit function would be
dominated by their paid wage function. It is implied that this latter group self-selects out
of the program.
4.3.3 Marginal Effects of Capital on Time Allocation and Utility
For households that have self-selected into the MC program (s > 0), the time alloca-
tion effect of a small change in the available loan size may be analyzed. For the type-1
household (s1 > 0 and e1 > 0), comparative statics results may be obtained by totally
differentiating the first-order conditions UYW − Ul = 0 and UY Πs − Ul = 0 with respect
to e, s, and k. This yields
ds∗1
dk
= − Πsk
Πss
≥ 0 (4.7)
de∗1
dk
=
Πsk(UY YW
2 + Ull)− UY Y ΠssΠkW
Πss(UY YW 2 + Ull)
≤ 0 (4.8)
For a type-2 household (s2 > 0), the only first-order condition is UY Πs − Ul = 0 since
this household is not engaged in wage work. Totally differentiating this condition with
2The assumptions made in regarding these as extremes are that a household can neither allocate all
its time to work (in which case it will live without rest) nor allocate all to leisure (in which case it will
live without earnings).
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respect to s and k gives
ds∗2
dk
= − UY Y ΠsΠk + UY Πsk
UY Y Π2s + UY Πss + Ull
(4.9)
The sign on equation (4.9) is positive if its numerator UY Y ΠsΠk + UY Πsk is positive.
Thus,
ds∗2
dk
> 0 if − UY Y
UY
<
Πsk
ΠsΠk
(4.10)
The fraction −UY Y /UY measures the degree of concavity of the utility function at income
level Y . At any given income level, the marginal utility of income decreases with increasing
concavity of the utility function. Equation 4.10, therefore, suggests that for a type-2
household, the marginal effect of microcredit on time allocation to the microenterprise is
positive if at the given income, the household’s marginal utility of income is high (i.e.,
the concavity of U in Y is low). This result occurs because the household has a high
preference for leisure. Given an initial level of time allocation to the microenterprise, an
additional capital would increase the household’s income. At a low marginal utility of
income, the household prefers to re-allocate some time to leisure thereby forfeiting the
income increase that could have been achieved by the added capital.
For each household type, an indirect utility function may be specified as
V1(k) = U [We
∗
1(k) + Π(s
∗
1(k), k), 1− e∗1(k)− s∗1(k)] (4.11)
V2(k) = U [Π(s
∗
2(k), k), 1− s∗2(k)] (4.12)
The function Π(s∗i (k), k) is the net profit after both the principal and the interest on
the loan has been repaid. The function V1(k) and V2(k) represent the indirect utility for
the type-1 and the type-2 households respectively. Differentiating each indirect utility
function with respect to k yields
dV1
dk
= UY1Πk ≥ 0 (4.13)
dV2
dk
= UY2Πk ≥ 0 (4.14)
The main results here are as follows. For households who have self-selected into the
MC program, the marginal effect of the available loan size on time allocation to the
microenterprise depends on the household type. While this effect is always positive for a
type-1 household, the direction of effect for a type-2 household depends on its marginal
utility of income. If its marginal utility of income is low, the type-2 household would re-
allocate some time away from the microenterprise in response to an increase in the size
of loan from the MC program. The behaviour of the type-2 household is consistent with
its having a higher preference for leisure (than for income). Irrespective of the household
type, an increase in the size of the microcredit loan results in an increase in the utility
that the household would derive if the loan were invested.
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4.3.4 Uncertainty and Households’ Time Allocation to Microcredit
These results have so far assumed perfect information about the nature of the microenter-
prise profit function. In the real world, however, households make an ex ante decision to
obtain the microcredit and invest in a microenterprise, while profits are realized ex post.
Therefore, investment decisions can only be made based on the household’s expectation
of the microenterprise profits.
Mishra and Goodwin (1997) consider the effect of risk aversion for households combining
farm work with wage employment. Their analysis can be readily adapted to the type-
1 household adopting the microcredit. A risk-neutral type-1 household would allocate
labour to equalize W and the expected Πs, while a risk-averse type-1 household would
discount the expected Πs and thus allocate labour where the expected Πs is greater than
W . Following Sandmo (1971) the effect of risk aversion on time allocation by a type-1 as
well as a type-2 household can be derived. The microenterprise profit function is assumed
to have a probability distribution with an expectation Π¯(s, k). Details of the analysis are
shown in the appendix. The results are illustrated in figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Effect of Risk Aversion on Time Allocation to Microcredit
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The first panel of the figure is for a type-1 household. The line a–h represents the ex-
pectation of the microenterprise profit function [Π¯(s, k)]. A risk-neutral household would
allocate sn1 to self-employment at which point the paid wage W and expected microenter-
prise wage Π¯s are equalized. Expected utility is maximized at point i. On the other hand,
a risk-averse household would allocate only sa1 to the microenterprise where Π¯s > W , and
expected utility is maximized at point m.
The second panel of figure 4.3 is for the type-2 household. For a risk-neutral household,
expected utility is maximized at point f, where the expected microenterprise wage equals
the expected marginal rate of substitution of leisure for income, i.e., Π¯s =
E[Ul]
E[UY ]
. Hence,
sn2 is allocated to the microenterprise. For a risk-averse household expected utility is
maximized at point b in the region in which Π¯s >
E[Ul]
E[UY ]
, hence only sa2 is allocated to the
microenterprise.
The conclusion here is that the impact of introducing risk is the same for both the type-1
and the type-2 households. Time allocation to a microenterprise is a decreasing function
of the household’s degree of risk aversion.
4.3.5 Summary of Results for the Single-Period Model
Overall, the single-period model explains household time allocation to a microenterprise
in any given period conditional on the household having self-selected into the microcredit
program. Risk-averse households allocate time between the microenterprise and a wage
job at a time allocation mix such that the expected marginal profit from the microenter-
prise equals the wage rate.
The single-period model also suggests that households self-select in the microcredit pro-
gram only when their anticipated microenterprise profit function dominates their paid
income function in the given period. This is to say, that households who self-select into
the program always experience an income gain in the given period. This suggestion is not
consistent with observations that households participate in the microcredit program even
when doing so would result in a short-fall in their current incomes. As already discussed
in the introduction, some microcredit borrowers have lower per-hour earnings from their
microenterprise than they do from paid work (Spalter-Roth et al., 1994; Frankiewicz,
2001). In a study of 405 microcredit users in the United States, only 50% of the house-
holds made a profit in a normal month, 10% broke even, while 40% made a loss [cited in
Schreiner (1999)].
Therefore, while the single-period model explains time allocation in a given period con-
41
Chapter 4.
ditional on the households having self-selected into the microcredit program, it does not
explain households’ self-selection into the program.
4.4 Role of Sequential Lending
It could be argued, in theory, that for households making a loss by their use of microcre-
dit, self-selection into the program may have been based on an erroneous belief about the
profitability of the venture. Households may lack the requisite skills to accurately esti-
mate the expected profits before making a decision to obtain and invest the microcredit.
Thus, the ex post profits realized from the venture may be lower than the households had
estimated ex-ante. However, there seems to be an alternative explanation to why house-
holds who make a loss do not ex-ante self-select out of the program. Their behaviour may
be due to the sequential lending attribute of microcredit programs.
In a 2008 interview of seven participants in Vancity’s Peer Lending Program, four of
them who were first-time borrowers reported their microenterprises were not profitable
enough to repay the invested loans.3 For three of them, repayment funds came from some
paid employment, while the fourth relied on government social assistance benefit. One of
them specifically reported being worse off as a result of participation in the microcredit
program. His experience is best summarized in his own words:
Oh, financial situation is not very good.... If only I can pay my loan, I will
be very happy. I work for a few hours here and there just to manage to pay
debts. But I don’t really mind right now because there is prospect now.... The
impact on my family is that – it affected them a bit because I don’t send the
kind of money I used to send when I was just working [in paid employment].
Now the money they get from me is not much, but at least I explained to them
that I am doing something, please be patient a bit. It is a bit of inconvenience
for them at the moment.
Yet this respondent was willing to continue in the program. His reported motivation for
applying to the program in the first place was beyond the desire to increase household
incomes in the current term. Rather, it was a strategic means of accessing a much larger
loan later as can be inferred from his comment,
I applied because it is a very good program; because if you finish paying your
loan they give you another one, you pay, they give you another, incrementally.
3Vancity Peer Lending Program is one of the microcredit programs in Canada. It is administered by
Vancity Credit Union in Vancouver, BC.
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Another respondent commented,
My loan payments I have, my plan was like pay all these with Vancity, and
get the line of credit
Additionally, one of the participants who had joined the program with a very poor credit
score three years before the interview date commented,
I think that when I finish paying this loan, I will be okay. Like I think if I
talked to Vancity, they would give me the line of credit.
It appears, therefore, that participation in the MC program is motivated by factors beyond
the desire to experience an immediate increase in household income. As submitted by the
respondents quoted above, current participation may be motivated by the anticipated
effect of facilitating the household’s future access to larger and more productive loans.
Indeed, MC programs (particularly those that use the peer-lending technique) typically
disburse their loans at five levels. With peer lending programs, first-time borrowers get
$500 or $1,000, while returning borrowers get a “next loan” in a pre-specified increment
over the previous, up to a maximum loan amount of $5,000 (Servon and Bates, 1998).
Additionally, one of the objectives of MC programs is to provide households with an
opportunity to acquire a credit history, which could be used to acquire larger loans in
the future (Frankiewicz, 2001). Thus, households that self-select into the program may be
maximizing utility over multiple periods rather than what is assumed by the single-period
model above. The following section develops a two-period model to capture the role of
sequential lending on households’ time allocation to microcredit.
4.5 A Model of Households’ Time Allocation in a Two
Period Game
Assume the given household lives in two periods, the present and the future. In each
period, the household may decide to participate (or not participate) in the microcredit
program. If the household decides to borrow in the current period, it gets a first loan in
the amount of k¯ dollars. In the next period, the household would be eligible for a higher
loan in the amount of 2k¯ dollars by virtue of having successfully borrowed and repaid the
microcredit k in the first period. Note that this loan in period 2 may not necessarily be
from an MC program since the household may have accumulated some credit history from
its first period use of the microcredit k¯, and now be able to access traditional sources of
loans. On the other hand, the household would get only the microcredit k¯ in the second
period if it does not participate in the program during the first period. Assume there are
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no strategic defaults or delinquencies by the participating household.
The household’s alternative strategies and outcomes are illustrated in figure 4.4. If the
household borrows in the first period, it is at node a. However, borrowing in the first
period does not always indicate the household has the intention of investing the loan. It
may have borrowed the first loan as a strategy to access the next, which would constitute
a bigger and more productive investment. Thus, at node a, the household may either
invest the k¯ dollars in some microenterprise or not invest.
On the one hand, the household would be at node c if the k¯ dollars are invested. Assume
the loan in period 1 was used to purchase some business equipment such as a sewing
machine, video recording equipment, hair dryer, or any other type of business asset in
the amount of k¯ dollars. The household continues to use this equipment over the period
while making repayments of the loan and interest to the lender. The maximized utility
in self-employment is V (k¯). This utility is derived from time spent on leisure, earnings
from a wage job, if any, as well as profit from the microenterprise after the microcredit
loan and interests have been repaid.
On the other hand, the household would be at node d if it borrowed but did not invest the
current loan. With a total interest charge r on the loan, the household makes a repayment
of R = k¯ + r to the lender, while it continues to live on full time paid employment. The
maximized utility from this strategy may be denoted as V (0|MC) — that is the utility
gained in full time paid employment V (0), given the expenditure incurred from having
participated in the MC program. Thus, the maximized utility V (0|MC) at node d is less
than V (0).
As a third option, the household may have decided not to obtain any microcredit in
the first period in which case it is at node b. At this node it relies on full time paid
employment, deriving utility V (0).
In period 2, borrowing as a strategy for accessing future loans does not obtain since
this is the terminal period in the household’s lifespan. Therefore, it is assumed that the
household will not borrow in period 2 unless it intends to invest the loan. Conditional on
having successfully borrowed and repaid the microcredit k¯ in the preceding period, the
household would get 2k¯ dollars if it applied for a loan in the second period. This loan
may be a next loan from the microcredit program, or the household may have acquired
enough credit history to be able to access other sources of business loans.
However, its period 2 utility would depend on whether or not it had invested the micro-
credit loan it borrowed in the preceding period. If the preceding period’s microcredit was
invested, then by the beginning of the second period the household would already have
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Figure 4.4: Decision Tree under Sequential Lending Model
business capital (equipment) worth of k¯ dollars (assuming there is no depreciation).4
Hence, if it borrows the next loan of 2k¯ in the second period (node e), it has a total
capital of 3k¯ and the maximized utility from having invested 3k¯ worth of capital in self-
employment is V (3k¯). The utility V (3k¯) would derive from time spent on leisure, earnings
from a wage job, if any, as well as profit from the microenterprise after the microcredit
loan (2k¯) and interests have been repaid.
On the other hand, a household which invested k¯ in the first period may decide not to
obtain any loan in the second (node f). In such a case, it may continue in self-employment
on its existing k¯ assets (node g). At this node this household has no loan repayment to
make since the loan used in purchasing the capital k¯ has already been repaid in the
first period. Therefore, its utility derives from time spent on leisure, earnings from a
wage job, if any, as well as profit from the microenterprise. This utility is denoted as
V (k¯|R=0) ≥ V (k¯). The sub-notation R = 0 indicates that the household does not make
any repayment at this node since the microcredit k¯ has already been repaid in the previous
period.5 Alternatively, the household at node f may decide to abandon self-employment
4The results would not change if rather than assume the first period loan was used to purchase
some business equipment, it is assumed instead that it was used as working capital. In either case,
the household would have acquired some business advantages as of the beginning of period 2, from
having been in business over the preceding period. Such advantages may, for instance, be from business
experience, or from established networks within the given industry, or from appreciation of the past
period’s investment. This advantage in physical and/or human capital may be loosely represented by k¯,
without causing any bias in the model outcome.
5The reader should understand that in any period in which the loan is borrowed (nodes c and e as well
as nodes i and l to be considered soon), the utility outcome results from profit which is net of repayment
R of the principal and interests.
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and rely fully on paid work (node h) for which the maximized utility is V (0).
Conditional on having obtained the first loan without investing it in the first period (node
d), the household in period 2 may decide not to obtain the next loan, choosing instead to
continue in full-time paid employment (node j). If it borrows the next loan of 2k¯ (node i),
its maximum utility is V (2k¯). This utility is derived from time spent on leisure, earnings
from a wage job if any, as well as profit from the microenterprise after the microcredit
loan and interests have been repaid.
As a third option, the household may have decided not to obtain any loan in the first
period (node b) in which case it lives only on paid employment. In the second period, it
may again decide not to borrow (node m) so that its utility remains at V (0). If it borrows
in the second period (node l), it gets only k¯ dollars since that would be the first time
it is participating in the program. Again, this household will not obtain the loan in the
terminal period unless it intends to invest it. Thus, at node l, the household invests k¯
dollars and derives the maximum utility V (k¯).
Note that since dV
dk
≥ 0, it must be true that V (3k¯) ≥ V (2k¯) ≥ V (k¯). If the size k¯ of the
current loan is large enough such that V (k¯) > V (0), then the household will always self-
select into the program since doing so will increase its utility above what it can get under
full time paid employment. On the other hand, if k¯ is so small, such that V (0) > V (3k¯),
the household will always self-select out of the program since participation can neither
improve its utility in the current period nor in the future. Thus, the decisions in each
period would be similar to the single period game if V (k¯) > V (0) or if V (0) > V (3k¯).
Consider the case where V (k¯) < V (0) < V (3k¯). In other words, a household could derive
less utility from the current loan than it would under full-time paid employment, but
more utility from its next loan and accrued investments than it would from future full-
time paid employment. Assume also that the anticipated next loan 2k¯ is big enough, such
that the payoff from the next loan and accrued investment would exceed the payoff from
accrued investment alone (that is, V (3k¯) > V (k¯|R = 0)).6
The household’s decision may be solved by backward induction. Conditional on the house-
hold choosing “No MC” in the first period (node b), V (k¯) < V (0) implies the household
would prefer the second period payoff at node m to the payoff at node l. Thus, node l is
eliminated from the possible decisions. Additionally, nodes h and g would be eliminated,
one after the other, since the payoffs V (0) and V (k¯|R = 0) are each less than the pay-
off at node e. Figure 4.5 shows the decision tree without the eliminated strategies and
6This latter assumption is consistent with MC participants seeking to access the next loan as revealed
in the interviews with Vancity MC borrowers.
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Figure 4.5: Decision Tree under Sequential Lending Model
If V (2k¯) < V (0), then the household would not obtain microcredit unless it intends to
invest it — node i would be inferior to j, the path a–d–j would be inferior to path b–m
and would therefore be deleted from consideration.
A more interesting scenario arises if V (2k¯) > V (0). That is, if the anticipated next loan
is big enough to yield utility in self-employment, in excess of what would be derived in
full-time paid employment. Node j would be eliminated since node i is preferred. In the
current period therefore, the household would have three alternative paths to choose from.
Henceforth, path a–c–e with invested microcredit will be labeled IMC, path a–d–i with
strategic borrowing will be labeled SMC and path b–m with no microcredit will be labeled
NMC. The maximum utilities on paths IMC, SMC and NMC are respectively
VIMC = V (k¯) + δV (3k¯) (4.15)
VSMC = V (0|MC) + δV (2k¯) (4.16)
VNMC = V (0) + δV (0) (4.17)
The parameter δ is a household-specific discount factor (time preference rate).
δ =
1
1 + τ
(4.18)
where τ is a household-specific discount rate. Thus, δ ∈ (0, 1) can be thought of as a
differentiating characteristic of households.
Equations 4.15 through 4.17 can be illustrated as functions of δ. As illustrated in figure
4.6, it is possible to have a case where both VSMC and VIMC are completely dominated
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by VNMC for all feasible values of δ. In such a case there would be complete nonadoption
of microcredit. This could happen when the anticipated benefits from future loans are so
small, such that even households with very high discount factors would not deem it worth
the trouble of borrowing the current microcredit that would bring about a short-fall in
current utility.
0 1
node l. Thus node l is eliminated from the possible decisions. Similarly, node
g is eliminated from further consideration since it is inferior to node h. Thus,
conditional on the household choosing “MC invested” in the first period (node c)
it is left to compare between nodes e and h in the second period. V (0) < V (3k¯)
implies node e will be chosen. The decision tree without the eliminated strategies
and associated outcomes is shown below.
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We now consider two alternative cases to arrive at the optimal strategy; case 1 in
which V (2k¯) > V (0) and case 2 in which V (2k¯) < V (0).
Case 1; V (2k¯) > V (0) In this case, node j is eliminated since it is preferred
to node i. Thus conditional on having borrowed the micro credit in the first
period (node a), the paths c–e is prefered to d–i if V (k¯) + δV (3k¯) is greater
than V (0|MC + δV (2k¯); where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is the household’s time preference rate.
Assuming households are uniformly distributed with respect to δ, figure illustrates
their payoff functions for the paths c–e and d–i. A household with δ∗ is indifferent
between ‘investing’ and ‘not investing’ the loan.
δ∗ =
V (0|MC)− V (k¯)
V (3k¯ − V (2k¯) (5.49)
Case 2; V (2k¯) < V (0)
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We now consider two alternative cases to arrive at the optimal strategy; case 1 in
which V (2k¯) > V (0) and case 2 in which V (2k¯) < V (0).
Case 1; V (2k¯) > V (0) In this case, node j is eliminated since it is preferred
to node i. Thus conditional on having borrowed the micro credit in the first
period (node a), the paths c–e is prefered to d–i if V (k¯) + δV (3k¯) is greater
than V (0|MC + δV (2k¯); where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is the household’s time preference rate.
Assuming households are uniformly distributed with respect to δ, figure illustrates
their payoff functions for the paths c–e and d–i. A household with δ∗ is indifferent
between ‘investi g’ and ‘not inv sting’ the loan.
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Household Utility
Differentiating Household Discount Factor 
It is commonly believed that Micro Credit (MC) Programs have little value for
households in North America given the small sizes of the loans they offer, as well
as the relative availability of alternative paid work for would-be beneficiaries of
the programs. The demand for MC is low partly because many households are
better off working as employees rather than as micro entrepreneurs. Further, mi-
cro enterprises, like every other business, have to cope with uncertainties, so that
risk-averse low-income households may prefer to remain in a wage job in which
the monthly paycheck is guaranteed. Against this reality some North American
households have participated in micro credit programs, suggesting they may be
better off in self-employment than as wage workers. Some individuals simultane-
ously allocate their time to both paid and self-employment. This paper presents
two alternative frameworks for explaining a households time allocation to MC.
The first – a static utility maximization framework draws from existing theory of
household time allocation between wage work and household work. A household’s
time allocation is influenced by it degree of risk aversion, its relative preference
for leisur as well as by the amo nt of capital available from the mi r credit pro-
gram. The static framework however does not explain a household’s willingness
to allocate time to micro credit even when doing so results in a short fall in its
current income. This is explained under a second framework – a dynamic utility
maximization framework which shows that he demand for MC in North Amer-
ica is due partly to the sequential lending characteristic of most of the programs.
Sequential lending means that a househol ’s current use of the m cro credit gives
it access to greater funds in the future. Under the dynamic utility maximization
framework, the effect of current time allocation to micro credit on a household’s
s ream of future utilities is captured. The implication of this on current demand
for micro credit is explored. Under certain conditions, the household - in a bid
to access a future loan - would borrow money in the short run and repay it with-
out having inve ted it in a micro enterprise. The likelihood of this happening
however disappears with an increase in the cost of borrowing, or an increase in
the lifetime net benefit from investing. Results of the dynamic utility maximisa-
tion framework implies a positive effect of sequential lending on demand for the
current micro credit for households with high rate of time preference and a high
expectation of the future benefits. Hence the persistent low demand faced by the
programs in North America could be the result of most households having a low
rate of time preference, such that they ignore all future streams of benefits that
could accrue from current participation. Alternatively, it may be the case that the
future benefits are themselves too small such that even households with high rate
of time preference do not consider these benefits as sufficient incentive for current
participation. Ther is yet a third possible explanation. It may be the case that
households have a high rate of time preference and the future benefits are large
but that households have no awareness of (or have a mistaken belief about) the
size of the benefits. Implications for a policy to increase the rate of participation
in North America’s MC programs are dis ussed.
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node l. Thus node l is eliminated from the possible decisions. Similarly, node
g is eliminated from further consideration since it is inferior to node h. Thus,
conditional on the household choosing “MC invested” in the first period (node c)
it is left to compare between nodes e and h in the se nd period. V (0) < V (3k¯)
implies node e will be chosen. The decision tree without the eliminated strategies
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Assuming households are uniformly distributed with respect to δ, figure illustrates
their payoff functions for the paths c–e and d–i. A household with δ∗ is indifferent
between ‘investing’ and ‘not investing’ the loan.
δ∗ =
V (0|MC)− V (k¯)
V (3k¯ − V (2k¯ (5.49)
Case 2; V (2k¯) < V (0)
37
node l. Thus node l is eliminated from the possible decisions. Similarly, node
g is eliminated from further consideration since it is inferior to node h. Thus,
conditional on the household cho sing “MC invested” in the first period (node c)
it is left to compare between nodes e and h in th second period. V (0) < V (3k¯)
implies node e will be chosen. Th decision tre without the liminated stra egies
and associate outcomes is shown below.
V (k¯)
V (3k¯)
MC
e
Invested
c
V (0|MC)
V (2k¯)
MC
i
V (0)
No MC
j
Not invested
d
MC
a
V (0)
V (0)
No MC
m
No MC
b
We now consider two alternative cases o arrive at the optimal st ategy; case 1 in
which V (2k¯) > V (0) and case 2 in which V (2k¯) < V (0).
Case 1; V (2k¯) > V (0 In this case, node j is eliminated since it is preferred
to node i. Thus conditional on having bo rowed the micr credit in the first
period (node a), the paths c–e is prefered to d–i if V (k¯) + δV (3k¯) is greater
than V (0|MC + δV (2k¯); where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is the household’s time preference rate.
Assuming households are uniformly distributed with respect to δ, figure illustrates
their payoff functions for the paths c–e and d–i. A household with δ∗ is indifferent
between ‘investing’ and ‘not investing’ the loan.
δ∗ =
V (0|MC)− V (k¯)
V (3k¯ − V (2k¯) (5.49)
Case 2; V (2k¯) < V (0)
37
Household Utility
VSMC
VNMC
VNMC VMC VSMC 2V (0) V (0|MC + V (2k¯) V (k) + V (3k¯)
32
VIMC
Figure 4.6: The Case with Complete Non-adoption of Microcredit
On the other hand, it is possible to have a case where SMC and VIMC dominates VNMC
for some househol s, as illustrated in figure 4.7. T is is the case of partial adoption of
microcredit that is widely experienced by micr credit programs. Within figure 4.7 all
households with 0 ≤ δ ≤ δ′ will not obtain microcredit, where
δ′ =
V (0)− V (0|MC)
V (2k¯)− V (0) (4.19)
Households with δ′ ≤ δ ≤ δ∗ will obtain and not invest microcredit, where
δ∗ =
V (0|MC)− V (k¯)
V (3k¯)− V (2k¯) (4.20)
And households with δ∗ ≤ δ ≤ 1 will obtain and invest the loan.
The multi-period model, therefore, indicates that households may not always self-select
of out of microcredit programs on account of the microcredit being small. Provided its
discount factor is high enough, a household which anticipates an increased benefit from
having future access to larger loans, would obtain the current microcredit loan in a bid to
access such loans in the future. This two-period model may now be used to consider the
effect of specific variables on the demand for microcredit among a given population.
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node l. Thus node l is eliminated from the possible decisions. Similarly, node
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conditional on the household choosing “MC invested” in the first period (node c)
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than V (0|MC + δV (2k¯); where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is the household’s time preference rate.
Assuming households are uniformly distributed with respect to δ, figure illustrates
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Differentiating Household Discount Factor 
It is commonly believed that Micro Credit (MC) Programs have little value for
households in North America given the small sizes of the loans they offer, as well
as the relative availability of alternative paid work for would-be beneficiaries of
the programs. The demand for MC is low partly because many households are
better off working as employees rather than as micro entrepreneurs. Further, mi-
cro enterprises, like every other business, have to cope with uncertainties, so that
risk-averse low-income households may prefer to remain in a wage job in which
the monthly paycheck is guaranteed. Against this reality some North American
households have participated in micro credit programs, suggesting they may be
better off in self-employment than as wage workers. Some individuals simultane-
ously allocate their time to both paid and self-employment. This paper presents
two alternative frameworks for explaining a households time allocation to MC.
The first – a static utility maximization framework draws from existing theory of
household time allocation between wage work and household work. A household’s
time allocation is influenced by it degree of risk aversion, its relative preference
for leisure as well as by the amount of capital available from the micro credit pro-
gram. The static f mework however does not explain a household’s willingness
to allocate time to micro credit even when doing so results in a short fall in its
current income. This is explained under a second framework – a dynamic utility
maximization framework which shows that the emand for MC in North Amer-
ica is due partly to the sequential lending characteristic of most of the programs.
Sequential lending mea that a household’s current use of the micro credit gives
it access to greater funds in the future. Under the dynamic utility maximization
framework, th effect of current time allocation to micro credit on a ousehold’s
stream of future utilities is captured. The implication of this on current demand
for micro credit is explored. Under certain conditions, the household - in a bid
to access a future loan - would borrow money in the short run and repay it with-
out having invested it in a micro enterprise. The likelihood of this happening
however disappears with an increase in the cost of borrowing, or an increase in
the lifetime net benefit from investing. Results of the dynamic utility maximisa-
tion framework implies a positive effec f seque tial lending on demand for the
current micro credit for households with high rate of time preference and a high
expectation of the future benefits. Hence the persistent low demand faced by the
programs in North America could be the result of most households having a low
rate of time preference, such that they ignore all future streams of benefits that
could accrue from current participation. Alternatively, it may be the case that the
future benefits are themselves too small such that even households with high rate
of time preference do not consider these benefits as sufficient incentive for current
participation. There is yet a third possible explanation. It may be the case that
households have a high rate of time preference and the future benefits are large
but that households have no awareness of (or have a mistaken belief about) the
size of the benefits. Implications for a policy to increase the rate of participation
in North America’s MC programs are discussed.
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VSMC
of time in self employment as the micro credit increases from k1 through k2. Hence
the household’s utility increases in accordance with dV
dk
≥ 0 as has been estimated
in section 3.5. A household investing a micro credit of size k1 will end up with a
Leisure (l)0
a
m
Income
(Y )
Session with Risk. The Khun Tucker neccessary conditions for a maximum are;
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= UYw − λ ≤ 0; e ≥ 0; e(dLde ) = 0
dL
ds
= UY απs − UAAs − λ ≤ 0; s ≥ 0; s(dLds ) = 0
dL
dl
= Ul − λ ≤ 0; l ≥ 0; l(dLdl ) = 0
dL
dλ
= 1− e− s− l = 0, λ ≥ 0;
(4.12)
e∗ > 0, s∗ = 0, l∗ > 0 if ∀s ∈ [0, l] π(s, k) < ws
or
e∗ > 0, s > 0, l∗ > 0 if for some s ∈ (0, 1), π(s, k) > ws and πs = w
or
e∗ = 0, s > 0, l∗ > 0 if
foralls = 1− l∗ π(s, k) > ws and πs > w
(4.13)
Khun Tucker conditions with IA
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Session with Risk. The Khun Tucker neccessary conditions for a maximum are;
dL
de
= UYw − λ ≤ 0; e ≥ 0; e(dLde ) = 0
dL
ds
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dl
= Ul − λ ≤ 0; l ≥ 0; l(dLdl ) = 0
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= 1− e− s− l = 0, λ ≥ 0;
(4.12)
e∗ > 0, s∗ = 0, l∗ > 0 if ∀s ∈ [0, l] π(s, k) < ws
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e∗ > 0, s > 0, l∗ > 0 if for some s ∈ (0, 1), π(s, k) > ws and πs = w
or
e∗ = 0, s > 0, l∗ > 0 if
foralls = 1− l∗ π(s, k) > ws and πs > w
(4.13)
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Figure 7.4: Household time allocation, given an inertia equivalent capital k∗
total self plus paid employment income lin that lies below a–m. It would thus
get a maximum utility V (k1) whic is less than the utility along line a–m. On the
other hand, the household would obt in higher income and a higher u ility han
its inertia condition if the micr credit were of size k2. For a micro credit of size k
∗,
the total work time (s∗|k∗ + e∗|k∗) is exactly equal to the time the household was
spending in full time paid employment. And the resulting utility is exactly equal
to the maximum utility in full time pa d employment. That is V (k∗) = U(we∗, l∗).
Thus we define k∗ as the “Inertia equivalent” size of a micro credit, such that the
household is indifferent between full time paid employment and (part time self
employment on k∗.
Denote the given micro credit k in terms of its iz relative to k∗. Sp cifically l t
k = αk∗, wher α may be greater than, equal to, or less than 1.
‘Not Invested’ ￿ ‘Invested’ ‘Invested’ ￿ ‘Not Invested’ δˆ δ¯ δ￿
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VNMC VMC VSMC 2V (0) V (0|MC + V (2k¯) V (k) + V (3k¯)
32
NMC
Household Utility
node l. Thus node l is eliminated from the possible decisions. Similarly, node
g is eliminated from further consideration since it is inferior to node h. Thus,
conditional on the household choosing “MC invested” in the first period (node c)
it s left t compare b tween n des e an h in th second period. V (0) < V (3k¯)
implies node e will be chosen. The decision tree without the eliminated strategies
and associated outcomes is shown below.
V (k¯)
V (3k¯)
MC
e
Invest d
c
V (0|MC)
V (2k¯)
MC
i
V (0)
No MC
j
Not invested
d
MC
a
V (0)
V (0)
No MC
m
No MC
b
We now consider two alter ative cases to arrive at the optimal strategy; case 1 in
which V (2k¯) > V (0) and case 2 in which V (2k¯) < V (0).
Case 1; V (2k¯) > V (0) In this case, node j is eliminated since it is preferred
to node i. Thus conditional on having borrowed the micro credit in the first
period (node a), the paths c–e is prefered to d–i if V (k¯) + δ (3k¯) is greater
than V (0|MC + δV (2k¯); where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is household’s time preference rate.
Assuming households are uniformly distributed wit res ect to δ, figure illustrates
their payoff functio s for t e paths –e and d–i. A household with δ∗ is indifferent
between ‘investing’ and ‘not investing’ the loan.
δ∗ =
V (0|MC)− V (k¯)
V (3k¯ − V (2k¯) (5.49)
Case 2; V (2k¯) < V (0)
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Figure 4.7: The Case with Partial Adoption of Microcredit
4.5.1 Effect of the Current Cost of Borrowing
An increase in the cost of borrowing would reduce the intercept V (0|MC) in figure 4.7
ab ve. Consequently, δ′ would increase indicating that more households would prefer not
to borrow. Also V (k¯) would ecrease si ce increased cost impl es that the microinvestment
has become less profitable. The verall effect on δ∗ of a simultaneous change in V (0|MC)
and V (k¯) is, however, not immediately obvious. A decrease in V (0|MC) decreases δ∗ while
a decrease in V (k¯) increases δ∗. The overall change in δ∗ would depend on the size of the
effect which cost of borrowing has on the microenterprise’s profitability. If the absolute
value of this effect is high, then with an increase in the cost of borrowing, the decrease in
V (k¯) could exceed that of V (0|MC) and δ∗ would increase. An increase in δ∗ would mean
that fewer households invest the microcredit loan.7
4.5.2 Effect of the Size of the Anticipated Future Loan
In the above model, 2k¯ represents the size of the future loan which a household anticipates
from its current participation in the microcredit program. In figure 4.7, the effects of
a marginal change in the size of the future loan can be considered as changes in the
slopes of VSMC and VIMC . Equations 4.13 and 4.14 had shown that
dV
dk
≥ 0 implying
V (3k¯) ≥ V (2k¯). Thus, dV
dk
evaluated at 2k¯ must be greater or equal to dV
dk
evaluated at
3k¯ to satisfy the concavity property of utility functions. It follows that while a marginal
7The reverse could hold if the effect of cost of borrowing on the microenterprise profitability is small.
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increase in the size of the future loan would rotate both VSMC and VIMC leftward, the
rotation in VSMC would be greater than or equal to the rotation in VIMC . Consequently, δ
∗
would increase. Additionally, with the slope of VNMC unaffected, δ
′ decreases. Therefore,,
holding other factors constant, an increase in the size of the future loan anticipated
by households results in an increase in the number of households engaged in strategic
borrowing, a decrease in the number of households who invest the current MC, and a
decrease in the number of non-borrowers.
4.5.3 Effect of the Investment Appreciation Rate
The investment appreciation rate refers to the amount of business capital and advantages
which the current k¯ dollars of investment can generate over the period. This model has
assumed an investment appreciation of k¯ over the period (see footnote 4 of this chapter).
Therefore, the available investment in the second period is this initial k¯ plus the 2k¯ of
loan borrowed in the second period. An increase in the investment appreciation rate
would increase the slope V (3k¯) of VIMC , resulting in a decrease in δ
∗. Therefore, fewer
households would engage in strategic borrowing (preferring instead to invest the loan).
At some very high rate of appreciation, δ∗ is small and all households who were initially
on strategic borrowing, as well as some of those who had preferred no MC, would prefer
to invest the microcredit loan.
4.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This paper shows how a household that has the option of both paid and self-employment
can maximize utility by allocating some of its time to self-employment. In any given
period, a household’s time allocation to the microenterprise is negatively affected by its
wage in paid employment, its degree of risk aversion, and its relative preference for leisure.
The effect of the amount of capital available from the microcredit program depends
on the household type. It is positive for households with a low relative preference for
leisure. For households whose relative preference for leisure is high, the marginal effect of
capital on time allocation to the microenterprise is negative (positive) if the household’s
marginal utility of income is low (high). Results of analyzing time allocation under a
single-period framework suggests a household self-selects into the microcredit program
only if it anticipates that such action would increase its income in the short run.
In contrast, empirical evidence suggests that households who anticipate a short-run de-
crease in income due to microcredit may also self-select into the program. Sequential
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lending plays an important role in households’ use of microcredit. Sequential lending
means that a household’s current use of microcredit gives it access to greater funds in the
future. Therefore, a model of household time allocation is developed using a multi-period
framework. The model explains why households do not always self-select out of the mi-
crocredit program on account of the microenterprise being less profitable than their wage
jobs. If the discounted benefit of accessing the future loans is high enough, a household
may self-select into the microcredit program and bear the current short-fall in incomes
(and utility) so as to be able to access the future loans. The likelihood of self-selecting
into the microcredit program is positively influenced by the size of the loan, the future
streams of loans anticipated from current participation, the investment appreciation rate,
and the household’s discount factor. This likelihood is negatively influenced by the house-
holds’ wage rate in paid employment, as well as by the costs of borrowing. Under certain
conditions, the household — in a bid to access a future loan — might borrow money in
the short run and repay it without having invested it in a microenterprise.
Given the predicted effect of sequential lending on the demand for microcredit, the per-
sistent low demand faced by the programs in the United States and Canada could partly
be a result of most households having a low discount factor, such that they ignore all
future streams of benefits that could accrue from current participation. Alternatively, it
may be the case that the future benefits are themselves too small, so even households
with high discount factors do not consider these benefits as sufficient incentive for current
participation. Additionally, it may be the case that the financial and transaction costs of
accessing the current microcredit are too high, to the extent that they erode any benefits
that could accrue to the household in the future. Lastly, it is possible that households
have no awareness (or have a mistaken anticipation) of the size of future benefits.
Empirical analysis is needed to determine if a change in any one of these variables would
have a statistically and/or economically significant impact on the demand for microcredit
among any given population of eligible participants. Thus, one of the contributions of this
paper is in providing a theoretical framework for such empirical investigation. If needed,
a policy which increases the size of the subsequent loans that can be borrowed due to
past participation in MC programs would have the effect of increasing the future streams
of benefit and provide more incentive for current participation. Programs that improve
households’ awareness of the future benefits of current participation may increase the
demand for microcredit.
It is implied that any policy to improve households’ productivity in a microenterprise
would also increase the demand for microcredit. Such a policy would increase the number
of households whose microenterprise profit dominates their paid wages, and decrease the
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critical discount factor above which households participate in the MC program. Another
issue that would be worthy of empirical investigation is, whether or not increased in-
vestment in skill development and self-employment training programs leads to a higher
demand for microcredit.
4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Derivation of the Results in Figure 4.3
Given uncertainty as assumed in section 4.3.4, the results in figure 4.3 are derived fol-
lowing the technique in Sandmo (1971). The effect of risk aversion on time allocation
by each household type is analysed by comparing time allocation when the households
are assumed to be risk neutral with the allocated time when they are assumed to be
risk averse. Given uncertainty, the profit function Π(s, k) is a gamble with a probability
distribution and a mean.
With Risk Neutrality
Let the profit function Π(s, k) be randomly distributed with a probability density f [Π(s, k)]
and a mean; Π¯(s, k). Since for a risk-neutral household, expected utility of a gamble is
the same as utility of expected gamble, the households maximize
Max E[U ] = U(We+ Π¯(s, k), 1− e− s)
e, s
(4.21)
Results are thus similar to the case with complete information except that the profit
function known with certainty is replaced in the current case by the expected profit
function Π¯(s, k). Specifically at the optimum allocation of time, the expected marginal
rates of substitution are
E[Ul]
E[UY ]
= W = Π¯s and
E[Ul]
E[UY ]
= Π¯s > W (4.22)
for type-1 and type-2 households respectively.
With Risk Aversion
For a risk-averse household, the condition E[U ] = U(We+ Π¯(s, k), 1− e− s) does not
hold. As a matter of fact, expected utility of the gamble would be less than utility of
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expected gamble. The household’s objective function is therefore better stated as,
Max E[U ] = E[U(We+ Π(s, k), 1− e− s)]
e, s
(4.23)
And the first-order conditions for a type-1 household using microcredit are
WE[UY ]− E[Ul] = 0 (4.24)
E[UY Πs]− E[Ul] = 0 (4.25)
It follows immediately from 4.24 that
E[Ul]
E[UY ]
= W (4.26)
For a type-2 household, the first-order condition is
E[UY Πs]− E[Ul] = 0 (4.27)
Equation 4.25 for the type-1, as well as 4.27 for the type-2 household require a little more
algebra to arrive at the relationship between E[Ul]
E[UY ]
and Π¯s for the each household type.
But these equations are essentially the same and, therefore, it suffices to work through
the algebra of only one of the equations.
In either of equations 4.25 and 4.27 move E[Ul] across the equality sign to get
E[UY Πs] = E[Ul]
Then, subtract E[UY Π¯s] from both sides of the equation and rearrange to get
E[UY (Πs − Π¯s)] = E[Ul]− E[UY Π¯s] (4.28)
Since it is true that
Y = E[Y ] + [Π(s, k)− Π¯(s, k)] (4.29)
it is also true that Y ≥ E[Y ] if Π(s, k) ≥ Π¯(s, k) and therefore,
UY ≤ UE[Y ] if Π(s, k) ≥ Π¯(s, k). (4.30)
But it is also true that Π(s, k) ≥ Π¯(s, k) implies Πs ≥ Π¯s. Thus, 4.30 may be restated
as
UY ≤ UE[Y ] if Πs ≥ Π¯s (4.31)
Therefore,
UY (Πs − Π¯s) ≤ UE[Y ](Πs − Π¯s) (4.32)
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The inequality in 4.32 always holds true even for Πs ≤ Π¯s. For in such a case, 4.29 would
mean Y ≤ E[Y ], so that UY ≥ UE[Y ]. Then multiplying each side by (Πs − Π¯s), which
is negative, would reverse the inequality so that the condition in 4.32 is preserved. Now,
taking expectation of both sides of 4.32, and noting that E[Y ] is a constant gives
E[UY (Πs − Π¯s)] ≤ UE[Y ]E[Πs − Π¯s] (4.33)
Notice that E[Πs − Π¯s] equals zero. Thus, equation 4.33 means
E[UY (Πs − Π¯s)] ≤ 0 (4.34)
It follows, therefore, that the expression on the right hand side of 4.28 is less than or
equal to zero
E[Ul]− E[UY Π¯s] ≤ 0 (4.35)
This yields
E[Ul]
E[UY ]
≤ Π¯s (4.36)
Thus, at the optimal time allocations for the type-1 household, equations 4.24 and 4.25
collectively give
E[Ul]
E[UY ]
= W ≤ Π¯s (4.37)
as depicted in the first panel of figure 4.3. For the type-2 household, equation 4.27
gives
E[Ul]
E[UY ]
≤ Π¯s (4.38)
as shown in the second panel of figure 4.3
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Income Assistance and Households’ Participation in
Microcredit Programs
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the multi-period model of household time allocation to a microenterprise
as developed in the preceding chapter is applied for income assistance recipients. The
model shows why an IA recipient facing a 100% earnings tax rate may self-select into
a microcredit program and allocate time to a microenterprise as against the traditional
theory of work disincentive at a 100% earnings tax rate.
The work disincentive from income assistance (IA) has traditionally been analyzed us-
ing a single-period, household-utility maximization framework (Moffitt, 1992; Hum and
Simpson, 1993; Danziger et al., 1981). The disincentive is known to arise from the guar-
anteed amount and the offsetting tax rate on the IA program. The guaranteed amount
is the benefit to which a household would be eligible if it had no other income. As the
household’s income from other sources increases, part (or all) of it is clawed back from
the guaranteed amount at a pre-specified rate. This is effectively a tax rate on the house-
hold’s earned (and unearned) income. The guaranteed amount has an income effect on
labour supply, while the tax rate produces both an income and a substitution effect. The
total effect is a reduction in the number of hours worked by an IA recipient relative to
a situation with no IA. At a 100% tax rate, labour supply is predicted to be zero for
households eligible for IA benefits (Moffitt, 2003; Friedman, 1962).
With respect to households in self-employment, the work disincentive from IA implies a
reduction in the demand for production inputs. Low-income households are eligible for
business loans from microcredit (MC) programs. Many of these households are already re-
ceiving monthly benefits from government IA programs (Schreiner, 1999; Wehrell, 2002).
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Notably, the low demand for MC in the United States and Canada is partly blamed on
the disincentive effect of IA (Coyle and Wehrell, 2006; Frankiewicz, 2001; Taub, 1998).
Going by the traditional single-period models, households receiving IA with a 100% earn-
ings tax rate should not take up microcredit unless it would generate enough income to
enable a break away from IA. In other words, there should be no observation of a house-
hold simultaneously participating in an MC program and an IA program with a 100%
tax rate.
In contrast, empirical evidence suggests a 100% tax rate on the IA program may not
eliminate the beneficiary’s incentive to take up a microcredit loan, even when such loan
would not induce a break away from the IA program. For instance in a review of 94 loan
application forms of returning borrowers on Vancity’s microcredit program, 36 forms
belonged to households who were participants in British Columbia’s Income Assistance
(BCIA) program as well as self-employed on the microenterprise they had set up with an
earlier borrowed microcredit. The BCIA program applies a 100% tax rate to the earnings
of its beneficiaries. Obviously, the work disincentive from IA is weaker than predicted by
the traditional model.
This observation of a less-than-predicted disincentive is not not unique to the borrowers
of Vancity’s MC program. Studies of the earliest IA programs — often called Guaranteed
Annual Income (GAI) Experiments — have had to contend with similar findings. The
GAI plans were similar to modern day IA programs to the extent that the benefits
calculation rule comprised of a guaranteed amount and an offsetting tax rate. Each of
the GAI experiments was of limited duration with the longest program lasting only five
years. In analyzing the effects of the guaranteed amount and tax rate on labour supply
by beneficiary households, Hum and Simpson (1993) (p. S287 ) conclude
If we were asked to summarize “in 25 words or less” what has been learned
from the experiments about the economic effects of a GAI plan we would
respond: “Few adverse effects have been found to date. Those adverse effects
found, such as work response, are smaller than would have been expected
without experimentation.”
Although welfare stigma has been proposed as one factor moderating the work disin-
centive from IA ((Moffitt, 1983; Monroe and Tiller, 2001), stigma does not explain the
“partial dependence” on IA as observed among the MC borrowers. Partial dependence
means a household gets a fraction of its total income from IA benefit and the remainder
from a microenterprise (or a wage job). Stigma arises mainly from the act of IA recipi-
ency per se and does not vary with the fraction of total income that is from IA (Moffitt,
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1983).
The duration of assistance has also been shown to affect the work disincentives from
the guaranteed amount and offsetting tax rate on the IA program (Metcalf, 1973). An
IA program of permanent duration is associated with less work disincentive than one
of temporary duration. The analysis suggests that the labour supply decisions of IA
recipients in a current period are based on maximizing the sum of current and future
period utility rather than the utility of the current period alone.
This chapter proposes that the decision to take up microcredit by IA recipients facing a
100% earnings tax rate can be explained by a multi-period utility maximization frame-
work. Given the sequential lending attribute of MC programs an IA recipient facing a
100% earnings tax rate may decide to invest the MC in the current period and have
its entire profit clawed back from the guaranteed amount, just so to be able to access
a larger loan at a future period to generate earnings above the IA eligibility limit. The
multi-period model developed in chapter 3 may therefore be applied to income assistance
recipients.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the traditional model
of work disincentive from income assistance with respect to time allocation to microcredit.
The model is shown to imply a complete nonadoption of microcredit among IA recipients
facing a 100% earnings tax rate. Section 5.3 applies the multi-period model developed
in chapter 4 in explaining the observed partial adoption of microcredit among these IA
recipients. Effects of specific variables on the IA program are considered. Section 5.4 gives
a summary of the results.
5.2 Microcredit and the Traditional Model of Work
Disincentive from Income Assistance
The traditional model of work disincentive from income assistance is a single period
model. The model assumes each household faces a constant wage rate (Christofides et al.,
1997; Moffitt, 2002). The model specifies a generic benefit calculation rule on the IA
program as
B = g − t(Wh+N) (5.1)
The variable B is income assistance benefit; g is the guaranteed benefit paid to households
with no earnings; 0 < t ≤ 1 is a tax rate applied to earnings; W is the constant wage
rate; h is time allocated to work; and N is unearned income. Total income is the sum
of the benefit B, earned income Wh, and unearned income N . The household which is
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assumed to maximize utility over income and leisure, chooses h such that the effective
wage rate (1 − t)W equals the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for income. This
model is appropriate for households supplying labour to paid work alone.
Since the article by Gronau (1977), it has been established that households may simultane-
ously supply labour to paid work and self-employment, where profit from self-employment
exhibits diminishing returns to time allocation. Therefore, in applying the traditional
model with respect to time allocation to microcredit, the work hours h is disaggregated
into time allocation (e) to a paid work and time allocation (s) to a microenterprise.
Assuming a household has no unearned income, its IA benefit would be
B = g − t[We+ Π(s, k)] (5.2)
The parameter W , therefore, represents the wage rate in paid employment; Π(s, k) is the
microenterprise profit function; and k is the amount of microcredit. To be eligible for
income assistance, a household’s earnings must satisfy the condition t[We+ Π(s, k)] < g
(see Meyer and Saupe (1970), as well as Hum and Simpson (1993)).
Income assistance programs do not acknowledge microenterprise losses in the benefit
calculation rule. Profit, Π(s, k), is ascribed the minimum value of $0.00 for households
who make a business loss during the benefit period. Therefore, while B ≥ 0 for all eligible
households, those with negative earnings (i.e., loss) and those with zero earnings get the
maximum amount g. This observation implies that under a single-period model, an IA
recipient who would make a loss from self employment is better off not obtaining the
micro credit loan because investing the loan would decrease the household’s total income
and leisure – and therefore, its utility. Total income Y for a household on IA is the sum
of its benefits, paid wages, and microenterprise profit.
Y = g + (1− t)[We+ Π(s, k)] (5.3)
Each household maximizes utility U(Y, l), where l is time spent on leisure. By normalizing
a household’s total time to 1, its objective function can be stated as
Max U = U(g + (1− t)[We+ Π(s, k)], 1− e− s)
e, s
(5.4)
Denote the household as type-1 if it combines paid work with self-employment, and type-2
if it works in self-employment alone.1,2 For a type-1 household, the first-order conditions
1The assumption here is that the microenterprise profit is positive for the type-1, as well as the type-2
household since a negative profit implies no self employment under a single-period model. It will be seen
in section 5.3 that a positive-profit assumption is not neccessary under a multi-period model.
2The type-1 household is one engaged in pluriactivity. See Fuller (1990) and Olfert (1992) for discus-
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for maximum utility are
UY (1− t)W − Ul = 0 (5.5)
UY (1− t)Πs − Ul = 0 (5.6)
These give
(1− t)Πs = (1− t)W = Ul
UY
(5.7)
The expression Πs is the marginal profit from the microenterprise (that is additional
profit generated by spending an additional unit of time in the microenterprise). The
marginal profit from the microenterprise is assumed to be a decreasing function of the
time allocation (s). The expression UY denotes marginal utility of income; Ul is marginal
utility of leisure. At the utility maximizing time allocations for the type-1 household, the
microenterprise wage rate Πs is equalized with the wage rate in paid work W . Also the
effective wage rate (1− t)W equals the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for income
Ul
UY
.
For a type-2 household, equation 5.6 constitutes the only first-order condition. The condi-
tion implies equality between the microenterprise wage rate and the household’s marginal
rate of substitution of leisure for income.
(1− t)Πs = Ul
UY
(5.8)
5.2.1 Disincentive Effect of IA under the Traditional Model
The amount of work disincentives from IA that is suggested by the single-period model
depends on the earnings tax rate faced by the IA recipients. On the one hand, the model
suggests that if t < 1, some households may invest the microcredit but decrease time
allocation to work relative to a situation with no IA. On the other hand a case of complete
nonadoption of the microcredit is suggested by the model under t = 1. Each of these cases
is discussed below.
Decrease in Time Allocation to Work by Households Facing t < 1
Consider first the type-1 household. For all t < 1, equation 5.7 means Πs = W at
the utility maximizing allocation of time to the microenterprise.3 This condition is as
sions on pluriactivity as distinct from part-time self-employment. The ‘pluriactor’ works at least as much
time in self-employment (full time) as other entrepreneurs who are engaged in self-employment alone,
and also works additional hours on a paid job.
3Recall Πs is non constant in time whereas W is. Hence, the household increases (or decreases) s until
the needed equality is realized.
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previously found in equation 4.5 where this household was assumed not to receive IA.
That this condition is unchanged implies time allocation to the microenterprise by a
type-1 household (i.e., s1) is unaffected by IA.
With IA, the household faces an effective wage (1− t)W due to the earnings tax rate in
the IA program. Rearranging the expression (1− t)W = Ul
UY
in (5.7) gives
W =
Ul
UY
1
(1− t) (5.9)
It was found for type-1 household in the case with no IA (equation 4.5) that W = Ul
UY
.
Since 1
(1−t) > 1, then
Ul
UY
in the case with IA must be less than Ul
UY
in the case with no
IA. It follows that the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for income at the optimal
allocation of time decreases as a consequence of IA. This suggests an increase in leisure
so that Ul can decrease.
4 With s1 remaining unchanged as noted above, an increase in
leisure (l1) for the type-1 household is possible only with a corresponding decrease in the
time it spends on wage work (e1).
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Figure 5.1: Effect of IA on Time Allocated to Work by a Type-1 Household (t < 1)
These results are illustrated in figure 5.1. Line a–c–f is the household budget line in the
absence of IA, with slope −Πs in the a–c region and −W in the c–f region. Line h–j–p is
the budget line with IA (assuming t < 1). The region h–j with slope −(1 − t)Πs is the
income line under self-employment. The region j–p with slope −(1− t)W is income line
4With an increase in income due to income assistance, UY decreases. To achieve the desired decrease
in UlUY , the decrease in Ul must outweigh the decrease in UY .
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under paid employment. The vertical line a–h represents the guaranteed amount g from
the IA program. At points c and j, the condition Πs = W is satisfied. With IA, utility
increases for the household as illustrated with the upward movement of the indifference
curve from point d to n. Time spent on self-employment remains at s1 (which is where
Πs = W is satisfied on both lines a–c–f and h–j–p). Time spent on paid employment
decreases from e1 to e1
′ and time spent on leisure increases from l1 to l′1.
The illustration in figure 5.1 assumes that the guaranteed benefit, tax rate and wages, are
such that the household is always better off with IA for the entire range of possible time
allocations to work (and leisure). In this case, the household faces only one tax scenario, t.
A special result may occur where a household faces an additional tax scenario depending
on the amount of time it allocates to work. As illustrated in figure 5.2, the parameters
g, t, W and Πs could be such that the household is eligible for IA when it allocates little
time to work but breaks away from IA when it allocates more time to work.
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Figure 5.3: Household time allocation, given an inertia equivalent capital k∗
Denote the given micro credit k in terms of its size relative to k∗. Specifically let
k = αk∗, where α may be greater than, equal to, or less than 1. en1 e
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As illustrated in figure 5.2, the parameters g, t, W and Πs could be such that the
household is eligible for IA when it allocates little time to work but breaks away
fr IA when it allocates more time to work.
For instance, a household that allocates only time s1 + e
￿￿
1 to work would have
earnings at point m which is below the IA eligibility limit. Therefore the household
would participate in the IA program where it faces the negative income tax rate, t
– and its total income would be at point m￿. On the other hand, a household that
allocates s1 + e1 to work (point d) would earn enough to become ineligible for IA
and therefore, would not face the tax rate t. A household at point d may face some
positive income tax rate depending on the prevailing tax rules for households whose
incomes are high enough to make them ineligible for IA. The important point
being made here is that the budget line becomes kinked for households whose tax
scenario depends on their time allocation to work. The kink is illustrated at point
z in figure 5.2. Given a kinked budget line, a household’s choice between IA and
no IA would depend on the shape of its indifference curve as illustrated in figure
5.2. The following analysis will assume that there is no kink in household’s budget
lines.
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Figure 5.3: Household time allocation, given an inertia equivalent capital k∗
Denote the given micro credit k in terms of its size relative to k∗. Specifically let
k = αk∗, where α may be greater than, equal to, or less than 1. en1 e
a
1 s
a
1 s
n
1 s
n
2 s
a
2
Πs Π¯s Π¯(s, k) w
64
slope = - (1- t) 
Chapter 5.
(5.13)
∂2E(U)
∂s∂γ
= E[π￿(s)U ￿(Y )] ≥ 0
equations 5.11 and 5.12 respectively become
de
dγ
=
∂2E(U)
∂s∂γ
∂2E(U)
∂e∂s
|H| ≥ 0 (5.14)
and
ds
dγ
=
−∂2E(U)
∂e2
∂2E(U)
∂s∂γ
|H| ≤ 0 (5.15)
l1 l
￿
1 e
a
1 δ1 s
n
1 s
n
2 s
a
2 Πs Π¯s Π¯(s, k) w
74
a
z
Sanders, C. K., 2002. The impact of microenterprise assistance pro- grams: A
comparative study of program participants, nonparticipants, and other low-
wage workers. The Social Service Review 76 (2), 321 - 340.
Sandmo, A., 1971. On the theory of the competitive firm under price uncertainty.
The American Economic Review 61 (1), 65 - 73.
Servon, L. J., Ba es, T., 1998. Micro nterprise as an exit route from poverty:
Recommendations for programs and policy makers. Journal of Urban Affairs
20 (4), 419 - 441.
Spalter-Roth, R., Soto, E., Zandniapour, L., 1994. Microenterprise and women:
The viability of self-employment as a strategy for alleviating poverty. Tech.
rep., Institute for Women’s Policy Re- search, Washington, D.C.
Taub, R. P., 1998. Making the adaptation across cultures and societies: A report
on an att mpt to clone the Grameen Bank in southern Arkansas. Journal of
Developmental Entrepreneurship 3 (1), 53 - 69.
Wehrell, R., 2002. The Atlantic micro credit social economic impact study. Final
report, Atlantic Canada Opportunity Agency and the Steering Committee to
Coordinate Research on Micro Credit in Atlantic Canada.
Williams, T., 2004. Requiem for microcredit? The demise of a romantic ideal.
Banking and Finance Law Review 19 (2), 145 - 198.
Zephyr, A. M., 2004. Money is not enough: Social capital and microcredit.
Iss es in Political Economy 13, 1 - 12.
j￿ h￿ n￿
22
m
slope = - (1- t) W
slope = - W
m
Sanders, C. K., 2002. The impact of microenterp ise assistance pro- grams: A
comparative study of program participants, nonparticipants, and other low-
w g workers. The Soci l Service Review 76 (2), 321 - 340.
Sandmo, A., 1971. On the theory of the competitive firm under price uncertainty.
The American Economic Review 61 (1), 65 - 73.
Servon, L. J., Bates, T., 1998. Microenterprise as an exit route from poverty:
Recommendations for programs and policy makers. Journal of Urban Affairs
20 (4), 419 - 441.
Spalter-Roth, R., Soto, E., Zandniapour, L., 1994. Microenterprise and women:
The viability of self-employment as a strat gy for allevi ting poverty. Tech.
rep., Institute for Women’s Policy Re- search, Washington, D.C.
Taub, R. P., 1998. Making the adaptation acr ss cultures and societies: A report
on an attempt to clone the Grameen Bank in southern Arkan as. Jo rnal of
Developmental Entrepreneurship 3 (1), 53 - 69.
Wehrell, R., 2002. The Atlantic micro credit social economic impact study. Final
report, Atlantic Canada Opportunity Agency and the St ering Committee to
Coordinate Research on Micro Credit in Atlantic Canada.
Williams, T., 2004. Requiem for microcredit? The demise of a romantic ideal.
Banking and Finance Law Review 19 (2), 145 - 198.
Zephyr, A. M., 2004. Money is not enough: Social capital and microcredit.
Issues in Political Economy 13, 1 - 12.
j￿ h￿ n￿
22
Income
(Y )
j
Sanders, C. K., 2002. The impact of microenterprise assistance pro- grams: A
comparative study f program partici ants, nonparticipants, and other l w-
wage workers. The Social Service Review 76 (2), 321 - 340.
Sandmo, A., 1971. On the theory of the competitive firm under price uncertainty.
The American Economic Review 61 (1), 65 - 73.
Servon, L. J., Bates, T., 1998. Microenterprise as an exit route from poverty:
Recommendations for programs and policy makers. Journal of Urban Affairs
20 (4), 419 - 441.
Spalter-Roth, R., Soto, E., Zandniapour, L., 1994. Microent rpris and women:
The viability of self-employment as a strategy for allevi ting p verty. Tech.
rep., Insti ut for Women’s Policy Re- search, Washington, D.C.
Taub, R. P., 1998. Making the adaptation across cultures and societies: A report
on an attempt to clone the Grameen Bank in southern Arkansas. Journal of
Developme t l Entrepreneu ship 3 (1), 53 - 69.
Wehrell, R., 2002. The Atlantic micro credit social economic impact study. Final
report, Atlantic Canada Opportunity Agency and the Steering Committee to
Coordinate Research on Micro Credit in Atlantic Canada.
Williams, T., 2004. Requiem for microcredit? The demise of a romantic ideal.
Banking and Finance Law Review 19 (2), 145 - 198.
Zephyr, A. M., 2004. Money is not enough: Social capital and microcredit.
Issues in Political Economy 13, 1 - 12.
j￿ h￿ n￿
22
s
s
e
Chapter 5.
(5.13)
∂2E(U)
∂s∂γ
= E[π￿(s)U ￿(Y )] ≥ 0
equations 5.11 and 5.12 respectively become
de
dγ
=
∂2E(U)
∂s∂γ
∂2E(U)
∂e∂s
|H| ≥ 0 (5.14)
and
ds
dγ
=
−∂2E(U)
∂e2
∂2E(U)
∂s∂γ
|H| ≤ 0 (5.15)
l1 l
￿
1 e
a
1 δ1 s
n
1 s
n
2 s
a
2 Πs Π¯s Π¯(s, k) w
74
e
Sanders, C. K., 2002. The impact of microenterprise ass stance pro- grams: A
comparative study of program participant , n participants, a d oth low-
wage workers. The Soci l S rvice Review 76 (2), 321 - 340.
Sandmo, A., 197 . On the theory of the competitive firm nder price unc rtainty.
The American Econ mic Revi w 61 (1), 65 - 73.
Servon, L. J., Bates, T., 1998. Microenterprise as an exit route from poverty:
Recommendations for progr ms and policy makers. Journal of Urban Affairs
20 (4), 419 - 441.
Spalter-Roth, R., Soto, E., Zandniapour, L., 1994. Microenterprise and women:
The v bility of self-employme t as a strategy f r lleviating poverty. Tech.
rep., Inst tute for Women’s Policy Re- search, Washington, D.C.
Taub, R. P., 1998. Making the adaptati n across cultures and societi s: A report
on an attempt to clone the Grameen Bank in southern Arkansas. Journal of
Developmental Entrepreneurship 3 (1), 53 - 69.
Wehrell, R., 2002. The Atlantic micro credit social economic impact study. Final
report, Atlantic Canada Opportunity Agency and the Steering Committee to
Coordinate Research on Micro Credit in Atlantic Canada.
Williams, T., 2004. Requiem for microcredit? The demise of a romantic ideal.
Banking and Finance Law Review 19 (2), 145 - 198.
Zephyr, A. M., 2004. Money is not enough: Social capital and microcredit.
Issues in Political Economy 13, 1 - 12.
j￿ h￿ n￿
22
Chapter 5.
(5.13)
∂2E(U)
∂s∂γ
= E[π￿(s)U ￿(Y )] ≥ 0
equations 5.11 and 5.12 respectively become
de
dγ
=
∂2E(U)
∂s∂γ
∂2E(U)
∂e∂s
|H| ≥ 0 (5.14)
and
ds
dγ
=
−∂2E(U)
∂e2
∂2E(U)
∂s∂γ
|H| ≤ 0 (5.15)
l1 l
￿
1 e
a
1 δ1 s
n
1 s
n
2 s
a
2 Πs Π¯s Π¯(s, k) w
74
Sanders, C. K., 2002. The impact of microenterprise assistance pro- grams: A
comparative study of program participants, nonparticipa ts, and o her l w-
wage workers. The Social Service Review 76 (2), 321 - 340.
Sandmo, A., 1971. On the theory of the competitive firm un er price uncert inty.
The American Economic Review 61 (1), 65 - 73.
Servon, L. J., Bates, T., 1998. Microenterprise as an exit route from poverty:
Recommendations for programs and policy makers. Journal f Urban Affairs
20 (4), 419 - 441.
Spalter-Roth, R., Soto, E., Zandniapour, L., 1994. Microenterprise and women:
The viability of self-employment as a strategy for alleviating poverty. ech.
rep., Institute for Women’s Policy Re- search, Washington, D.C.
Taub, R. P., 1998. Making the adaptation across cultures and s cieties: A report
on an attempt to clone the Grameen Bank in southern Arkansas. Journal of
Developmental Entrepreneurship 3 (1), 53 - 69.
Wehrell, R., 2002. The Atlantic micro credit social economic impact study. Final
report, Atlantic Canada Opportunity Agency and the Steering Committee to
Coordinate Research on Micro Credit in Atlantic Canada.
Williams, T., 2004. Requiem for microcredit? The demise of a romantic ideal.
Banking a Finance Law Review 19 (2), 145 - 198.
Zephyr, A. M., 2004. Money is not enough: Social capital and microcredit.
Issues in Political Economy 13, 1 - 12.
j￿ h￿ n￿
22
Figure 5.2: A Case with Alternative Tax Scenarios
Figures 5.1 suggests that a type-1 household that decides to participate in an IA
program would always decrease its time allocation to work. The marginal effect
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As illu trated in figure 5.2, the parameters g, t, W and Πs could be such that the
household is eligible for IA when it allocates little time to work but breaks away
from IA when it allocates more time to work.
For instance, a household that allocat s only time s+e to work would have earnings
at point m which is below the IA eligibility limit. Therefore the household would
participate in the IA program where it faces the negative income tax rate, t, and its
total income would be at point m￿. On the other hand, a household that allocates
s+e￿ to work (point d) would earn enough to become ineligible for IA and therefore,
would not face the tax rate t. A household at point d may face s me positive income
tax rate depending on the prevailin tax rules for households whose incomes are
high enough to make them ineligible for IA. Th important point being made here
is that the budget line becomes kinked for households whose tax scenario depends
on their time allocation to work. The kink is illustrated at point z in figure 5.2.
Given a kinked budget line, a hous hold’s choice b tween IA and no IA would
depend on the shape of its indifference curve as illustrated in figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.3: Household time allocation, given an inertia equivalent capital k∗
Deno e t e given micro credit k in terms of its size relative to k∗. Specifically let
k = αk∗, where α may be greater than, equal to, or less than 1. en1 e
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As illustrated in figure 5.2, the para ers g, t, W and Πs could be such that the
household is eligible for IA when it allo ates little time to work but breaks away
fr IA when it allocates more time to wo .
For instance, a household that allocates only t me s1 + e
￿￿
1 to work w uld have
earnings at point m which is below the IA eligibility limit. Therefore the household
would participate in the IA program where it faces the negative income tax rate, t
– and its total income would be at point m￿. On the other hand, a household that
allocates s1 + e1 to work (point d) would earn enough to become ineligible for IA
and therefore, would not face the tax rate t. A household at point d may face some
positive income tax rate depending on the prevailing tax rules for households whose
incomes are high enough to make them ineligible for IA. The important point
being made here is that the budget line becomes kinked for households whose tax
scenario depends on their time allocation to work. The kink is illustrated at point
z in figure 5.2. Given a kinked budget line, a household’s choice between IA and
no IA would depend on the shape of its indifference curve as illustrated in figure
5.2. The following analysis will assume that there is no kink in household’s budget
lines.
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Figure 5.3: Household time allocation, given an inertia equivalent capital k∗
Denote the given micro credit k in terms of its size relative to k∗. Specifically let
k = αk∗, where α may be greater than, equal to, or less than 1. en1 e
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The following analysis will assum that there are no kinks in households’ budget
lines. Figure 5.1 suggests that a type-1 household that decides to participate in
an IA program would always decrease its time allocation to work. The marginal
effect of the guaranteed benefit g on time allocation to work by a type-1 household
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As illustrated in figure 5.2, the parameters g, t, W and Πs could be such that the
household is eligible for IA when it allocates little time to wor but breaks away
from IA when it allocates more time to work.
For instance, a household that allocates only time s+e to work would have earnings
at point which is below the IA eligibility limit. Therefore the household would
participate in the IA program where it faces the negative income tax rate, t, and its
total income would be at point m￿. On the other hand, a household that allocates
s+e￿ to work (point d) would earn enough to become ineligible for IA and therefore,
would not face the tax rate t. A household at point d may face some positive income
tax rate depending on the prevailing tax rules for households whose incomes are
high enough to make them ineligible for IA. The important point being made here
is that the budget line becomes kinked for households whose tax scenario depends
on their time allocation to work. The kink is illustrated at point z in figure 5.2.
Given a kinked budget line, a household’s choice between IA and no IA would
depend on the shape of its indifference curve as illustrated in fig re 5.2
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Chapter 5.
As illu rat d in figur 5.2, the parameters g, t, W and Πs could be such that the
household is eligible f r IA when it allo ates little time to work but breaks away
fr IA when it allocates more time to wor .
For insta ce, a household that allocates o ly time s1 +
￿￿
1 to work would h ve
earnings at point m which is below the IA eligibility limit. Therefore the household
would participate in the IA program where it faces the negative i come tax rate, t
– and its total income would be at point m￿. On the other hand, a household that
allocates s1 + e1 to work (point d) would earn enough to become ineligible for IA
and therefore, ould not face the tax rate t. A household at point d may face some
positive income tax rate depending on the prevailing tax rules for households whose
incomes are high enough to make them ineligible for IA. he important point
being made her is th the budget line becomes kink d for households whose tax
scenario depends on th ir time allocation to work. The kink is illu trated at point
z in figure 5.2. Given a kinked budget line, a household’s choice between IA and
no IA would depend on the shape of its indifference curve as illustrated in figure
5.2. The following analysis will assume that there is no kink in household’s budget
lines.
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Figure 5.3: Household time allocation, given an inertia equivalent capital k∗
Denote the given micro credit k in terms of its size relative to k∗. Specifically let
k = αk∗, where α may be greater than, equal to, or less than 1. en1 e
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Chapter 5.
As illust ated in figu e 5.2, the pa ameters g, , W and Πs could be such that the
household is eligible for IA when it allocates little time to work but breaks away
from IA when it allocates more time to work.
For instance, a household that all cates o ly time s+e to work would have earning
at point m which is below the IA eligibility limit. Therefor the househol would
participate in the IA program where it faces the negative income tax rate, t, and its
total income would be at point m￿. On the other hand, a household that allocates
s+e￿ to work (point d) would earn enough to become ineligible for IA and ther f re,
would not face the tax rate t. A household at point may face some positive inc m
tax rate depending on the prevaili g tax rules for househol s whose inco s re
high enough to make them ineligible for IA. The important poi t bei g mad here
is that the budget line becomes kinked for households whose tax scenario d pends
on their time allocation to work. The kink is illustrated a point z in figure 5.2.
Given a kinked budget line, a household’s choic betw IA and no I w uld
depend on the shape of its indifference curve a illustra ed in figure 5 2.
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As illustrated in figure 5.2, the parameters g, t, W and Πs could be such that the
household is eligible for IA when it allocates little time to work but breaks away
from IA when it allocates more ime o work.
For instance, a household that allocates nly time s+e t work would have earnings
at point m which is below the IA eligibility limit. Therefore e househol wou d
participate in the IA program where it faces the negative income tax rate, t, a its
total income would be at point m￿. On the other hand, a household that allocates
s+e￿ to work (point d) would earn enough to become ineligible for IA and therefore,
would not face the tax rate . A hous ho d at p int d may face some positiv income
tax rate depending on the prevaili g tax rules for households whose incomes ar
high enough to make them ineligible for IA. The important point b ing made here
is that the budget line becomes kinked for house olds whose t x sc ari dep nd
on their time allocation to work. The kink is illustrated at point z i figure 5 2.
Given a kinked budget line, a household’s choice between IA a d no IA would
depend on the shape of its indifference curve as illustrated in fi re 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Illustration of the Case where Labour Allocation Affects IA Eligibility
For instance, a household at allocates only time s + e to work would hav earn ngs at
point m which is below the IA eligibility limit. Therefore t e household would parti ipate
in the IA pro ram where it faces the negative income tax rate, t, and its total income
would be at point m′. On the other hand, a household that allocates s+ e′ to work (point
d) would earn enough to become ineligible for IA and therefore, would not face the tax
rate t. A household at point d may face some positive income tax rate depe ing on
the prevailing tax rules for households whose i comes are high ough to mak em
ineligible for IA. The important point being made here is that the budget li becom s
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kinked for households whose tax scenario depends on their time allocation to work. The
kink is illustrated at point z in figure 5.2. Given a kinked budget line, a household’s choice
between IA and no IA would depend on the position of its indifference curve as illustrated
in figure 5.2.
The following analysis will assume that there are no kinks in households’ budget lines.
Figure 5.1 suggests that a type-1 household that decides to participate in an IA program
would always decrease its time allocation to work. The marginal effect of the guaranteed
benefit g on time allocation to work by a type-1 household can be found by totally
differentiating (5.5) and (5.6) with respect to s, e and g. This yields
ds1
dg
= 0 (5.10)
de1
dg
=
−WUY Y (1− t)
UY Y (1− t)2W 2 + Ull ≤ 0 (5.11)
Therefore, for a type-1 household, the work disincentive of an IA program with t < 1
implies a reduction in time allocated to paid work while time allocated to the microen-
terprise remains unchanged.
For a type-2 household, a comparison of equations (4.6) and (5.8) shows the household
decreases time allocation to the microenterprise as a consequence of IA. See proof in
appendix. Figure 5.3 illustrates the disincentive effect of IA for a type-2 household. The
household responds to IA by moving upward from the indifference curve through point b
to the curve through point i. As a result, time allocation to the microenterprise decreases
from s2 to s
′
2 while leisure increases from l2 to l
′
2.
Totally differentiating (5.6) with respect to s and g gives the marginal effect of g on time
allocation by the type-2 household.
ds2
dg
=
−UY Y Πs(1− t)
UY Y (1− t)2Π2s + ΠssUY (1− t) + Ull
≤ 0 (5.12)
An interesting case to consider is when microenterprise profits are taxed at a lesser rate
than the tax rates on wage earnings. This is indeed the experience in some jurisdictions.
For instance, the Microenterprise Tax Credit Act of Nebraska allocates $2 million annually
to provide tax credit for microentepreneurs who expand their microenterprises. Such tax
credits lower the effective tax rate on the microenterprise profits. If a lower tax rate on
the microenterprise profits is assumed (say the tax rate on the microenterprise is t′ < t,
while the tax rate on wage earnings remains at t), the budget line would become steeper
in the region in which time is allocated to the microenterprise. A steeper budget line
implies that more time would be allocated to the microenterprise by both the type-1 and
the type-2 household.
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Figure 5.3: Effect of IA on Time Allocated to MC by a Type-2 Household (t < 1)
Complete Nonadoption of MC by Households Facing t =1
For t = 1, equations 5.7 and 5.8 give Ul/UY = 0, for the type-1 and type-2 household
respectively. This condition occurs only at the corner (e = 0, s = 0, l = 1). This is shown
in figure 5.4. Utility is maximized at point h, and the maximized utility is U(g, 1).
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Figure 5.4: Effect of IA on Time Allocated to MC by Types 1 and 2 Households (t = 1)
Overall, the traditional model suggests that any household would decrease time allocation
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to work as a consequence of IA. If the IA program applies a less than 100% tax rate on
earnings, then both household types may obtain the microcredit loan in spite of IA. The
type-1 household would decrease only time spent in paid work while time allocated to
the microenterprise remains unchanged. The type-2 household on the other hand would
reduce time allocation to the microenterprise. When faced with a 100% tax rate, both
type-1 and type-2 households would prefer not to work and therefore would not obtain
the microcredit loan.
As explained in the introductory part of this chapter, some IA recipients facing a 100%
earnings tax rate have been observed to allocate time to microcredit. Participation in
microcredit programs by such IA recipients may be explained by the sequential lending
of microcredit. The next section applies the multi-period model developed in chapter 4
to explain the partial adoption of microcredit among IA recipients facing t = 1.
5.3 Explaining Partial Adoption of MC under t=1
Under the sequential lending attribute of microcredit, the maximum loan size available
to a participating household increases with the number of loans it has successfully bor-
rowed and repaid. A typical first-time borrower of a microcredit loan is eligible for only
$1,000. In subsequent applications to the program, the returning borrower is eligible for
higher amounts up to the maximum specified by the program. The maximum amount
ranges from $5,000 to $35,000 across the MC programs in the United States and Canada.
Additionally, the credit histories accumulated during the period of participating in the
microcredit program may facilitate the household’s access to larger loans from conven-
tional sources. Sequential lending, therefore, means an IA recipient who participates in
the microcredit program in the current period may be able to access a larger loan at a
future period. It follows that the adoption decisions by IA recipients can be analyzed by
a multi-period model.
5.3.1 The Multi-Period Model
Suppose an income assistance recipient lives in two periods. Assume for now that there
are no program limits on the duration of assistance. Hence, the households may also
receive IA in the future period. To keep the analysis simple, suppose the tax rate on the
IA program is t = 1, there is no stigma from IA dependency, and the households have no
intention to default on the MC program. The effect of sequential lending can be analyzed
by assuming the first loan a household gets is k¯, the next loan is 2k¯ and y(k¯) < g < y(2k¯),
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where y(k) = We+Π(s, k) represents household earnings and g represents the guaranteed
amount on the IA program. With t = 1, a household with a microcredit loan of amount
k¯ will not allocate any time to paid work since the overall effect on current income would
be zero (that is e = 0 for k = k¯).5
Figure 5.5 shows a household’s decision alternatives in each period along with their as-
sociated outcomes. A household that borrows k¯ in the current period is at node a. It
may invest the loan on a microenterprise (node c), and generate some revenue before
repaying the loan with interest. At node c, the household allocates time, s, to the mi-
croenterprise. It makes profit Π(s, k¯) = Pf(s, k¯)−R where f(s, k¯) is output, P is output
price, Pf(s, k¯) is total revenue, and R = k¯ + r is repayment of loan k¯ and interest r to
the lender. The household’s total income is the microenterprise profit Π(s, k¯), plus its IA
benefit g − tΠ(s, k¯). With t = 1 total income at this node is g. Therefore, the household
gets utility V (g, 1− s) for the period, where 1− s represents time spent on leisure.
V (g, 1− s)
V (3k¯)
Loan
e
V (g, 1− s)
g
V (g, 1)
h
No Loan
f
Invested
c
V (g − r, 1)
V (2k¯)
Loan
i
V (g, 1)
No Loan
j
Not invested
d
MC
a
V (g, 1)
V (g, 1− s)
MC
l
V (g, 1)
No MC
m
No MC
b
Figure 5.5: Decision Tree for IA Recipient Contemplating Participation in a Microcredit
Program
On the other hand, the household may obtain the MC loan in the current period and
repay it without ever making an investment (node d). In such a case, current borrowing is
only a strategy for accessing the larger loan at a future period. At node d, the household
allocates its entire time to leisure, and gets the guaranteed amount g in IA benefit. The
income at its disposal is g − r and its maximum utility V (g − r, 1).
As a third alternative, the household may decide not to borrow in the current period
(node b). In such a case, its entire time would be allocated to leisure and its total income
5It is assumed that current income is the only motivation for paid work and that work experience
would not have any impact on paid wages at a future date; this is mostly true for unskilled labour.
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would be the guaranteed amount on the IA program. Its maximized utility for the period
would be V (g, 1).
Payoff in the second period depends on which one of the alternatives was adopted in the
first. If the household had successfully participated in the microcredit program in the first
period, it would be able to obtain a loan of amount 2k¯ in the second. This may either be
a “next loan” from the same MC program or a conventional form of business loan from
other sources. However, given that this is the last period in the household’s lifetime, it
would no longer borrow as a strategy for accessing future loans. Hence, it does not obtain
any loans in the second period unless it intends to invest.
If the household had invested the microcredit in the first period, then by the beginning of
period 2 it would already have business capital (equipment) worth k¯ dollars.6 Therefore,
if it borrows the next loan of 2k¯ in the second period (node e), it has total capital of 3k¯
and earnings y(3k¯) > g. The earnings may be coming entirely from the microenterprise
or it may include earnings from paid work. In either case, y(3k¯) > g implies the house-
hold would not be eligible for IA in that period. Household utility at node e would be
V [y(3k¯, e∗, s∗), 1− e∗ − s∗] where e∗ and s∗ are utility maximizing allocations of time to
paid work and the microenterprise respectively. To keep the notation compact, denote
V [y(3k¯, e∗, s∗), 1− e∗ − s∗] as V (3k¯).
However, a household that invested the MC in the first period might not take a loan
in the second (node f). It may continue in self-employment on its accumulated capital
k¯ (node g ). At this node, it continues to allocate s to the microenterprise with profit
Π(s, k¯) = Pf(s, k¯). The household does not incur a cost on capital at this node (i.e.,
R = 0). If Pf(s, k¯) < g, the household would still be eligible for income assistance,
total income at this node would be the guaranteed IA benefit g and utility would be
V (g, 1 − s). On the other hand, if Pf(s, k¯) > g, the household would break away from
income assistance and may obtain higher levels of income and utility by taking up a wage
job in addition to the self-employment. Assume the former case is what obtains at node
g (i.e., Pf(s, k¯) < g and utility is V (g, 1− s)). The reader may wish to return here later,
to verify that the main results of the model would not change if the latter case were
assumed.
An IA recipient who invested the MC in the first period, may decide in the second period
to relinquish self-employment altogether in which case it would rely fully on IA (node h).
At this node, it gets utility V (g, 1) .
6To simplify the analysis, assume the first loan was spent on the purchase of some business equipment
and that there is no depreciation. Relaxing these assumptions will only complicate the model without
changing the main results.
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A household at node i gets 2k¯ in loan by virtue of having participated in the microcredit
program in the first period. However, it has no standing investment and no accumulated
capital since it did not invest the first loan. It earns y(2k¯) > g and its utility is V (2k¯).
Alternatively, this household may decide not to take a loan in the second period (node
j). It remains eligible for IA, getting g in total income and V (g, 1) in utility.
At node l, the household would be a first-time borrower since it did not participate in an
MC program in the first period. Hence, it can only get the specified amount k¯ of MC. Its
utility from investing the loan is V (g, 1−s). On the other hand, the household may again
choose not to obtain the microcredit (node m). Under this choice, it continues to rely on
IA and to allocate all its time to leisure. Its maximized utility for the period remains at
V (g, 1).
Assume V (2k¯) > V (g, 1). In other words, the household would prefer a loan of size 2k¯ to
IA. By backward induction, the decision tree becomes as shown in figure 5.6 below.
V (g, 1− s)
V (3k¯)
Loan
e
Invested
c
V (g − r, 1)
V (2k¯)
Loan
i
Not invested
d
MC
a
V (g, 1)
V (g, 1)
No MC
m
No MC
b
Figure 5.6: Possible Decision Alternatives after Backward Induction
Label path a–c–e with invested microcredit as IMC; path a–d–i with strategic borrowing
as SMC. A household on either IMC or SMC is simultaneously participating in the IA
and MC programs. Define path b–m with no microcredit as NMC. A household on NMC
is participating only in the IA program. The maximum utilities on paths IMC, SMC and
NMC are respectively
VIMC = V (g, 1− s) + δV (3k¯) (5.13)
VSMC = V (g − r, 1) + δV (2k¯) (5.14)
VNMC = V (g, 1) + δV (g, 1) (5.15)
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The parameter δ is a household-specific discount factor (time preference rate).
δ =
1
1 + τ
(5.16)
where τ ≥ 0 is a household-specific discount rate. Therefore, δ ∈ (0, 1) can be regarded
as a differentiating characteristic of households. Suppose there is a discount factor δA
at which a household is indifferent between NMC and SMC, equating VNMC with VSMC
gives
δA =
V (g, 1)− V (g − r, 1)
V (2k¯)− V (g, 1) (5.17)
Households with δ < δA would prefer to remain on only the IA program. Those with
δ > δA would simultaneously participate in the IA and MC programs.
The numerator in equation 5.17 is the loss in current utility that a household would
experience from borrowing the current microcredit for the strategic purpose of accessing a
future loan. The denominator is the gain in utility that the household would experience at
a future date from having engaged in strategic borrowing in the current period. It follows
that δA would fall within the feasible region of household discount factors (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1)
only if the utility loss is no more than the utility gain. If the loss exceeds the gain, then
δA would exceed 1, meaning for all households, δ would be less than δA, and, therefore,
no household would be willing to engage in strategic borrowing.
Suppose there is a discount factor δB at which a household is indifferent between SMC
and IMC, equating VSMC with VIMC gives
δB =
V (g − r, 1)− V (g, 1− s)
V (3k¯)− V (2k¯) (5.18)
Households with δA < δ < δB would engage in strategic borrowing while those with
δ > δB would invest the microcredit.
Again, δB would exceed 1 if the numerator of 5.18 exceeds its denominator. In other words,
the current utility loss from making the investment rather than strategic borrowing would
exceed the future gain. If such happens, no IA recipient would invest the loan since δ ≤ 1
for all households.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the payoffs for a case where both δA and δB fall within the feasible
region of household δ. That is the case for 0 < δA < δB < 1. This results in partial
adoption of the microcredit loan k¯ among IA recipients. Households with 0 ≤ δ ≤ δA
would not adopt the microcredit, those with δA < δ < δB would engage in strategic
borrowing, while those with δ > δB would invest the microcredit.
The results here indicate a household facing a 100% earnings tax rate on the IA program
may not always opt out of the microcredit program. If the benefits from a next loan are
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0 1
node l. Thus node l is eliminated from the possible decisions. Similarly, node
g is eliminated from further consideration since it is inferior to node h. Thus,
conditional on the household choosing “MC invested” in the first period (node c)
it is left to compare between nodes e and h in the second period. V (0) < V (3k¯)
implies node e will be chosen. The decision tree without the eliminated strategies
and associated outcomes is shown below.
V (k¯)
V (3k¯)
MC
e
Invested
c
V (0|MC)
V (2k¯)
MC
i
V (0)
No MC
j
Not invested
d
MC
a
V (0)
V (0)
No MC
m
No MC
b
We now consider two alternative cases to arrive at the optimal strategy; case 1 in
which V (2k¯) > V (0) and case 2 in which V (2k¯) < V (0).
Case 1; V (2k¯) > V (0) In this case, node j is eliminated since it is preferred
to node i. Thus conditional on having borrowed the micro credit in the first
period (node a), the paths c–e is prefered to d–i if V (k¯) + δV (3k¯) is greater
than V (0|MC + δV (2k¯); where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is the household’s time preference rate.
Assuming households are uniformly distributed with respect to δ, figure illustrates
their payoff functions for the paths c–e and d–i. A household with δ∗ is indifferent
between ‘investing’ and ‘not investing’ the loan.
δ∗ =
V (0|MC)− V (k¯)
V (3k¯ − V (2k¯) (5.49)
Case 2; V (2k¯) < V (0)
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Household Utility
Differentiating Household Discount Factor 
It is commonly believed that Micro Credit (MC) Programs have little value for
households in North America given the small sizes of the loans they offer, as well
as the relative availability of alternative paid work for would-be beneficiaries of
the programs. The demand for MC is low partly because many households are
better off working as employees rather than as micro entrepreneurs. Further, mi-
cro enterprises, like every other business, have to cope with uncertainties, so that
risk-averse low-income households may prefer to remain in a wage job in which
the monthly paycheck is guaranteed. Against this reality some North American
households have participated in micro credit programs, suggesting they may be
better off in self-employment than as wage workers. Some individuals simultane-
ously allocate their time to both paid and self-employment. This paper presents
two alternative frameworks for explaining a households time allocation to MC.
The first – a static utility maximization framework draws from existing theory of
household time allocation between wage work and household work. A household’s
time allocation is influenced by it degree of risk aversion, its relative preference
for leisure as well as by the amount of capital available from the micro credit pro-
gram. The static f mework however does not explain a household’s willingness
to allocate time to micro credit even when doing so results in a short fall in its
current income. This is explained under a second framework – a dynamic utility
maximization framework which shows that the ema d for MC in North Amer-
ica is due partly to the sequential lending characteristic of most of the programs.
Sequential lending means that a household’s current use of the micro credit gives
it access to greater funds in the future. Under the dynamic utility maximization
framework, the effect of current time allocation to micro credit on a household’s
stream of future utilities is captured. The implication of this on current demand
for micro credit is explored. Under certain conditions, the household - in a bid
to access a future loan - would borrow money in the short run and repay it with-
out having invested it in a micro enterprise. The likelihood of this happening
however disappears with an increase in the cost of borrowing, or an increase in
the lifetime net benefit from investing. Results of the dynamic utility maximisa-
tion framework implies a positive effect of sequential lending on demand for the
current micro credit for households with high rate of time preference and a high
expectation of the future benefits. Hence the persistent low demand faced by the
programs in North America could be the result of most households having a low
rate of time preference, such that they ignore all future streams of benefits that
could accrue from current participation. Alternatively, it may be the case that the
future benefits are themselves too small such that even households with high rate
of time preference do not consider these benefits as sufficient incentive for current
participation. There is yet a third possible explanation. It may be the case that
households have a high rate of time preference and the future benefits are large
but that households have no awareness of (or have a mistaken belief about) the
size of the benefits. Implications for a policy to increase the rate of participation
in North America’s MC programs are discussed.
Household Utility Differe tiating Household Discount Fact (δ)
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VSMC
NMC
Household Utility
VIMC
U(g|e) and U(g) respectively.
On the other hand, the household is at node a if it obtains the micro credit in
the current p rio . D note the amount approved to first time borrowers as k¯.
Having borrowed the amount, it may invest it in some micro enterprise (node c),
or simply repay it without making any investment (node c￿). In either case the
household may or may not have a wage job. If it does not invest the borr wed
micro credit and has no wage job (node d￿), its utility is U(g − r, 1), where r
represents the interest and any other costs of having borrowed the loan. But its
utility is U(g− r, 1− e) f it is u der node c￿ with a wage job (node d). We pref r
to specify U(g− r, 1) and U(g− r, 1− e) as U(g|r) and U(g|r,e) respectively.
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Figure 5: Decision Tr e for an IA Recipi t C ntempl ting Participation in a
Micro Credit Program
If the household invests the current loan k¯ (that is at node c), current period
earnings is either Y (k¯, e, s) = We + Π(s, k¯) if it is also engaged in paid work, or
Y (k¯, s) = Π(s, k¯) otherwise. The household loses eligibility for income assistance
if its earnings is greater than the guaranteed benefit g. Hence if also engaged in
paid work (node e), the household’s utility U(k¯, e, s) is
U(k¯, e, s)

= U [Y (k¯, e, s)] if Y (k¯, e, s) > g
= U(g|e,s) if Y (k¯, e, s) < g
(10)
10
engage in strategic borrowing.
δSMC =
V (g, 1)− V (g − r, 1)
V (2k¯)− V (g, 1) (20)
d δSMC
dg
=
VY (g)− VY (g − r)
V (2k¯)− V ( , 1) +
VY (g) [V (g, 1)− V (g − r, 1)]
[V (2k¯)− V (g, 1)]2 (21)
d δSMC
dg
> 0 if
V (g, 1)− V (g − r, 1)
V (2k¯)− V (g, 1) >
VY [g − r]
VY [g]
− 1 (22)
It should be obviou that if r = 0, then δSMC =
VY [g−r]
VY [g]
− 1 = 0. Further δSMC
increases in r while VY [g−r]
VY [g]
− 1 decreases in r. Therefore the inequality in 22
actually holds at as long as there is a cost involved in borrowing the micro credit.
Thus with an increase in the guaranteed IA benefit, less households borrow the
micro credit for the strategic purpose of accessing a future loan.
Notice that we denote the critical time preference rate in equation 20 as δ0. This
critical value is a function of the cost r of borrowing the current micro credit.
This cost directly affects the value of U(g|r) but has no effect on U(g) and the
utility from future loans U(2k¯, e, s). At a low cost of current borrowing, U(g|r) is
high and therefore δ0 is low. However as the cost of borrowing increases, U(g|r)
decreases and thus δ0 increases. Let δ
L
0 represent the low (L) value of δ
0 at some
arbitrary low r. And let δH0 represent the high (H) value of δ0 at an arbitrary high
r. Then δL0 and δ
H
0 represent the lower and upper bounds of δ0 of as r moves from
low to high. This is shown in figure 4.8 below.
Similarly, by comparing between the payoffs from the alternative decision paths,
it is found that Full IA Dependency is preferred to “Partial IA Dependency with
Self Employment” if
δIMC =
V (g − r, 1)− V (g, 1− s)
V (3k¯)− V (2k¯) (23)
d δIMC
dg
=
V 0Y (g − r)− V sY (g)
V (3k¯)− V (2k¯) (24)
We note that δ1 is unaffected by the cost of borrowing the current loan. As r
increases (decreases), the earnings from self employment (given s) may decrease
(increase). But this is always compensated for by the IA benefit which ensures the
16
engage in strategic borrowing.
δSMC =
V (g, 1)− V (g − r, 1)
V (2k¯)− V (g, 1) (20)
d δSMC
dg
=
VY (g)− VY (g − r)
V (2k¯)− V (g, 1) +
VY (g) [V (g, 1)− V (g − r, 1)]
[V (2k¯)− V (g, 1)]2 (21)
d δSMC
dg
> 0 if
V (g, 1)− V (g − r, 1)
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− 1 (22)
It shoul be obvious that if r = 0, then δSMC =
VY [g−r]
VY [g]
− 1 = 0. Further δSMC
increases in r while VY [g− ]
VY [g]
− 1 decreases in r. Therefore the inequality in 22
actually holds a as long as there is a cost involved in borrowing the micro credit.
Thus with an increase in the guaranteed IA benefit, less households borrow the
micro credit for the trategic purpose of acc ssing a future loan.
Notice that we denote the critical time preference rate in equation 20 as δ0. This
critical valu i a function of the cost r of borrowing the current micro credit.
This cost directly affects the value of U(g|r) but has no effect on U(g) and the
utility from future loans U(2k¯, e, s). At a low cost of current borrowing, U(g|r) is
high and therefore δ0 is low. However as the cost of borrowing increases, U(g|r)
decreases and thus δ0 increases. Let δ
L
0 represent the low (L) value of δ
0 at some
arbitrary low r. And let δH0 represent the high (H) value of δ0 at an arbitrary high
r. Then δL0 and δ
H
0 pres nt he lower upper bounds of δ0 of as r moves from
low to high. This is shown in figure 4.8 below.
Similarly, by co paring betw en th payoffs from he alternative decision paths,
it is found that Full IA Dependency is preferred to “Partial IA Dependency with
Self Employment” if
δIMC =
V (g − r, 1)− V (g, 1− s)
V (3k¯ − V (2k¯) (23)
d δIMC
dg
=
V 0Y (g − r)− V sY )
(3k¯) (2k¯)
(24)
We note that δ1 is unaffected by the cost of borrowing the current loan. As r
increases (decreases), the earnings from self employment (given s) may decrease
(increase). But this is always compensated for by the IA benefit which ensures the
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U(g|e) and U(g) respectively.
On the other hand, the household is at node a if it obtains the micro credit in
the current period. Denote the amount approved to first time borr w rs as k¯.
Having borrowed the amount, it may invest it in some micro enterprise (node c),
or simply repay it without making any investment (node c￿). In either case the
household may or may not have a wage job. If it does not inv t he borrowed
micro credit and has no wage job (node d￿), its utility is U(g − r, 1), where r
represents the interest and any other costs of having borrowed the loan. But its
utility is U(g− r, 1− e) if it is under node c￿ with a wage job (node d). We prefer
to specify U(g− r, 1) and U(g− r, 1− e) as U(g|r) and U(g|r,e) respectively.
V (g, 1− s)
V (3k¯)
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e
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V (g, 1)
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f
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c
V (g − r, 1)
V (2k¯)
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i
V (g, 1)
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j
Not invested
d
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a
V (g, 1)
V (g, 1− s)
MC
l
V (g, 1)
No MC
m
No MC
b
Figure 5: Decision Tree for an IA Recipient Contemplating Participation in a
Micro Credit Program
If the household invests the current loan k¯ (that is at node c), current period
earnings is either Y (k¯, e, s) = We + Π(s, k¯) if it is also engaged in paid work, or
Y (k¯, s) = Π(s, k¯) otherwise. The household loses eligibility for income assistance
if its earnings is greater than the guaranteed benefit g. Hence if also engaged in
paid work (node e), the household’s utility U(k¯, e, s) is
U(k¯, e, s)

= U [Y (k¯, e, s)] if Y (k¯, e, s) > g
= U(g|e,s) if Y (k¯, e, s) < g
(10)
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as NMC. A household on NMC is participating only in the IA program. The
maximum utilities on paths IMC, SMC and NMC are respectively
VIMC = V (g, 1− s) + δV (3k¯) (1)
VSMC = V (g − r, 1) + δV (2k¯) (2)
VNMC = V (g, 1) + δV (g, 1) (3)
The parameter δ is a household-specific discount factor (time preference rate).
δ =
1
1 + i
(4)
where i is a household-specific discount rate. Therefore δ ∈ (0, 1) can be regarded
as a differentiating characteristic of households. Figure 3 illustrates the payoffs
as functions of the household discount factor. This illustration depicts a situation
whereby a fraction of participants in an IA program (with a 100% tax rate) are
also participants in a micro credit program.
0 1
node l. Thus node l is eliminated from the possible decisions. Similarly, node
g is eliminated from further consideration since it is inferior to node h. Thus,
conditional on the hou ehold choosing “MC invested” in the first period (node c)
it is left to compare between nodes e and h in the second period. V (0) < V (3k¯)
implies node e will be chosen. The decision tree without the eliminated strategies
and associated outcomes is shown below.
V (k¯)
V (3k¯)
MC
Invest d
c
V (0|MC)
V (2k¯)
MC
i
V (0)
No MC
j
Not invest d
d
MC
a
V (0)
V (0)
No MC
m
No MC
b
We now consider two alternative cases to arrive at the optimal strategy; case 1 in
which V (2k¯) > V (0) and case 2 in which V (2k¯) < V (0).
Case 1; V (2k¯) > (0) In this case, node j is eliminated since it is preferred
to node i. Thus conditional on having borrowed the micro credit in the first
peri d (node a), the paths c– is prefered to d–i if V (k¯) + δV (3k¯) is greater
than V (0|MC + δV (2k¯); where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is the household’s time preference rate.
Ass ming households are uniformly distributed with respect to δ, figure illustrates
their payoff functions for the paths c–e and d–i. A household with δ∗ is indifferent
between ‘investing’ and ‘not investing’ the loan.
δ∗ =
V (0|MC)− V (k¯)
V (3k¯ − 2k¯) (5.49)
Case 2; V (2k¯) < V (0)
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Household Utility
Differentiating Household Discount Factor 
It is commonly believed that Micro Credit (MC) Programs have little value for
households in North America given the small sizes of the loans they offer, as well
as the relative availability of alternative paid work for would-be beneficiaries of
the programs. The demand for MC is low partly because many households are
better off working as employees rather than as micro entrepreneurs. Further, mi-
cro enterprises, like every other business, have to cope with uncertainties, so that
risk-averse low-income households may prefer to remain in a wage job in which
the monthly paych ck is guaranteed. Against this reality s me North American
households have participated in micro credit programs, suggesting they may be
better off in self-employment than as wage workers. Some individuals simultane-
ously allocate their time to both paid and self-employment. This paper presents
two alternative frameworks for explaining a households time allocation to MC.
The first – a static utility maximization framework draws from existing theory of
household time allocation between wage work and household work. A household’s
time allocation is influenced by it degree of risk aversion, its relative preference
for leisure as well as by the amount of capital available from the micro credit pro-
gram. The static f mework however does not explain a household’s willingness
to allocate time to micro credit even when doing so results in a short fall in its
current income. This is explained under a second framework – a dynamic utility
maximization framework which shows that the ema d for MC in North Amer-
ica is due partly to the sequential lending characteristic of most of the programs.
Sequential lending means that a household’s current use of the micro credit gives
it access to greater funds in the future. Under the dynamic utility maximization
framework, the effect of current time allocation to micro credit on a household’s
stream of future utilities is captured. The implication of this on current demand
for micro credit is explored. Under certain conditions, the household - in a bid
to access a future loan - would borrow money in the short run and repay it with-
out having invested it in a micro enterprise. The likelihood of this happening
however disappears with an increase i the cost of borrowing, or an increase in
the lifetime net benefit from investing. Results of the dynamic utility maximisa-
tion fram work implies a posit ve effect of sequenti l l ndi g on demand for the
current icro credi for households with high ate of time preference and a high
expectation of the future benefits. Hence the persistent low demand faced by the
programs in N rth America could be the result of most households having a low
rate of time preference, such that they ig ore all future streams of benefits that
c uld accru from current participation. Alternatively, it may be the case that the
future benefits are themselves too small such that even hou eholds with high rat
of time prefer nce do not consider these benefits s sufficient incentive for curre t
participation. There is yet a third possible explanation. It may be the case that
households have a high rate of time preference an the future benefits are large
but that households av n awarenes f ( have a mistaken belief about) the
size of th benefits. Implications for policy to ncr ase the rat of participation
in North America’s MC programs are discussed.
Household Utility Differe tiating Household Discount Fact (δ)
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VSMC
VNMC
Household Utility
VIMC
U(g|e) and U(g) respectively.
On the other hand, the household is at node a if it obtains the micro credit in
the current p rio . D note the amount approved to first time borrowers as k¯.
Having borrowed the amount, it may invest it in some micro enterprise (node c),
or simply repay it without making any investment (node c￿). In either case the
household may or may not have a wage job. If it does not invest the borr wed
micro cr dit and has no wage job (node d￿), its utility is U(g − r, 1), where r
represents the interest and any other costs of h ving borrowed the loan. But its
utility is U(g− r, 1− e) f it is u der node c￿ with a wa e job (node d). We pref r
to specify U(g− r, 1) and U(g− r, 1− ) as U(g|r) a d U(g|r,e) respectively.
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Figure 5: Decision Tr e for an IA Recipi t Contempl ting Participation in a
Micro Credit Program
If the household invests the current loan k¯ (that is at node c), current period
earnings is either Y (k¯, e, s) = We + Π(s, k¯) if it is also e aged i paid work, or
Y (k¯, ) = Π(s, k¯) otherwise. The household loses eligibility for inc e assistance
if its earnings is greater than the guaranteed b nefit g. Hence if also engaged in
paid work (node e), the household’s utility U(k¯, e, s) is
U(k¯, e, s)

= U [Y (k¯, e, s)] if Y (k¯, e, s) > g
= U(g|e,s) if Y (k¯, e, s) < g
(10)
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engage in strategic borrowing.
δSMC =
V (g, 1)− V (g − r, 1)
V (2k¯)− V (g, 1) (20)
d δSMC
dg
=
VY (g)− VY (g − r)
V (2k¯)− V ( , 1) +
VY (g) [V (g, 1)− V (g − r, 1)]
[V (2k¯)− V (g, 1)]2 (21)
d δSMC
dg
> 0 if
V (g, 1)− V (g − r, 1)
V (2k¯)− V (g, 1) >
VY [g − r]
VY [g]
− 1 (22)
It should be obviou that if r = 0, then δSMC =
VY [g−r]
VY [g]
− 1 = 0. Further δSMC
increases in r while VY [g−r]
VY [g]
− 1 decreases in r. Therefore the inequality in 22
actually holds at as long as there is a cost involved in borrowing the micro credit.
Thus with n increase in the guaranteed IA benefit, less households borrow the
micro credit for th s rategic purp se of accessing a future loan.
Notic that we denote the critical tim preference rate in equation 20 as δ0. This
critical value is a function of the cost r of borrowing the current micro credit.
This cost d rectly affect the value of U(g|r) but has no effect on U(g) and the
utility from futur loans U(2k¯, e, s). At low cost of current borrowing, U(g|r) is
high and therefor δ0 is low. However as the cost of borrowing increases, U(g|r)
decreases and thus δ0 increases. Let δ
L
0 represent the low (L) value of δ
0 at some
arbitrary low r. And let δH0 represent the high (H) value of δ0 at an arbitrary high
r. Then δL0 and δ
H
0 repres nt the lower and upper bounds of δ0 of as r moves from
low to high. This is shown in figure 4.8 below.
Similarly, by comparing between the payoffs from the alternative decision paths,
it is found that Full IA Dependency is preferred to “Partial IA Dependency with
Self Employment” if
δIMC =
V (g − r, 1)− V (g, 1− s)
V (3k¯)− V (2k¯) (23)
d δIMC
dg
=
V 0Y (g − r)− V sY (g)
V (3k¯)− V (2k¯) (24)
We note that δ1 is unaffected by the cost of borrowing the current loan. As r
increases (decreases), the earnings from self employment (given s) may decrease
(increase). But this is always compensated for by the IA benefit which ensures the
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U(g|e) and U(g) respectively.
On the other hand, the household is at node a if it obtains the micro cr dit in
the current period. Denote the amount approved to first time borr wers as k¯.
Having borrowed the amount, it may invest it in some micro enterprise (node c),
or simply repay it without making any investment (node c￿). In either c se he
household may or may not have a wage job. If it does not inv t he borrowed
micro credit and has no wage job (node d￿), its utility is U(g − r, 1), where r
represents the interest and any other costs of having borrowed the loan. But its
utility is U(g− r, 1− e) if it is under node c￿ with a wage job (node d). We prefer
to specify U(g− r, 1) and U(g− r, 1− e) as U(g|r) and U(g|r,e) respectively.
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Figure 5: Decision Tree for an IA Recipient Contemplating Participation in a
Micro Credit Program
If the household invests the current loan k¯ (that is at node c), cu rent period
earnings is either Y (k¯, e, s) = We + Π(s, k¯) if it is also engaged in paid work, or
Y (k¯, s) = Π(s, k¯) otherwise. The household loses eligibility for income assistance
if its earnings is greater than the guaranteed benefit g. Hence if also engaged in
paid work (node e), the household’s utility U(k¯, e, s) is
U(k¯, e, s)

= U [Y (k¯, e, s)] if Y (k¯, e, s) > g
= U(g|e,s) if Y (k¯, e, s) < g
(10)
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Figure 3: Househol Discount Factor and Simultaneous Use of IA and MC
Within figure 3, δA den t s th disc unt factor at which the IA recipient is indif-
f r nt between NMC a d SMC. Households with δ < δA would prefer to remain on
only the IA program. Hous holds wi h δ > δA would simultaneously participate
in the IA and MC progra s.
A =
V (g, 1)− V , 1)
V (2k¯) V (g, 1)
(5)
7
Th p r meter δB refers to the discount factor at which a household is indiffer-
ent twe n SMC a d IMC. Households with δ < δB would engage in strategic
borrowing while thos with δ > δB would invest the micro credit.
δB =
V (g , 1)− V (g, 1− s)
V (3k¯)− V (2k¯) (6)
3.2 Disincentive Effect of IA on Househol s’ Use of Micro Credit
δA
dg
=
VY (g)− VY (g − r)
V (2 )− V (g, 1) +
VY (g) [V (g, 1)− V (g − r, 1)]
[V (2k¯)− V (g, 1)]2 (7)
dδA
dg
> 0 if
V (g, 1)− V (g − r, 1)
V (2k¯)− V (g, 1) >
VY [g − r]
VY [g]
− 1 (8)
It should be obvious that if r = 0, then δA =
VY [g−r]
VY [g]
− 1 = 0. Further δA increases
in r while VY [g−r]
VY [g]
− 1 decreases in r. Therefore the inequality in 8 actually holds
at as long as there is a cost involved in borrowing the micro credit. Thus with an
increase in the guaranteed IA benefit, less households borrow the micro credit for
the strategic purpose of accessing a future loan.
dδB
dg
=
V 0Y (g − r)− V sY (g)
V (3k¯)− V (2k¯) (9)
3.3 Eff ct of Specific Variable of the IA Policy
3.3.1 Duration of Eligibility for Benefit
3.3.2 Earnings Tax Rate
3.3.3 Income Exemption Criteria
4 Conclusion
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Figure 5.7: Household D scount Factor and Simultaneous Use of IA and MC
higher than those from IA, a household with high di count factor may obtai and invest
th microcred lo n o ome s f-employment activity. It does so knowing that its action
would not change its current total income from the basic guaranteed amount on the IA
program. Its action is a strategic means of accessing the next loan which would be bigger
than the current microcredit. The results also i dicate that it is ossible for households
to adopt the strategy of borrowing but not investin the micr credit, just so that they
become eligible for l rger loans in the future. In such a case, the household incurs the
interest and transaction costs of accessing the curr t mic oc edit, while maintaini g
its short-run total dependence on income assi a ce. However,, the likeli ood that the
household would adopt such a s rategy disappears with increased cost of borrowing (bo
the intercept and the slope of VSMC decreases, leading to an increase in δA). IA recipients
who prefer not to obtain the microcredit are those with a low discount factor.
5.3.2 Effect of Specific Variables of the IA Policy
Earnings Tax Rate
Although the analysis has been carried out for t = 1, it is straightforward to infer the
results for the case t < 1. At a less than 100% earnings tax rate, not all of the earnings
from a microenterprise would be clawed back from the guaranteed amount g. Hence,
a household’s participation in the microcredit program would result in an increase in
its total income in the short run. The incentive for an IA recipient to participate in a
microcredit program would arise both from the potential long-term effects, as well as the
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short-term effect on total incomes. The slope of line VSMC in figure 5.7 would increase
resulting in a decrease in δA. Both the intercept and slope of line VIMC would increase
resulting in a decrease in δB. Therefore, any IA recipient who participates in a microcredit
program at t = 1 would also participate in the program if t < 1. Some IA recipients who
did not participate in a microcredit program at t = 1 would participate at t < 1. In other
words, a decrease (an increase) in the earnings tax rate results in the self-selection of
more IA recipients into (out of) the microcredit program.
Duration of Eligibility for Assistance
The above multi-period model has assumed a time invariant eligibility for income assis-
tance. However,, duration of assistance is often temporary for many households. Assum-
ing benefits would be terminated at the end of the first period, in the second period the
household would either have to rely on microcredit, or on paid employment, or both.
The maximum payoffs along path VIMC and VSMC are unaffected, but the second-period
payoff in path VNMC would be less than V (g, 1).
7 In figure 5.7, the slope of VNMC would
decrease and consequently δA would decrease. Therefore, with a temporary duration of
assistance, more households would participate in microcredit programs even at a 100%
tax rate on their IA benefits. Households facing an imminent termination of their IA
benefit are more likely to participate in microcredit programs than those on longer term
or permanent assistance.
Guaranteed Benefit
The marginal effect of g on the proportion of IA recipients who adopt microcredit can
be understood from its marginal effect on δA and δB. Using equation 5.17, the marginal
effect of g on δA is estimated as
dδA
dg
=
VY (g)− VY (g − r) + VY (g)δA
V (2k¯)− V (g, 1) (5.19)
The parameters VY (g) and VY (g − r) denote marginal utility of income evaluated at g
and g − r respectively for the utility function in which the household allocates its entire
time to leisure (i.e., V (Y, 1)). With leisure held constant, the marginal utilities of income
at income levels g and g − r are shown in the first panel of figure 5.8. It is obvious
that VY (g − r) > VY (g), hence, the sign on equation 5.19 is not immediately obvious.
Notice, however, that the sign on (5.19) would be same as that of its numerator. Thus,
7Along path VNMC , the household gets a maximum of k¯ in MC in the second period. Earnings
y(k¯) = We+ Π(s, k) is less than g which is why the household is on income assistance in the first place.
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substituting the expression for δA (equation 5.17) into the numerator of (5.19) gives
dδA/dg > 0 if
V (2k¯) <
VY (g)[V (g, 1)− V (g − r, 1)]
VY (g − r)− VY (g) + V (g, 1) (5.20)
Notice that both sides of the inequality in (5.20) are positive. The inequality would hold if
the future loan, 2k¯, anticipated from current microcredit participation is small. Equation
5.20, therefore, indicates that dδA/dg > 0 if the anticipated future loan is small. That is
to say, an increase in g will increase the proportion of IA recipients who self-select out
of the microcredit program if the future loan anticipated from current participation is
small.
0
alternative decision paths in the short term and their corresponding long term
payoffs (given the households time preference rate 0 ≤ δ¯ ≤ 1) are;
(i) Full IA dependency (path a￿–b￿) with payoff U(g) + δ¯U(g)
(ii) Full IA dependency with strategic borrowing (path a–c￿–d￿) with payoff
U(g|r) + δ¯U(2k¯, e, s)
(iii) Partial IA dependency with self employment on the borrowed micro credit
(path a–c–e￿) with payoff U(g|s) + δ¯U(3k¯, e, s)
It follows that “Full IA Dependency” is preferred to “Full IA Dependency with
Strategic Borrowing” if U(g)+δ¯U(g) > U(g|r)+δ¯U(2k¯, e, s). This is same as saying
Let δSMC refer to the minimum discount factor that would make the household
engage in strategic borrowing.
δSMC =
V (g, 1)− V (g − r, 1)
V (2k¯)− V (g, 1) (20)
d δSMC
dg
=
VY (g)− VY (g − r)
V (2k¯)− V (g, 1) +
VY (g) [V (g, 1)− V (g − r, 1)]
[V (2k¯)− V (g, 1)]2 (21)
d δSMC
dg
> 0 if
V (g, 1)− V (g − r, 1)
V (2k¯)− V (g, 1) >
VY [g − r]
VY [g]
− 1 (22)
It should be obvious that if r = 0, then δSMC =
VY [g−r]
VY [g]
− 1 = 0. Further δSMC
increases in r while VY [g−r]
VY [g]
− 1 decreases in r. Therefore the inequality in 22
actually holds at as long as there is a cost involved in borrowing the micro credit.
Thus with an increase in the guaranteed IA benefit, less households borrow the
micro credit for the strategic purpose of accessing a future loan.
Notice that we denote the critical time preference rate in equation 20 as δ0. This
critical value is a function of the cost r of borrowing the current micro credit.
This cost directly affects the value of U(g|r) but has no effect on U(g) and the
utility from future loans U(2k¯, e, s). At a low cost of current borrowing, U(g|r) is
high and therefore δ0 is low. However as the cost of borrowing increases, U(g|r)
decreases and thus δ0 increases. Let δ
L
0 represent the low (L) value of δ
0 at some
arbitrary low r. And let δH0 represent the high (H) value of δ0 at an arbitrary high
U(g) < U(2k¯, s))
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alternative decision paths in the short term and their corresponding long term
payoffs (given the households time preference rate 0 ≤ δ¯ ≤ 1) are;
(i) Full IA dependency (path a￿–b￿) with payoff U(g) + δ¯U(g)
(ii) Full IA dependency with strategic borrowing (path a–c￿–d￿) with payoff
U(g|r) + δ¯U(2k¯, e, s)
(iii) Partial IA dependency with self employment on the borrowed micro credit
(path a–c–e￿) with payoff U(g|s) + δ¯U(3k¯, e, s)
It follows that “Full IA Depen ency” i prefe red to “Full IA Depend ncy with
Strategic Borrowing” if U(g)+δ¯U(g) > U(g|r)+δ¯U(2k¯, e, s). This is sa e as saying
Let δSMC refer to the minimum discount factor that would make the household
engage in s rategic bo rowing.
δSMC =
V (g, 1)− V (g − r, 1)
V (2k¯)− V (g, 1) (20)
d δSMC
dg
=
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It should be obvious that if r = 0, then δSMC =
VY [g−r]
VY [g]
− 1 = 0. Further δSMC
increases in r while VY [g−r]
VY [g]
− 1 decreases in r. Therefore the inequality in 22
actually holds at as long as there is a cost involved in borrowing the micro credit.
Thus with an increase in the guaranteed IA benefit, less households borrow the
micro credit for the strategic purpose of accessing a future loan.
Notice that we denote the critical time preference rate in equation 20 as δ0. This
critical value is a function of the cost r of borrowing the current micro credit.
This cost directly affects the value of U(g|r) but has no effect on U(g) and the
utility from future loans U(2k¯, e, s). At a low cost of current borrowing, U(g|r) is
high and therefore δ0 is low. However as the cost of borrowing increases, U(g|r)
decreases and thus δ0 increases. Let δ
L
0 represent the low (L) value of δ
0 at some
arbitrary low r. And let δH0 represent the high (H) value of δ0 at an arbitrary high
U(g) < U(2k¯, s))
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Figure 5.8: Marginal Utility of Income (VY ) Evaluated at g g − r and (g)|s
The marginal effect of g on δB is found using (5.18).
dδB
dg
=
VY (g − r)− VY (g)|s
V (3k¯)− V (2k¯) (5.21)
The parameter VY (g)|s denotes marginal utility of income evaluated at g for the utility
function in which the household allocates time s to the microenterprise. The function
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V (Y, 1 − s), as well as the marginal utility VY (g)|s, are shown in the second panel of
figure 5.8. Notice that VY (g − r) > VY (g) > VY (g)|s. Hence, (5.21) is easily signed,
dδB
dg
> 0.
The main finding here is that an increase in guaranteed benefits results in more households
self-selecting out of the MC program and fewer households investing the microcredit
loan.
5.4 Summary
This chapter analyzed how households who receive income assistance benefits allocate
their time to microcredit. The analysis indicates that the single-period labour-leisure
model may overstate the disincentive for microcredit that is generated by IA programs.
The single-period model suggests that IA recipients faced with a 100% earnings tax rate
should self-select out of the microcredit program. In contrast, empirical evidence suggests
a partial adoption of microcredit among IA recipients facing the 100% tax rate.
The analysis in this chapter has shown that a multi-period utility maximization frame-
work is more appropriate for explaining the use of microcredit by IA recipients. Under
the sequential lending attribute of microcredit, an IA recipient who uses the microcredit
loan in the current period may get future access to a larger loan by which he or she can
increase future earnings above the IA eligibility limit. At a less than 100% earnings tax
rate, current participation in the MC program is motivated by its anticipated effect on
both current and future period incomes. At a 100% tax rate, current participation in the
MC program is motivated by its future effect on the household’s income. The likelihood
of participation in the microcredit program is an increasing function of the household’s
discount factor. This likelihood is negatively influenced by the guaranteed amount of IA
benefit, the earnings tax rate, and the duration of eligibility for income assistance.
5.5 Appendix
5.5.1 Formal Proof that sa2 < s
n
2
Let sa2 be the time allocated to a microenterprise by a type-2 household with income
assistance. Let sn2 be the time allocation with no income assistance. Then the optimality
condition with income assistance equation 5.8 may be written as
(1− t)Πs(sa2) =
Ual
UaY
(5.22)
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while the corresponding condition with no income assistance equation 4.6 is
Πs(s
n
2 ) =
Unl
UnY
(5.23)
It is true that Y a ≥ Y n, otherwise the household would not participate in the income
assistance program. Thus, UaY ≤ UnY .
Proof by contradiction
Suppose sa2 = s
n
2 . Then Πs(s
a
2) = Πs(s
n
2 ). And
(1− t)Πs(sa2) < Πs(sn2 ) ∀ 0 < t ≤ 1 (5.24)
Also by sa2 = s
n
2 , we have 1 − sa2 = 1 − sn2 which implies la2 = ln2 and therefore Ual = Unl .
It follows that
Ual
UaY
≥ U
n
l
UnY
given UaY ≤ UnY (5.25)
But comparing with equations 5.22 and 5.23, the condition in 5.25 implies
(1− t)Πs(sa2) ≥ Πs(sn2 ) (5.26)
This is a contradiction with equation 5.24. Hence,, it is not possible that sa2 = s
n
2 .
Now suppose sa2 > s
n
2 . Then Πs(s
a
2) < Πs(s
n
2 ) given the assumption of a decreasing returns
to scale.8 It follows that
(1− t)Πs(sa2) < Πs(sn2 ) ∀0 < t ≤ 1 (5.27)
And by sa2 > s
n
2 , we get 1−sa2 < 1−sn2 implying la2 < ln2 . Thus, Ual > Unl . Therefore,
Ual
UaY
≥ U
n
l
UnY
given UaY ≤ UnY (5.28)
Again, when compared with equations 5.22 and 5.23, the condition in 5.28 implies
(1− t)Πs(sa2) ≥ Πs(sn2 ) (5.29)
which is a contradiction of 5.27. Hence, it is not possible that sa2 > s
n
2 .
It has been proved by contradiction that the cases sa2 ≥ sn2 are not possible. Therefore,
it must be the case that sa2 < s
n
2 . The consistency of this can actually be checked very
quickly. sa2 < s
n
2 implies Πs(s
a
2) > Πs(s
n
2 ). Hence,
∃ some t ∈ (0, 1] s.t
(1− t)Πs(sa2) > Πs(sn2 ) (5.30)
8With increasing returns to scale, the solution would be at the corner (i.e., s=1 for household type-1
and s=0 for type-2) and the results would not be affected by the provision of income assistance at t < 1.
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And for sa2 < s
n
2 , it is found that 1− sa2 > 1− sn2 , which means Ual < Unl and therefore
∃ some (UaY , UnY ) s.t.
Ual
UaY
≥ U
n
l
UnY
given UaY ≤ UnY (5.31)
This is consistent with the condition in 5.30. Thus, the time allocated to self-employment
by a type-2 household is less in the case with income assistance than in the case with no
income assistance.
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Substituting Microcredit for Income Assistance
6.1 Introduction
The preceding analysis 5 shows that time allocation by IA recipients using a microcredit
loan is affected by both the guaranteed amount of IA benefit and the size of the micro-
credit loan. The marginal effects of microcredit and income assistance on a household’s
time allocation mix, imply some marginal effects on the household’s current income and
utilities. In this chapter, some of the equations generated in the time allocation analysis
for income assistance recipients, are exploited in comparing the marginal effects of MC
and IA on the household’s incomes and utilities.
The marginal effect of IA benefits on household incomes has received considerable atten-
tion in economic theory. This effect is at the heart of the efficiency-equality argument
with social transfer programs. The programs seek to improve on income equality by re-
distributing income from high to low-income households. Since Okun (1975), it has been
known that an efficiency loss arises from such programs because each dollar in transfer to
a household as IA benefit results in less than a dollar increase in the household’s income.
The loss in efficiency prompted Okun’s description of such a redistribution program as
a “leaky bucket” — a phrase which has become widely used by economists discussing
income assistance. Okun explains that the efficiency loss (leakage) arises partly because
of the administrative costs of IA programs and partly because of the work disincentive
created by income assistance. The receiving household decreases time allocation to work
such that a fraction of the benefit received is offset by a decrease in earnings.
The 1996 reform in the United States, and subsequent reforms by different provincial
authorities in Canada, included the imposition of time limits on the duration of eligibility
for assistance, a reduction in guaranteed benefits, and the tightening of employment
obligations for IA recipients (Fuller et al., 2008; Jones-DeWeever et al., 2003). These
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reforms aimed to encourage work by recipients, reduce the growth rate of IA caseloads,
and reduce public expenditure on the programs (Stewart and Dooley, 1999; Fuller et al.,
2008;Moffitt, 2002). There is an ongoing shift in emphasis from welfare to “workfare”,
with IA programs now also involved in job placement for recipients. In the words of
Wallace et al., 2006 (P. 27), regarding the reform in British Columbia, Canada, “the
Ministry is very clear that these policy changes are an attempt to redesign welfare ‘from
a culture of entitlement to a culture of employment and self sufficiency.’”
In the midst of the debates and policy reforms to IA, there has been increased attention
to microcredit in the United States and Canada (Morduch, 1999). Advocates claim that
the needed transition of IA recipients to self-sufficiency can be achieved by further social
policy reform to ease their access to microcredit for self-employment (Raheim, 1997; Snow,
1999; Stoesz and Saunders, 1999; Klein et al., 2003). Past studies of MC usage among IA
recipients have concluded that households experience an increase in earnings from their
use of a MC loan (Wehrell, 2002, Klein et al., 2003).1 Therefore, as an alternative to
income assistance, microcredit could be adopted as a social policy to assist low-income
households in setting up a microenterprise with a view to achieving the needed reduction
in income inequality. If the social cost of microcredit is smaller than that of income
assistance, then substituting microcredit for income assistance would mitigate the loss in
efficiency that has made social policy a highly controversial subject.
This chapter considers a policy reform that grants households a microcredit loan in ex-
change for a decrease in income assistance. The marginal effects of income assistance and
microcredit on household income, as well as on household utilities are analyzed and com-
pared. The analysis seeks to estimate how many dollars in microcredit an IA recipient
would have to receive in exchange for a dollar of income assistance without causing a
decrease in the household’s total income or in its utility. Implications for policy reform
are discussed.
1The impact of microcredit on the earnings of IA recipients cannot be generalized as the impact of
microcredit programs. Schreiner (1999) and Servon, 1997 report that a higher proportion of MC users are
not eligible for IA, and have higher incomes, better skills, and better education. The impact assessment
for this group of households is mixed. Some studies report that these households experience a short-fall
in current earnings when they self-select into microcredit programs (Spalter-Roth et al., 1994; Sanders,
2002). Other studies report that the households experience growth in income over time (Burrus, 2005;
Clark and Kays, 1999).
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6.2 The Model
The first-order conditions derived in equations (5.5) and (5.6) may be totally differentiated
with respect to e, s and k to get the marginal effect of microcredit on time allocation by
a type-1 household as
ds1
dk
= −Πsk
Πss
≥ 0 (6.1)
de1
dk
=
Πsk(UY Y (1− t)2W 2 + Ull)− UY Y (1− t)2WΠkΠss
Πss [UY Y (1− t)2W 2 + Ull] ≤ 0 (6.2)
Similarly, totally differentiating the first-order condition 5.6 with respect to s and k yields
the marginal effect of microcredit on time allocation to the microenterprise by a type-2
household.
ds2
dk
= − UY Y (1− t)
2ΠsΠk + (1− t)ΠskUY
UY Y (1− t)2Π2s + (1− t)ΠssUY + Ull
(6.3)
On the basis of equations 6.1 through 6.3, as well as equations 5.10 through 5.12, the
income equation (5.3) for an IA recipient may be respecified with both e and s expressed
as functions of the microcredit loan k and the guaranteed IA amount g. That is
Y = g + (1− t)[We(g, k) + Π(s(g, k), k)] (6.4)
The household’s utility is
U = U [Y (g, k, t), 1− e(g, k, t)− s(g, k, t)] (6.5)
Assume for now that the IA program applies a less than 100% earnings deduction rate
(i.e., t < 1) — the case for t = 1 will be discussed later. Suppose there is a policy reform
which stipulates that eligible IA recipients be given a microcredit loan in exchange for a
decrease in the guaranteed amount g.2 With the tax rate held constant, total change in
each household’s income would be the sum of the partial changes with respect to k and
g
dY =
∂Y
∂g
dg +
∂Y
∂k
dk (6.6)
2The policy may not be applied on all households currently receiving income assistance. For instance
those classified as unable to work due to disability or other reasons would be excluded from such a policy.
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6.2.1 Marginal Effect of g on Households’ Incomes
The partial effect of g on each household’s income can be estimated from (6.4) using the
time allocation effects; ds1/dg and de1/dg for a type-1 household and ds2/dg for a type-2
household as derived in (5.10) through (5.12). These give ∂Y1/∂g and ∂Y2/∂g for the
type-1 and type-2 household respectively.
∂Y1
∂g
=
Ull
UY Y (1− t)2W 2 + Ull , 0 ≤
dY1
dg
< 1 (6.7)
∂Y2
∂g
=
UY Πss(1− t) + Ull
UY Πss(1− t) + Ull + UY Y (1− t)2Π2s
, 0 ≤ dY2
dg
< 1 (6.8)
These partial effects represent the marginal effect of g on income, holding all other factors
constant. Notice that the effects as shown in (6.7) and (6.8) are less than 1. Therefore,
the estimates are consistent with Okun’s theory of the “leaky bucket.” Equations 6.7 and
6.8 show that a dollar decrease in g would (holding k constant) decrease each household’s
income by less than a dollar. The result occurs because the household would respond by
increasing time allocation to work, such that a part of the income lost due to the decrease
in g is regained from work.
6.2.2 Marginal Effect of k on Households’ Incomes
The partial effect of k on each household’s income can be estimated from (6.4) using the
time allocation effects ds1/dk and de1/dk for a type-1 household and ds2/dk for a type-2
household.
These give ∂Y1/∂k and ∂Y2/∂k for the type-1 and type-2 households respectively.
∂Y1
∂k
=
(1− t)ΠkUll
UY Y (1− t)2W 2 + Ull ≥ 0 (6.9)
The partial effect for a type-2 household is
∂Y2
∂k
= (1− t)[Πs ∂s
∂k
+ Πk] (6.10)
where ∂s/∂k is as given in equation 6.3. Solving 6.10 completely would give.
∂Y2
∂k
=
(1− t)Πk(UY Πss(1− t) + Ull)− UY ΠsΠsk(1− t)2
UY Πss(1− t) + Ull + UY Y (1− t)2Π2s
≥ 0 (6.11)
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Equations 6.9 and 6.11 are the marginal effects of capital on income, holding all other
factors constant. The equations show that the marginal impact of capital on income is
nonnegative for both household types. If Πk > 0, then an increase in k would increase
the household’s earnings. If the earnings are still below the eligibility limit for IA, then
given t < 1 only a fraction of the additional earnings would be clawed back from the
household’s IA benefit. Therefore, the increase in earnings would outweigh the loss in
benefit and the household’s total income would increase. For IA recipients with earnings
at the margin of eligibility, a marginal increase in k may increase earnings beyond the IA
eligibility limit. Households at such a margin would no longer face a tax rate (i.e., t = 0).
Substituting t = 0 into equations 6.9 and 6.11 leaves the direction of the inequalities
unaffected for a household at the margin.
6.2.3 A Suggestion on the Minimum Rate of Substituting k for g
The marginal effects in (6.7) through (6.11) may now be used to derive the minimum
rate at which k must be substituted for g if the change in household income must be
nonnegative. By using (6.7) and (6.9) in (6.6) for the type-1 household, the condition
yeilding dY1 ≥ 0 is found as
dY1 ≥ 0 if dk ≥ − 1
(1− t)Πk dg (6.12)
For a policy that reduces g (i.e., dg < 0), the right-most term in (6.12) is positive. The
condition in 6.12 shows that the minimum rate of substitution depends on the marginal
value product of capital Πk. If Πk is equal to the inverse of the earnings exemption rate
( 1
1−t) on the IA program, then the minimum rate of substitution of microcredit for income
assistance is 1. If Πk is less than
1
1−t , the minimum substitution rate is greater than 1
(that is a dollar decrease in g should be followed by more than a dollar increase in k to a
type-1 household). If Πk is greater than
1
1−t , the minimum substitution rate is less than 1
(that is a dollar decrease in g could be followed by less than a dollar increase in k without
causing a decrease in the income of a type-1 household).
For a type-2 household, substituting (6.8) and (6.11) into (6.6) gives
dY2 ≥ 0 if dk ≥ − UY Πss(1− t) + Ull
(1− t)Πk(UY Πss(1− t) + Ull)− UY ΠsΠsk(1− t)2 dg (6.13)
The right-most term in 6.13 is positive for dg < 0. Comparing the inverse of the term in
(6.13) with the corresponding term in (6.12) would reveal that for a type-1 and a type-2
household with an equivalent Πk, the prescribed minimum rate of substitution of k for g
is greater for the type-1 than for the type-2 household. The type-1 household has a higher
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preference for income and therefore a higher utility loss from a decrease in g. Therefore,
the type-1 household desires a higher compensation with k.
This section concludes with the following summary. If the marginal value product of
capital is greater than the inverse of the earnings exemption rate on an IA program,
then for each household type, each dollar decrease in IA could be followed by less than a
dollar increase in microcredit without causing a decrease in the household’s income. If the
marginal value product of capital is less than the inverse of the earnings exemption rate,
then a dollar decrease in IA must be followed by more than a dollar increase in MC to
the household in pluriactivity. However, the household in self-employment alone may still
get less than a dollar increase in MC without causing any decrease in its income. At an
extremely low marginal value product of capital, both types of households would require
more than a dollar increase in microcredit as compensation for each dollar decrease in
income assistance.
6.3 Marginal Effects of k and g on Utilities
Analysis in the preceding section has assumed that the goal of social policy is to increase
incomes among low-income households. If the goal is instead to increase the households’
utilities, then the impact of the proposed reform on household utilities would be a more
appropriate consideration than the impact on incomes. The change in utility resulting
from the substitution of microcredit for income assistance is
dU =
∂U
∂g
dg +
∂U
∂k
dk (6.14)
The partial effects for a type-1 household are
∂U1
∂g
=
UYUll + UlWUY Y (1− t)
UY Y (1− t)2W 2 + Ull ≥ 0 (6.15)
∂U1
∂k
= (1− t)Πk UYUll + UlWUY Y (1− t)
UY Y (1− t)2W 2 + Ull ≥ 0 (6.16)
Using 6.15 and 6.16in 6.14 gives
dU1 ≥ 0 if dk ≥ − 1
(1− t)Πk dg (6.17)
Comparing between the conditions in 6.17 and 6.12 shows that for a type-1 household
a substitution rate that does not decrease income will also not decrease the household’s
utility.
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For the type-2 household, the partial effects of g and k are
∂U2
∂g
= UY
[
1 + (1− t)Πs∂s2
∂g
]
− Ul∂s2
∂g
(6.18)
∂U2
∂k
= UY (1− t)
[
Πs
∂s2
∂k
+ Πk
]
− Ul∂s2
∂k
(6.19)
Recall from the first-order condition (equation 5.6) that UY (1− t)Πs−Ul = 0. Therefore,
∂U2/∂g = UY and ∂U2/∂k = UY (1− t)Πk. Thus, equation 6.14 yields
dU2 ≥ 0 if dk ≥ − 1
(1− t)Πk dg (6.20)
For (dg < 0) the right-most term in 6.20 is greater than the corresponding term in
6.13. Therefore, for a type-2 household, a higher substitution rate is required to keep
utility from decreasing, than that which is required to keep income from decreasing.
In other words, a substitution rate that does not decrease income may decrease the
household’s utility. This result occurs because the type-2 household prefers leisure to
income. Therefore, a substitution of k for g that increases the household’s income but
reallocates its time away from leisure may result in a decrease in utility. This situation is
illustrated in figure 6.1.
Within the figure, the indifference curve labelled U2 represents utility to a
type-2 IA recipient before the substitution of microcredit for income assistance. The
household receives a guaranteed benefit g and has a microenterprise profit function f . The
household allocates s2 to the microenterprise and l2 to leisure. Total income is Y2. With
the substitution of k for g, the guaranteed amount is decreased to g′ (i.e., dg = g′−g < 0).
Microenterprise capital increase by dk and therefore the slope of the microenterprise profit
function increases (i.e., f ′ has a larger slope than f). Time allocated to the microenterprise
increase to s′2 and leisure decreases to l
′
2. Income increases to Y
′
2 while utility decreases
to U ′2.
The main result in this section is that a substitution rate that does not decrease income
of the type-1 IA recipient will also not decrease its utility whereas a substitution rate
that does not decrease income of the type-2 IA recipient may decrease its utility. These
results imply that households with a higher preference for income obtain greater utility
from microcredit than those with a higher preference for leisure. The results also imply
that households with a higher preference for leisure obtain greater utility from income
assistance than they do from microcredit.
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Figure 6.1: Decrease in Current Utility for a Type-2 Household from a Substitution of k
for g
6.4 Special Case with t = 1
The analyses in chapter 5 showed that under a 100% earnings tax rate, time allocation
to a microenterprise by an IA recipient is zero if the household’s utility maximization is
over a single period, but may be positive for households maximizing utility over multiple
periods. Equation 6.4 shows that irrespective of the household’s choice of time allocation
under t = 1, its current income would be Y = g. By implication, although an increase
in k may increase the earnings of households who decide (or are made) to work, the
effect of this additional k on income would be zero as long as the earnings is below the
IA eligibility limit (the “break away” point). If the effect of additional microcredit on
income is to be positive, then the additional microcredit (dk) must be large enough to
make the household’s earnings greater than the break away point on the IA program.
This is the only means k can be substituted for g under t = 1 without causing a decrease
in the household’s income. Given the initial g on the IA program, a break-away inducing
amount of microcredit must be allocated to the household as a complete replacement for
IA.
Given t = 1, the prescribed break-away inducing amount of microcredit dk depends on
the household’s initial level of earnings relative to the IA eligibility limit. For a household
with marginal earnings (i.e., those with earnings just below the break away point), dk
would be small. On the other hand, dk would be large for households with less than
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marginal earnings (i.e., those with earnings far below the break away point).
6.5 Summary
This chapter has considered the possibility of a policy reform to substitute microcredit
for income assistance without causing a decrease in the incomes and utilities of affected
households. The rate of substitution depends on the prevailing tax rate on the IA program.
At t = 1, only a complete replacement of g with a break-away inducing k would ensure
that the impact on household incomes is nonnegative. On the other hand, a partial
replacement of g with k can be achieved at t < 1 without causing a decrease in the
household income. Additionally, the recommended rate of substitution of k for g, given
t < 1, depends on the household type, and is inversely related to the household’s marginal
value product of capital. While a substitution rate that does not decrease income for a
type-1 household would also not decrease its utility, a substitution rate that does not
decrease income of a type-2 household may decrease its utility.
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Summary, Conclusions, Policy Implications, and Sug-
gestions for Further Study
This research was motivated by empirical evidence that time allocation to work by mi-
crocredit borrowers in the United States and Canada runs contrary to the traditional
model of household time allocation between paid work and self-employment. Developed
by Becker (1965) and Gronau (1977), the traditional model suggests that households will
allocate time to a microenterprise, only if the microenterprise profit function rises above
the paid wage line. In contrast, observation of some microcredit participants reveals they
allocate time to microenterprises for which the profit function lies below the paid wage
line. As part of this dissertation, some interviews were carried out in November 2008 with
seven borrowers on the microcredit program of Vancity Credit Union in Vancouver. The
interviews revealed that some households are willing to self-select into the microcredit
program and to invest the microcredit loans, in spite of anticipating a lower return from
their microenterprises than from their paid jobs.
Additionally, for households who receive income assistance benefits, the traditional model
suggests that those facing a 100% earnings tax rate on the IA program would prefer to
allocate all their time to leisure. In contrast, some IA recipients facing a 100% earnings
tax rate have been observed to also participate in MC programs, in which case they
allocate some time to self-employment.
The inadequacy of the traditional model in explaining time allocation among microcredit
participants can be attributed to the sequential lending attribute of microcredit. Under
the sequential lending arrangement, a household’s use of microcredit in the current period
facilitates its access to a larger loan at a future period. The time allocation decision of
microcredit participants can be modelled as a multi-period utility maximization prob-
lem. In this regard, the traditional model is limited to the extent that it assumes that
households maximize utility over a single period.
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The purpose of this dissertation therefore was (1) to develop a two-period model in
explaining time allocation by households who are eligible for microcredit in the United
States and Canada, and (2) to apply the model in explaining self-selection into microcredit
programs among income assistance recipients who face a 100% earnings tax rate on the
IA program. The analysis in chapter 4 develops the basic model of time allocation by
households that are eligible for microcredit. The analysis is chapter 5 applies the basic
model in explaining microcredit participation among IA recipients.
The analyses of time allocation by income assistance recipients produced a set of equa-
tions for comparing between the marginal effects of income assistance and microcredit
on household incomes and utilities. This comparison is at the heart of ongoing propos-
als to replace income assistance with microcredit in a bid to reduce public spending on
IA while encouraging work among recipients. Based on the marginal effects of IA and
MC, the analyses in chapter 6 was aimed at suggesting the minimum rate of substitut-
ing microcredit for income assistance such that affected households do not experience a
short-fall in their incomes and utilities.
Following is a summary of the research findings and the conclusions that can be drawn
from the results. Some policy implications of the findings are also discussed.
7.1 Summary and Conclusions
The models assumed that households are heterogeneous with respect to their relative
preference for income and leisure. Two types of households were assumed. The type-1
household has a high relative preference for income, while the type-2 household has a
high relative preference for leisure. Each household has a reservation utility, — the utility
it would derive if no time were allocated to participating in the microcredit program. The
reservation utility derives from leisure and paid earnings for households that are non IA
recipients. For IA recipients facing a less than 100% earnings tax rate, the reservation
utility derives from leisure, IA benefit, and paid earnings. For IA recipients facing a 100%
tax rate, no time is allocated to paid work and therefore, the reservation utility derives
from leisure and IA benefit alone.
Each household also faces a utility from investing the microcredit loan. Conditional on
investing the microcredit loan, the type-1 household may engage in pluriactivity — having
both paid work and the microenterprise — at a time allocation mix such that the marginal
profit from the microenterprise equals the paid wage rate. A type-2 household which
invests the microcredit loan would relinquish paid work and allocate time only to leisure
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and the microenterprise. With an increase in the size of microcredit, a type-1 household
would increase time allocation to the microenterprise and reduce leisure, while a type-2
household would reduce time allocation to the microenterprise and increase leisure. For
both types of households, the marginal effect of microcredit on utility is positive.
Because microcredit loans are small, the current-period utility from participating in the
MC program may be less than the current-period reservation utility. But with sequential
lending, a current-period participant gets access to a larger loan in the future and utility
with that loan may increase beyond the reservation utility. A household’s net present
value of utilities is the sum of its current and future period utilities, adjusted by the
household’s discount factor. Each household self-selects into the microcredit program
only if the net present value of its utility with microcredit exceeds the net present value
of its reservation utility.
The net present value of utilities is an increasing function of the household discount fac-
tor. Households are differentiated according to their discount factors. Households with
high discount factors are more likely to desire the future benefit of current participation
in a microcredit program and are, therefore, more likely to self-select into the microcredit
program than households with low discount factors. Therefore, the partial adoption of mi-
crocredit among eligible households in the United States and Canada could be explained
in part by the distribution of household discount factors.
One of the interesting results of the model is that some households — in a bid to access the
future loan — may obtain microcredit in the current period and repay it without having
invested it in a microenterprise. Such action was referred to as “strategic borrowing” in
this dissertation. Households which engage in strategic borrowing are those for which
the net present benefit from strategic borrowing exceeds the net present benefit from
non borrowing as well as the net present benefit from investing the microcredit loan.
With other factors remaining constant, strategic borrowers have discount factors that are
higher than those of non borrowers but lower than those of investors.
The size of future loans that households anticipate from current borrowing has an increas-
ing effect on anticipated benefits of microcredit and, therefore, an increasing effect on the
fraction of eligible households who self-select into the microcredit program. Additionally,
an increase in a household’s productivity in self-employment results in an increase in its
anticipated benefit and therefore an increase in its likelihood of self selecting into the
microcredit program. On the other hand, the cost of borrowing has a decreasing effect on
anticipated benefit and therefore a decreasing effect on a household’s likelihood of using
microcredit. Also, an increase in the wage rate in paid employment would increase the
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reservation utility for households and, therefore, decrease the households’ likelihood of
participating in a microcredit program.
Among income assistance recipients, those facing a 100% earnings tax rate do not al-
locate time to paid work because their entire earnings would be clawed back from their
guaranteed benefit, leaving them with no change in total income. If the household obtains
microcredit and allocates time to a microenterprise, its utility would decrease because
leisure would decrease and total income would not change under the 100% earnings tax
rate. However, in the future period, the household would get a larger loan by virtue of its
past period’s participation in the microcredit program. The loan could be large enough
to generate profits beyond the IA eligibility point. In such a case, the household would
break away from IA, total income would increase, and utility might increase to the point
of offsetting any utility loss incurred in the preceding period. Therefore, an IA recipient
facing a 100% earnings tax rate may obtain microcredit and allocate time to a microen-
terprise in order to access larger capital that it anticipates would induce a break away
from the IA program.
At a less than 100% earnings tax rate, not all of the earnings from a microenterprise
would be clawed back from the guaranteed benefit. The household’s participation in a
microcredit program would result in an increase in its total income in the short run. As
well, the household would get access to a larger loan in the future period. Thus, for IA
recipients who face a tax rate of less than 100%, the incentive to participate in microcredit
programs arises both from the potential long-term effects as well as the short-term effect
on total incomes.
Specific variables of the IA policy were found to affect households’ self-selection into the
microcredit program. The earnings tax rate, the guaranteed benefit, and the duration of
eligibility for assistance all have a decreasing effect on the fraction of IA recipients who
participate in microcredit programs.
For each household, total income is affected by the household’s time allocation response
to income assistance as well as to microcredit. Comparison between the marginal effects
of income assistance and microcredit revealed the minimum rates of replacing income as-
sistance with microcredit that would ensure that households do not experience a decrease
in income. For an IA recipient facing a 100% tax rate, only a complete replacement of
income assistance with a break-away-inducing amount of microcredit would ensure that
the household’s income does not decrease. For an IA recipient facing a less than 100% tax
rate, partial substitution of microcredit for income assistance may be made at a prescribed
minimum rate. The prescribed minimum rate is a positive function of the earnings tax
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rate on the prevailing IA program. The prescribed minimum rate is a negative function
of the household’s preference for leisure and its marginal value product of capital.
If the marginal value product of capital is greater than the inverse of the earnings exemp-
tion rate on the IA program, then for each household type, each dollar decrease in IA
could be followed by less than a dollar increase in microcredit without causing a decrease
in the household’s income. If the marginal value product of capital is less than the inverse
of the earnings exemption rate, then a dollar decrease in IA must be followed by more
than a dollar increase in MC to the household in pluriactivity. However, the household in
self-employment alone may still get less than a dollar increase in MC without causing any
decrease in its income. At an extremely low marginal value product of capital, both types
of households would require more than a dollar increase in microcredit to compensate
for each dollar decrease in income assistance. A substitution rate that does not decrease
income for the pluriactive IA recipient will also not decrease its utility, whereas a substi-
tution rate that does not decrease income for the IA recipient working in self-employment
alone may decrease its utility.
7.2 Policy Implication
Public and private agencies in the United States and Canada have continued to grapple
with ways of improving the socio-economic conditions of low-income households. The
ability of microcredit programs to bring about the needed improvement has often been
criticized by opponents who claim that the loans are too small to make any significant pos-
itive impact on household income. The multi-period model developed in this dissertation
implies that the social value of microcredit programs goes beyond their immediate impact
on household incomes. In spite of a non significant impact on current incomes, society’s
expenditure on MC programs could be justified if there are known long-term positive
effects on the incomes of participants. The long-term effect of microcredit participation
has so far not been given any attention in empirical studies.
This dissertation reported that microcredit programs are yet to reach a sustainable scale,
and that cost recovery has remained low even among the best programs in Canada and
the United States. Part of the problem is a low rate of program participation coupled
with the loss of loans to borrowers who default on repayment. This research revealed
that the desire to build a credit score and access future loans provides an incentive for
program participation and for loan repayment among participants. The incentive effect of
sequential borrowing could be exploited by microcredit programs with a view to increasing
the participation rate and repayment rate on the programs. For instance, an increase in
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the rate of access to future loans by virtue of past MC participation would increase both
the participation rate and the repayment rate on the programs. The rate of access to
future loans could be increased by expanding the number of loans available to households
that have successfully participated in a microcredit program.
Latest IA reforms in both Canada and the United States have sought to motivate work
among low-income households by tightening IA eligibility requirements and implementing
active job placement for recipients. Results of the time allocation model suggests that
irrespective of their continued eligibility for IA, households who can exercise agency will,
on their own, self-select into microcredit programs if the anticipated benefit from owning
a microenterprise is high enough. Factors which increase the anticipated benefits from
having a microenterprise will increase the rate of self-selection into microcredit programs.
One such factor is the household’s productivity in a microenterprise. Public investment
in self-employment training programs for income assistance recipients may pay off in
the long run because it would increase the household’s anticipated productivity in the
microenterprise. More households would self-select into the MC program and ultimately
relinquish part or all of their IA benefits.
A society’s choice between microcredit and income assistance as social policy must be
based on the goal of such policy, as well as the private preference for income and leisure
among affected households. Although the goals of increasing household incomes and util-
ity may appear complementary, the policy alternatives of microcredit and income assis-
tance differ in the extent to which they can meet each goal. Therefore, a trade-off between
microcredit and income assistance may result in a trade-off between income and utility
among affected households. Households with higher preference for income obtain greater
utility from microcredit than those with higher preference for leisure. And households
with higher preference for leisure obtain greater utility from income assistance than they
do from microcredit. The social welfare effect of income assistance may outweigh the ef-
fect of microcredit if the private preferences for leisure exceed the preferences for income.
On the other hand, the social welfare effect of microcredit could outweigh the effect of
income assistance if private preferences are higher for income than for leisure. A careful
consideration of both social and private preferences is necessary in designing a socially
optimal mix of microcredit and income assistance.
7.3 Suggestions for Further Study
This study has employed theoretical analyses in explaining household time allocation to
microcredit. The analyses provide the basis for some empirical estimation. First, a number
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of factors that influence a household’s participation in a microcredit program have been
identified in this study. The factors include the financial and transaction costs of obtaining
the loans, the size of anticipated future loans, the household’s relative preference between
income and leisure, its wage in paid employment, its degree of risk aversion, and its rate of
time preference. Among households that are eligible for income assistance, the guaranteed
benefit, tax rate and duration of eligibility are also influential in determining whether or
not the household participates in the microcredit program. Each of these factors enters
into a participation equation which can be estimated using data from participants and
eligible nonparticipants of microcredit programs. The estimation will reveal the statistical
significance of each of these factors in influencing microcredit participation among eligible
households.
Second, the theoretical analyses have revealed that the parameters Πk and Πs are im-
portant to the household deciding on the use of microcredit, as well as to the policy
analyst interested in substituting microcredit for income assistance. While Πk refers to
the marginal returns to capital in the microenterprise, Πs denotes the marginal returns
to time in the microenterprise (i.e., the microenterprise wage rate). The actual values of
these parameters may be derived from empirical estimation of a microenterprise profit
equation using data from microenterpreneurs in the United States and Canada who may
be participants or nonparticipants in microcredit programs. Such analysis would also pro-
duce an estimate of the effect of microcredit on microenterprise profit. Further, the study
may be expanded to include data of households’ total incomes in order to estimate the
effect of microcredit on household incomes.
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